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The OMT Judgment of the German Federal Constitutional Court

Repositioning the Court within the European Constitutional Architecture

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 May 2017

Mehrdad Payandeh
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Type
Case Notes
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European Constitutional Law Review , Volume 13 , Issue 2 , June 2017 , pp. 400 - 416
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Copyright © The Authors 2017 

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Footnotes

*

Professor of International Law, European Law and Public Law at Bucerius Law School in Hamburg.

References

1 FCC, Judgment of 21 June 2016, Case 2 BvR 2728/13. The Court has not provided an English translation of the judgment, but only of the press release summarising the decision, see <www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/EN/2016/bvg16-034.html>, visited 23 March 2017.

2 FCC, Order of 14 January 2014, Case 2 BvR 2728/13.

3 ECJ 16 June 2015, Case C-62/14, Gauweiler et al. v Deutscher Bundestag. In previous proceedings, the General Court had held challenges against the Outright Monetary Transactions program brought through a direct action of annulment to be inadmissible, see EGC 10 December 2013, Case T-492/12, von Storch et al. v ECB. The ECJ dismissed the appeal against this decision as manifestly unfounded, see ECJ 29 April 2015, Case C-64/14 P, von Storch et al. v ECB.

4 FCC, Order of 29 May 1974, Case BvL 52/71.

5 FCC, Order of 22 October 1986, Case 2 BvR 197/83.

6 For an overview see Sauer, H., Staatsrecht III, 4th edn. (C.H. Beck 2016) p. 176-228 Google Scholar.

7 FCC, Judgment of 7 September 2011, Case 2 BvR 987/10; on this decision see, e.g., von Ungern-Sternberg, A., ‘Parliaments – Fig Leaf or Heartbeat of Democracy? German Federal Constitutional Court Judgment of 7 September 2011 – Euro Rescue Package’, 8 EuConst (2012) p. 304 Google Scholar.

8 FCC, Judgment of 12 September 2012, Case 2 BvR 1390/12 et al.; on this decision see, e.g., Wendel, M. ‘Judicial Restraint and the Return to Openness: The Decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court on the ESM and the Fiscal Treaty of 12 September 2012’, 14 German Law Journal (2013) p. 21 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

9 FCC, Judgment of 18 March 2014, Case 2 BvE 6/12 et al.

10 Speech by Draghi, Mario, President of the European Central Bank at the Global Investment Conference in London, 26 July 2012, <www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2012/html/sp120726.en.html>, visited 23 March 2017,+visited+23+March+2017>Google Scholar.

11 Press Conference of the European Central Bank, Frankfurt am Main, 2 August 2012, <www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2012/html/is120802.en.html>, visited 23 March 2017,+visited+23+March+2017>Google Scholar.

12 Minutes of the 340th meeting of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank, 5 and 6 September 2012, cited after FCC, Order of 14 January 2014, Case 2 BvR 2728/13, para. 2; Press Release of the European Central Bank, 6 September 2012, Technical features of Outright Monetary Transactions, <www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2012/html/pr120906_1.en.html>, visited 23 March 2017.

13 See ECJ 16 June 2015, Case C-62/14, Gauweiler et al. v Deutscher Bundestag, para. 79; Gerner-Beuerle, C. et al., ‘Law Meets Economics in the German Federal Constitutional Court: Outright Monetary Transactions on Trial’, 15 German Law Journal (2014) p. 281 at p. 282CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

14 See, e.g., Forkel, H.-W., ‘Euro-Rettung, Demokratie und Rechtsstaat, Zur Frage des Rechtsschutzes für jedermann gegen die Geldpolitik der EZB’, 8 Zeitschrift für Rechtspolitik (2012) p. 240 Google Scholar.

15 See Arts. 119, 123, 127 TFEU; Arts. 17-24 Protocol on the European System of Central Banks and the European Central Bank.

16 FCC, Order of 14 January 2014, Case 2 BvR 2728/13, para. 5; FCC, Judgment of 21 June 2016, Case 2 BvR 2728/13, paras. 10-42.

17 FCC, Order of 14 January 2014, Case 2 BvR 2728/13, para. 1.

18 This aspect is criticised by the Dissenting Opinion of Justice Lübbe-Wolff on the Order of 14 January 2014, Case 2 BvR 2728/13, para. 2.

