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Dictatorial Institutions and their Impact on Economic Growth*

  • Jennifer Gandhi (a1)
Abstract
Abstract

Non-democratic regimes vary in the degree to which domestic groups threaten their rule and the extent to which they need the cooperation of these groups. To both neutralize threats to their rule and solicit cooperation, some dictators coopt potential domestic opposition by providing rents and policy concessions within nominally-democratic institutions, such as legislatures and political parties. These institutions, designed as instruments of cooptation, facilitate cooperation between the regime and outside groups which promotes economic growth.

Résumé

Les régimes dictatoriaux varient notamment selon la menace que des groupes d'opposants peuvent représenter et selon leur besoin de coopération de la part de la population. À ces deux fins, certaines dictatures font des concessions aux institutions démocratiques de façade maintenues : parlement et partis politiques. La croissance économique s'en trouve favorisée par rapport aux autres régimes dictatoriaux plus durs.

Zuzammenfassung

Diktaturen unterscheiden sich, je nachdem ob Regimegegner eine Bedrohung darstellen und ob die Mitarbeit einheimischer Bevölkerungsgruppen notwendig ist. Unter diesem Druck können z.B. Parlamente und Parteien entstehen, selbst wenn es sich um demokratische Scheininstitutionen handelt. Die Zusammenarbeit zwischen Regime und Randgruppen führt anders als bei härteren Diktaturen zu einem wirtschaftlichen Wachstum.

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References
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European Journal of Sociology / Archives Européennes de Sociologie
  • ISSN: 0003-9756
  • EISSN: 1474-0583
  • URL: /core/journals/european-journal-of-sociology-archives-europeennes-de-sociologie
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