(1) The right to development is recognized in the African Charter of Human and Political Rights, 1985 and in a Declaration of the United Nations General Assembly of December, 1986. The right to a clean environment is also recognized in the African Charter. The right to peace is recognized in a 1984 Declaration of the General Assembly.

(2) See, for example, Alston, Philip, A third generation of solidarity rights: progressive development or obfuscation of International Human Rights Law ?, Netherland International Law Review, XXIX (1987), 307Google Scholar ; also Brownlie, Ian, The rights of peoples in modern international law, Bulletin of the Australian Society of Legal Philosophy, IX (1985), 104.Google Scholar

(3) Marx, Karl, On the Jewish question, in McLelland, David (ed.), Karl Marx: selected writings (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1977), pp. 52–53.Google Scholar

(4) Ibid. p. 51. I have discussed this at length in Chapter Six of my book Nonsense Upon Stilts: Bentham, Burke and Marx on the Rights of Man (London, Methuen, 1987).Google Scholar

(5) Ibid. pp. 46 and 54–5.

(6) Karl Marx, Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, in McLellan, op. cit. p. 33. I have been unable to track down the source of the Arendt reference.

(7) Hare, R.M., Freedom and Reason (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1963), Chapters 8–9.Google Scholar

(8) For example, the theory considered rejected by Moore, G.E. in Principia Ethica (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1903), Chapter 6.Google Scholar

(9) MacCormick, Neil, Rights in legistion in Hacker, P. M. S. and Raz, J. (eds), Law, Morality and Society (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1977), pp. 204–205.Google Scholar

(10) MacCormick, Neil, Legal Right and Social Democracy (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1982), p. 143.Google Scholar

(11) Raz, Joseph, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 198.Google Scholar

(12) Ibid. p. 199.

(13) Raz, Joseph, Right-based moralities, in Waldron, J. (ed.), Theories of Rights (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 183.Google Scholar

(14) Reaume, Denise, Individuals, groups and rights to public goods (unpublished paper presented to Centre for Criminology and the Social and Philosophical Study of LawEdinburgh1985) pp. 5–6. I am indebted also to Reaume for some formulations in the previous paragraph.Google Scholar

(15) Raz, Morality of Freedom, op. cit. p. 202.

(16) Reaume, op. cit. pp. 6 ff.

(17) The cases usually cited here include Ricket v. Metropolitan Rly Co (1865) 5 B & S 156, and Blundy Clarke and Co Ltd v. London and North East Rly Co [1931] 2 KB 334.

(18) For recent discussions, see, e.g., Chambers, J., Class action litigation—Representing divergent interests of class members, University of Dayton Law Review, IV (1979)Google Scholar; and Yeazell, S.C., From group litigation to class actions, UCLA Law Review, XXVII (1980).Google Scholar

(19) H.L.A. Hart, Are there any natural rights, in Waldron, Theories of Rights, op. cit. For Hart's repudiation of this view, see Hart, H.L.A., Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1983), p. 17CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See, generally, Waldron, Critical notice of Hart's Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy, Mind, XCIV (1985), pp. 291–293.Google Scholar

(20) Hume, David, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. Selby-Bigge, L.A. (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1888)Google Scholar, Book I, Part 4, section 6; see also Parfit, Derek, Reasons and Persons (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1983).Google Scholar

(21) See Dworkin, Ronald, Taking Rights Seriously (Revised Edition : London, Duckworth, 1978), p. 91 n.Google Scholar

(22) See H.L.A. Hart, Definition and theory in jurisprudence, in his Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy, op. cit. pp. 26 ff

(23) I am grateful to Steven Lukes for this point.

(24) Dworkin, op. cit. p. 194.

(25) Ibid., p. ix. See also Ronald Dworkin, Rights as trumps, in Waldron, Theories of Rights, op. cit.

(26) Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, op. cit. p. 277.

(27) This approach is rejected by Dworkin in Rights as trumps, op. cit. pp. 164–5.

(28) Though Dworkin wants at least to leave open the possibility that there may be some rights which can be justified relative to all goals, and which may therefore be regarded as ‘natural’ or ‘human’ rights: see Taking Rights Seriously, op. cit. p. 365, and Rights as trumps, op. cit. p. 165.

(29) Hart, Are there any natural rights, op. cit.

(30) Raz, Morality of Freedom, passim.

(31) See Laslett, Peter, Introduction to Philosophy, Politics and Society, First Series (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1956), p. viiGoogle Scholar: ‘It is one of the assumptions of intellectual life in our country that there should be amongst us men whom we think of as political philosophers […]’.

* This paper was presented at a conference on ‘Economic Development, Peace, and the Environment as Human Rights’ organized by the Oxford Human Rights Institute at the Maison Française, Oxford, May 29–31, 1987. I am grateful to the organizers and to the University of Edinburgh for their support, and to my discussants, Steven Lukes and Joseph Raz, for their comments. Earlier versions were read at seminars and conferences in York, Toronto, Auckland, and Dunedin. I am grateful to all the participants, but particularly Gregory Currie, Robert Durrant, Robert Goodin, Leslie Green, Desmond King, Jennifer Nedelsky, Denise Reaume, Kim Scheppele, John Skorupski, Robert Sugden, Christine Swanton, and Gwen Taylor for their helpful comments and criticisms.