19 See FCC, Order of 14 January 2014, Case 2 BvR 2728/13, paras. 44-49; for a harsh critique in this regard see Heun, W., ‘Eine verfassungswidrige Verfassungsgerichtsentscheidung – der Vorlagebeschluss des BVerfG vom 14. 1. 2014’, Juristenzeitung (2014) p. 331 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; for a more nuanced view see Wendel, M., ‘Exceeding Judicial Competence in the Name of Democracy: The German Federal Constitutional Court’s OMT Reference’, 10 EuConst (2014) p. 263 Google Scholar.

20 FCC, Order of 14 January 2014, Case 2 BvR 2728/13, paras. 36-43.

21 Cf. paras. 63-83.

22 Cf. paras. 84-94.

23 Cf. paras. 99-100.

24 Cf. paras. 27, 39, 55.

25 For extensive discussion of the decision see, e.g., 15 German Law Journal (2014) p. 107-382 Google Scholar.

26 ECJ 16 June 2015, Case C-62/14, Gauweiler et al. v Deutscher Bundestag; see on this Hinarejos, A., ‘Gauweiler and the Outright Monetary Transactions Programme: The Mandate of the European Central Bank and the Changing Nature of Economic and Monetary Union’, 11 EuConst (2015) p. 563 Google Scholar; for a more sceptical view, see Nettesheim, M., ‘Europarechtskonformität des Europäischen Stabilitätsmechanismus’, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (2013) p. 14 Google Scholar.

27 Cf. para. 16.

28 Cf. paras. 33-92.

29 Cf. paras. 93-127.

30 Cf. para. 42.

31 Cf. para. 43.

32 Cf. paras. 47-50.

33 Cf. paras. 51-52.

34 Cf. para. 55.

35 Cf. paras. 57-65.

36 Cf. para. 66.

37 Cf. paras. 68-75.

38 Cf. paras. 94-96.

39 Cf. paras. 97-102.

40 Cf. paras. 105-127.

41 See, e.g., Fabbrini, F., ‘After the OMT Case: The Supremacy of EU Law as the Guarantee of the Equality of the Member States’, 16 German Law Journal (2015) p. 1003 at p. 1012-1013CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

42 See, e.g., Simon, S., ‘Direct Cooperation Has Begun: Some Remarks on the Judgment of the ECJ on the OMT Decision of the ECB in Response to the German Federal Constitutional Court’s First Request for a Preliminary Ruling’, 16 German Law Journal (2015) p. 1025 at p. 1046-1048Google Scholar.

43 FCC, Judgment of 21 June 2016, Case 2 BvR 2728/13, paras. 95-100.

44 FCC, Judgment of 12 October 1993, Case 2 BvR 2134/92, para. 70.

45 See FCC, Order of 27 April 2010, Case 2 BvR 1848/07, paras. 13-15; Sauer, supra n. 6, p. 221.

46 FCC, Judgment of 21 June 2016, Case 2 BvR 2728/13, para. 81. The Court thereby follows and extends an approach it had already proclaimed in its Maastricht (FCC, Judgment of 12 October 1993, Case 2 BvR 2134/92) and Lisbon (FCC, Judgment of 30 June 2009, Case 2 BvE 2/08) decisions.

47 See Art. 23(1) sentences 2 and 3 and Art. 79(2) of the German Constitution. Such a law regularly requires a majority of two thirds of the Members of the Federal Parliament and two thirds of the votes of the Federal Council.

