Skip to main content
    • Aa
    • Aa

Dictatorial Institutions and their Impact on Economic Growth*

  • Jennifer Gandhi (a1)

Non-democratic regimes vary in the degree to which domestic groups threaten their rule and the extent to which they need the cooperation of these groups. To both neutralize threats to their rule and solicit cooperation, some dictators coopt potential domestic opposition by providing rents and policy concessions within nominally-democratic institutions, such as legislatures and political parties. These institutions, designed as instruments of cooptation, facilitate cooperation between the regime and outside groups which promotes economic growth.


Les régimes dictatoriaux varient notamment selon la menace que des groupes d'opposants peuvent représenter et selon leur besoin de coopération de la part de la population. À ces deux fins, certaines dictatures font des concessions aux institutions démocratiques de façade maintenues : parlement et partis politiques. La croissance économique s'en trouve favorisée par rapport aux autres régimes dictatoriaux plus durs.


Diktaturen unterscheiden sich, je nachdem ob Regimegegner eine Bedrohung darstellen und ob die Mitarbeit einheimischer Bevölkerungsgruppen notwendig ist. Unter diesem Druck können z.B. Parlamente und Parteien entstehen, selbst wenn es sich um demokratische Scheininstitutionen handelt. Die Zusammenarbeit zwischen Regime und Randgruppen führt anders als bei härteren Diktaturen zu einem wirtschaftlichen Wachstum.

Linked references
Hide All

This list contains references from the content that can be linked to their source. For a full set of references and notes please see the PDF or HTML where available.

John Aldrich , 1995. Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in America (Chicago, University of Chicago Press).

Janine Aron , 2000. “Growth and Institutions: A Review of the Evidence”, World Bank Research Observer, 15 (1), pp. 99-135.

Larry Diamond , 2002. “Thinking About Hybrid Regimes”, Journal of Democracy, 13, 2, pp. 21-35.

Peter Evans , 1989. “Predatory, Developmental, and other Apparatuses: A Comparative Analysis of the Third World State”, Sociological Forum, 4 (4), pp. 561-82.

Jennifer Gandhi and Adam Przeworski , 2006. “Cooperation, Cooptation, and Rebellion under Dictatorships”, Economics and Politics,18 (1), pp. 1-26.

Jennifer Gandhi and Adam Przeworski , 2007. “Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats”, Comparative Political Studies, 40 (11), pp. 1279-1301.

Barbara Geddes , 1999. “What do We Know About Democratization After Twenty Years?”, Annual Review of Political Science, 2, pp. 115-144.

James Heckman , 1979. “Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error”, Econometrica, 47, pp. 153-161.

Anita Isaacs , 1993. Military Rule and Transition in Ecuador, 1972-92. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Stathis Kalyvas , 1999. “The Decay and Breakdown of Communist One-Party Systems”, Annual Review of Political Science, 2, pp. 323-343.

Gary King and Langche Zeng , 2007. “When Can History Be Our Guide? The Pitfalls of Counterfactual Inference”, International Studies Quarterly, 51 (1), pp. 183-210.

Brian Lai and Dan Slater , 2006. “Institutions of the Offensive: Domestic Sources of Dispute Initiation in Authoritarian Regimes, 1950-1992”, American Journal of Political Science, 50 (1), pp. 113-126

Paolo Mauro , 1995. “Corruption and Growth”, Quarterly Journal of Economics (August), pp. 681-712.

Terry Moe , 1990. “Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story”, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 6, pp. 213-253.

Kevin Neuhouser , 1996. “Limits on Authoritarian Imposition of Policy: Failed Ecuadoran Military Populism in Comparative Perspective”, Comparative Political Studies, 29 (6), pp. 635-659.

Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi , 1993. “Political Regimes and Economic Growth”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 7 (3), pp. 51-69.

Robert Summers and Alan Heston , 1991. The Penn World Table (Mark 5): An Expanded Set of International Comparisons 1950-1988, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106 (2), pp. 327-368.

Recommend this journal

Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this journal to your organisation's collection.

European Journal of Sociology / Archives Européennes de Sociologie
  • ISSN: 0003-9756
  • EISSN: 1474-0583
  • URL: /core/journals/european-journal-of-sociology-archives-europeennes-de-sociologie
Please enter your name
Please enter a valid email address
Who would you like to send this to? *


Altmetric attention score

Full text views

Total number of HTML views: 11
Total number of PDF views: 85 *
Loading metrics...

Abstract views

Total abstract views: 249 *
Loading metrics...

* Views captured on Cambridge Core between September 2016 - 27th June 2017. This data will be updated every 24 hours.