Bull, Hedley, The Anarchical Society, 3rd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), pp. 4, 8, 16–21, 51. Many authors have adopted Bull's definition either verbatim or with some modification. One flaw is that Bull never clearly defined what he meant by “activity.” To give him the benefit of the doubt, I assume that his definition is a broad one that includes both behavior and interactions.
Weber, Max, Economy and Society (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 37–8. See also
Tang, Shiping, “Order: A Conceptual Analysis,” Chinese Political Science Review
1, no. 1 (2016), pp. 30–46
Weber, Economy and Society, pp. 29–36.
Tang, “Order: A Conceptual Analysis.” A conceptual analysis of order is not the same as assigning the proper label for the emerging order.
For details, see Tang, “Order: A Conceptual Analysis.”
With Trump now in the White House, we have even less reason to call the existing order a liberal one.
Mitter, Rana, A Bitter Revolution: China's Struggle with the Modern World (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).
Johnston, Alastair Iain, Social States: China in International Institutions, 1980–2000 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).
Xi Jinping, “China Has Been a Participant, Builder, Contributor, but also Beneficiary of the Existing International Order,” September 25, 2015, Xinhua News Agency, china.huanqiu.com/hot/2015-09/7647903.html.
“Xin Jinping Chairs Sessions of National Security Committee,” February 17, 2017, Xinhua News Agency, news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2017-02/17/c_1120486809.htm. The exact word in Chinese is “yin-dao,” which can be translated into “guide” and “channel,” but not exactly “lead.” One must wonder whether this word has been carefully chosen to test the waters.
Needless to say, this increase is statistically significant (p < 0.01). A more detailed “content analysis” of these discussions will be provided elsewhere. Here, I merely provide some snapshots.
“Tianxia/all-under-heaven” is a central notion within the traditional Chinese philosophy of governance and order. For our discussion here, its key implication is that the world (as a planet under the empyrean or within the cosmos) should live in more-or-less perfect harmony.
For the original notion of the “Chinese World Order,” see
Fairbank, John K., “A Preliminary Framework,” in Fairbank, John K., ed., The Chinese World Order (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968), pp. 1–23
. It is important to point out that the “Chinese World Order” should not be misleadingly simplified as the tributary system. See
Perdue, Peter C., “The Tenacious Tributary System,” Journal of Contemporary China
24, no. 96 (2015), pp. 1002–1014
Interestingly, the number of papers on East Asian order has not witnessed any significant change before and after 2008, unlike the number of papers on international world order.
Xi, “President Xi's Speech in Davos in Full.”
Proponents of forced regime change, if not most IR scholars, tend to conveniently ignore this fact.
Feigenbaum, Evan A., “China and the World: Dealing with a Reluctant Power,” Foreign Affairs
96, no. 1 (2017), pp. 33–40
Acharya, Amitav, The End of American World Order (Cambridge, U.K.: Polity Press, 2014); and
Buzan, Barry, “A World Order without Superpowers,” International Relations
25, no. 1 (2011), pp. 3–25
Acharya, The End of American World Order;
Ikenberry, G. John, Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011); and
Tang, Shiping, The Social Evolution of International Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
The term comes from
Morse, Julia C. and Keohane, Robert O., “Contested Multilateralism,” Review of International Organizations
9 (2014), pp. 385–412