48 FCC, Judgment of 21 June 2016, Case 2 BvR 2728/13, para. 81.

49 Cf. paras. 83-88.

50 Cf. para. 86.

51 Cf. paras. 105-113.

52 Cf. paras. 136-142.

53 Cf. paras. 143-152.

54 FCC, Order of 6 July 2010, Case 2 BvR 2661/06.

55 Cf. para. 61.

56 FCC, Judgment of 21 June 2016, Case 2 BvR 2728/13, paras. 154-157.

57 Cf. paras. 159-161.

58 Cf. paras. 181-189.

59 Cf. para. 189.

60 Cf. paras. 190-196.

61 Cf. paras. 197-204.

62 Cf. para. 205.

63 Cf. paras. 206-219.

64 See, e.g., Simon, , supra n. 42, p. 1029 Google Scholar.

65 See, e.g., Sauer, H., ‘Doubtful it Stood...: Competence and Power in European Monetary and Constitutional Law in the Aftermath of the CJEU’s OMT Judgment’, 16 German Law Journal (2015) p. 971 at p. 979-980Google Scholar; Bast, J., ‘Don’t Act Beyond Your Powers: The Perils and Pitfalls of the German Constitutional Court’s Ultra Vires Review’, 15 German Law Journal (2014) p. 167 at p. 177CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Wendel, , supra n. 19, p. 263 Google Scholar.

66 FCC, Order of 6 July 2010, Case 2 BvR 2661/06, para. 61.

67 See Dissenting Opinion of Justice Gerhardt on the Order of 14 January 2014, Case 2 BvR 2728/13, para. 17.

68 FCC, Judgment of 21 June 2016, Case 2 BvR 2728/13, para. 149.

69 Cf. FCC, Judgment of 21 June 2016, Case 2 BvR 2728/13, para. 150.

70 See Classen, C.D., ‘Europäische Rechtsgemeinschaft á l’allemande?’, 5 Europarecht (2016) p. 529 at p. 539CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

71 FCC, Judgment of 21 June 2016, Case 2 BvR 2728/13, paras. 197-204.

72 Cf. para. 205.

73 Cf. paras. 205-209.

74 Cf. paras. 162-173 and paras. 210-220.

75 See Dissenting Opinion of Justice Lübbe-Wolff on the Order of 14 January 2014, Case 2 BvR 2728/13, para. 5 ff; Dissenting Opinion of Justice Gerhardt on the Order of 14 January 2014, Case 2 BvR 2728/13, para. 2; Mayer, F.C.,’Rebels Without a Cause? A Critical Analysis of the German Constitutional Court’s OMT Reference’, 15 German Law Journal (2014) p. 111 at p. 139Google Scholar; for a less critical view in this regard see, e.g., Kahl, W., ‘Bewältigung der Staatsschuldenkrise unter Kontrolle des Bundesverfassungsgerichts – ein Lehrstück zur horizontalen und vertikalen Gewaltenteilung’, Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt (2013) p. 197 Google Scholar.

76 FCC, Judgment of 21 June 2016, Case 2 BvR 2728/13, para. 171.

77 See Dissenting Opinion of Justice Gerhardt on the Order of 14 January 2014, Case 2 BvR 2728/13, para. 5 ff.

78 See Classen, supra n. 70, p. 531.

79 FCC, Judgment of 21 June 2016, Case 2 BvR 2728/13, para. 153.

80 Cf. para. 140; see on this Claes, M. and Reestman, J.-H., ‘The Protection of National Constitutional Identity and the Limits of European Integration at the Occasion of the Gauweiler Case’, 16 German Law Journal (2015) p. 917 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

81 See on this von Bogdandy, A. and Schill, S., ‘Overcoming Absolute Primacy: Respect for National Identity under the Lisbon Treaty’, 48 Common Market Law Review (2011) p. 1417 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

82 See Mayer, supra n. 75, p. 496-499.

83 FCC, Judgment of 21 June 2016, Case 2 BvR 2728/13, para. 142; for a critique of this form of ‘comparative constitutionalism’ see Classen, supra n. 70, p. 533-534.

84 This has also been pointed out already by Classen, supra n. 70, p. 541.

85 FCC, Judgment of 21 June 2016, Case 2 BvR 2728/13, para. 199 and para. 206.

86 ECJ 16 June 2015, Case C-62/14, Gauweiler et al. v Deutscher Bundestag, paras. 177-178.

87 For an attempt to find patterns and stages in the development of the jurisprudence see M. Payandeh, ‘Constitutional Review of EU Law after Honeywell: Contextualizing the Relationship between the German Constitutional Court and the EU Court of Justice’, 48 Common Market Law Review (2011) p. 9 at p. 27-32.

88 See Schönberger, C., ’Die Europäische Union zwischen “Demokratiedefizit” und Bundesstaatsverbot’, 48 Der Staat (2009) p. 535 at p. 537-538CrossRefGoogle Scholar.