2 Yet another approach to cybersecurity that contrasts with both national security and human-centric approaches is one that is focused around corporate security and the maximization of profits, with a company's intellectual property and the unfettered flow of financial information being the object of security. I outlined this paradigm of cybersecurity in a 2002 chapter entitled “Circuits of Power: Security in the Internet Environment,” in Rosenau, James and Singh, J. P., eds., Information Technologies and Global Politics: The Changing Scope of Power and Governance (Albany, N.Y.: SUNY Press, 2002), pp. 115–42.” For brevity, I focus here mostly on the contrast between national security and human-centric approaches.
3 Glasius, Marlies, “What Authoritarianism Is…and Is Not: A Practice Perspective,” International Affairs 94, no. 3 (2018), pp. 515–33.
4 Deibert, Ronald, Palfrey, John, Rohozinski, Rafal, and Zittrain, Jonathan, eds., Access Controlled: The Shaping of Power, Rights, and Rule in Cyberspace (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2010); and Deibert, Ronald J., “Authoritarianism Goes Global: Cyberspace Under Siege,” Journal of Democracy 26, no. 3 (2015), pp. 64–78.
5 Deudney, Daniel, Bounding Power: Republican Security Theory from the Polis to the Global Village (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2007).
6 For an overview of the concept of human security, see Paris, Roland, “Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?” International Security 26, no. 2 (2001), pp. 87–102.
9 For a complementary view, see Cavelty, Myriam Dunn, “Breaking the Cyber-Security Dilemma: Aligning Security Needs and Removing Vulnerabilities,” Science and Engineering Ethics 20, no. 3 (2014), pp. 701–715.
10 Reidenberg, Joel, “Governing Networks and Cyberspace Rule-Making,” Emory Law Journal 45, no. 3 (1996), p. 911.
12 Besson, Samantha, “Sovereignty, International Law and Democracy,” European Journal of International Law 22, no. 2 (2011), p. 373–87.
14 Deudney, Bounding Power.
15 Deibert, Ronald J., “Trajectories for Future Cybersecurity Research,” in Gheciu, Alexandra and Wohlforth, William C., eds., The Oxford Handbook of International Security (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018).
18 Chris Duckett, “Encryption Leaves Authorities ‘Not in a Good Place’: Former US Intelligence Chief,” ZDNet, June 7, 2017, www.zdnet.com/article/encryption-leaves-authorities-not-in-a-good-place-former-us-intelligence-chief/; and Don Reisinger, “James Comey on Apple and Google's Data Encryption: They ‘Drove Me Crazy,’” Fortune, April 16, 2018, fortune.com/2018/04/16/james-comey-apple-google-data-encryption/.
19 Fred Cate and Jon Eisenberg, “NAS Report: A New Light in the Debate over Government Access to Encrypted Content,” Lawfare (blog), February 15, 2018, www.lawfareblog.com/nas-report-new-light-debate-over-government-access-encrypted-content; and David Ruiz, “There Is No Middle Ground on Encryption,” Electronic Frontier Foundation, May 2, 2018, www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/05/there-no-middle-ground-encryption.
21 Deibert, Ronald, Palfrey, John, Rohozinski, Rafal, and Zittrain, Jonathan, eds., Access Denied: The Practice and Policy of Global Internet Filtering (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2008).
26 For an elaboration of these themes with respect to private contracting of cybersecurity, see Eichensehr, Kristen, “Public-Private Cybersecurity,” Texas Law Review 95, no. 3 (2017), pp. 467–538; UCLA School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 16-47, ssrn.com/abstract=2847173.
31 That the university will remain a free space for such inquiries is hardly guaranteed, as both commercial and national security interests continuously present threats to academic freedom, and these are, arguably, growing.