Keohane, Robert O., After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 46
Acharya, Amitav, The End of American World Order (Cambridge: Polity, 2014), p. 37
Nye, Joseph S., “Will the Liberal Order Survive? The History of an Idea,” Foreign Affairs
96, no. 1 (January/February 2017).
This term refers to the documented phenomenon of when the rapidly growing economy of a country stagnates after reaching a per capita income level of roughly $10,000 to $15,000 as it loses the initial advantages that had led to high growth, such as abundant cheap labor and high investment rates, to low-wage competitors.
Micklethwait, John and Wooldridge, Adrian, The Fourth Revolution: The Global Race to Reinvent the State (New York: Penguin Press, 2014).
He Yafei, “China's Role in Steering the Future of Globalisation,” Telegraph, May 10, 2017, www.telegraph.co.uk/news/world/china-watch/politics/role-in-steering-globalisation/; Zheng Bijian (former permanent Vice-President of the Central Party School), “China's ‘One Belt, One Road’ Plan Marks the Next Phase of Globalization,” Huffington Post, May 18, 2017, www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/china-one-belt-one-road_us_591c6b41e4b0ed14cddb4527.
The OBOR, also known as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), is a massive Chinese economic aid and investment program worth over a trillion U.S. dollars over the next decade. Launched by President Xi Jinping in 2013, it focuses on infrastructure development in Eurasia and beyond. China's motives behind the initiative are both economic (such as expanding markets for its surplus production capacity, new business for Chinese companies, and promoting the economic development of its western provinces), and strategic, especially enhancing Chinese influence in the region and the world. See Scott Cendrowski, “Inside China's Global Spending Spree,” Fortune, December 12, 2016, fortune.com/china-belt-road-investment/.
Amitav Acharya, “Emerging Powers Can Be Saviours of the Global Liberal Order,” Financial Times, January 18, 2017.
Acharya, End of American World Order. Interestingly, a recent essay in Foreign Affairs also argues for developing a “mixed order” to cope with a “pluralistic world.” See
Mazarr, Michael J., “The Once and Future Order: What Comes After Hegemony?” Foreign Affairs
96, no. 1 (January/February 2017).
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Human Development Report 2013. The Rise of the South: Human Progress in a Diverse World (New York: UNDP, 2013), p. 2
Ibid; Joakim Reiter, Deputy Secretary-General of United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), “UNCTAD and South-South Cooperation,” March 10, 2016.
ASEAN +3 refers to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations plus China, Japan, and South Korea.
On June 1, 2017, Trump announced the withdrawal of the United States from the Paris Agreement. However, far from signaling the collapse of the agreement, the reaction to U.S. withdrawal perfectly illustrates the dynamics of the multiplex world, where global cooperation on critical challenges does not necessarily rely on a leading power. No other country followed the United States; and at a meeting in Hamburg in July 2017, the other nineteen members of the G-20 reaffirmed their “strong commitment” to the Agreement, calling it “irreversible.” Trump’s decision paradoxically also prompted a wave of domestic support for the Agreement, including from U.S. businesses, states, and cities, which are especially crucial to climate action. See Oliver Milman, “G20 leaders’ statement on climate change highlights rift with US,” The Guardian, July 8, 2017, www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jul/08/g20-climate-change-leaders-statement-paris-agreement.
Slaughter, “The Return of Anarchy?”
For a detailed discussion and debate, see
Acharya, Amitav, ed., Why Govern? Rethinking Demand and Progress in Global Governance (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2016).
Pettersson, Therése and Wallensteen, Peter, “Armed conflicts, 1946–2014,” Journal of Peace Research
52, no. 4 (2015), p. 537
Global Terrorism Index 2016 (Sydney and New York: Institute for Economics and Peace, 2016), p.3
, economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2016.2.pdf. This data is derived from the Global Terrorism Database of the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), a Department of Homeland Security Center of Excellence at the University of Maryland.
These Latin American initiatives included the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace, attended by nineteen Latin American nations and held in Mexico City, February 21–March 8, 1945 (the Chapultepec Conference). Three years later, twenty Latin American and Caribbean countries as well as the United States signed the American Declaration of Rights and Duties of Man at Bogota, Colombia, in April 1948—seven months before the passage of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on December 10, 1948. See
Sikkink, Kathryn, “Human Rights,” in Why Govern, ed. Acharya, Amitav (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016) pp.125–133
. See also
Acharya., Amitav “‘Idea-Shift’: How Ideas from the Rest Are Reshaping Global Order,” Third World Quarterly
37, no. 7 (2016), pp. 1156–170; “Principles from the Periphery: The Neglected Southern Sources of Global Norms,” Global Governance
20, no. 3 (2014); and “The UN and the Global South, 1945 and 2015: Past As Prelude?” Third World Quarterly
37, no. 7 (2016).
Allison, Graham, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides's Trap? (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017). Although Allison popularized the phrase “Thucydides's Trap,” the underlying logic of the term reflects realist theories of international relations, especially “power transition” theory, which is precisely about how a rising power and a status-quo power might get into conflict.