Hostname: page-component-8448b6f56d-c47g7 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-23T07:05:53.661Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

The good, the loyal or the active? MPs’ parliamentary performance and the achievement of static and progressive career ambitions in parliament

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 August 2022

Richard Schobess Open the ORCID record for Richard Schobess [Opens in a new window]  and
Benjamin de Vet
Richard Schobess*
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, GASPAR, Ghent University, Ghent, Belgium
Benjamin de Vet
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, GASPAR, Ghent University, Ghent, Belgium
*
*E-mail: richard.schobess@googlemail.com
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Although often theorized, empirical research on the relationship between MPs’ parliamentary behaviour and their chances to realize career ambitions is relatively scarce. This article holistically analyses the effect of MPs’ (1) party loyalty, (2) activity level and (3) the quality of their parliamentary work on MPs’ prospects for re-election and their promotion to higher parliamentary office. Based on a unique combination of behavioural and peer assessment data on 325 federal and regional MPs in Belgium (2014–2019), we find that particularly MPs’ loyalty and activity level improve their career prospects in the subsequent term, in contrast to more qualitative aspects of their parliamentary work. These findings provide important new insights into how and to what degree legislators are rewarded for their parliamentary performance.

Keywords

career advancementparliamentary activityparliamentary performanceparty loyaltyre-election
Type
Research Article
Information
European Political Science Review , Volume 14 , Issue 4 , November 2022 , pp. 600 - 617
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of European Consortium for Political Research

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

André, A., Depauw, S., Shugart, M.S. and Chytilek, R. (2017), ‘Party nomination strategies in flexible-list systems: do preference votes matter?’, Party Politics 23(5): 589–600.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bailer, S. (2017), ‘To use the whip or not: whether and when party group leaders use disciplinary measures to achieve voting unity’, International Political Science Review 39(2): 163–177. doi: 10.117/0192512116676907 Google Scholar
Becher, M. and Sieberer, U. (2008), ‘Discipline, electoral rules and defection in the Bundestag, 1983–94’, German Politics 17(3): 293–304.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Borghetto, E. and Lisi, M. (2018), ‘Productivity and reselection in a party-based environment: evidence from the Portuguese case’, Parliamentary Affairs 71(4): 868–887.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bouteca, N., Smulders, J., Maddens, B., Devos, C. and Wauters, B. (2019), ‘‘A Fair Day’s Wage for a Fair Day’s Work’? Exploring the connection between the parliamentary work of MPs and their electoral support’, The Journal of Legislative Studies 25(1): 44−65. doi: 10.1080/13572334.2019.1570602 Google Scholar
Bowler, S. (2010), ‘Private members’ bills in the UK parliament: is there an ‘electoral connection’?’, The Journal of Legislative Studies 16(4): 476–494.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bräuninger, T., Brunner, M. and Däubler, T. (2012), ‘Personal vote-seeking in flexible list systems: how electoral incentives shape Belgian MPs’ bill initiation behaviour’, European Journal of Political Research 51(5): 607–645.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Carey, J.M. (2007), ‘Competing principals, political institutions, and party unity in legislative voting’, American Journal of Political Science 51(1): 92–107.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Carey, J.M. and Shugart, M.S. (1995), ‘Incentives to cultivate a personal vote: a rank ordering of electoral formulas’, Electoral Studies 14(4): 417–439.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Carroll, R., Cox, G.W. and Pachón, M. (2006), ‘How parties create electoral democracy, chapter 2’, Legislative Studies Quarterly 31(2): 153–174.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cox, G.W. and McCubbins, M.D. (1993), Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House, Berkeley: University of California Press.Google Scholar
Crisp, B.F., Olivella, S., Malecki, M. and Sher, M. (2013), ‘Vote-earning strategies in flexible list systems: seats at the price of unity’, Electoral Studies 32(4): 658−669. doi: 10.1016/j.electstud.2013.02.007 CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cucchi, S. and Cavazza, N. (2021), ‘More guilty if woman: the role of gender and causal attribution in political scandals’ impact’, The Journal of Social Psychology 161(2): 173−181. doi: 10.1080/00224545.2020.1779641 CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Däubler, T., Bräuninger, T. and Brunner, M. (2016), ‘Is personal vote-seeking behavior effective?’, Legislative Studies Quarterly 41(2): 419–444.10.1111/lsq.12119CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Däubler, T., Christensen, L. and Linek, L. (2018), ‘Parliamentary activity, re-selection and the personal vote. Evidence from flexible-list systems’, Parliamentary Affairs 71(4): 930–949.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
de Vet, B. (2019), Between Party and Parliament: The Roles of Parliamentary Party Group Leaders in Partitocratic Belgium, Ghent: Ghent University.Google Scholar
De Winter, L. (2005), ‘Belgium: empowering voters or party elites?’, in Gallagher, M. and Mitchell, P. (eds.), The Politics of Electoral Systems, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 417–432.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
De Winter, L. and Dumont, P. (2006), ‘Do Belgian parties undermine the democratic chain of delegation?’, West European Politics 29(5): 957–976.Google Scholar
Depauw, S. and Martin, S. (2008), ‘Legislative party discipline and cohesion in comparative perspective’, in Giannetti, D. and Benoit, K. (Eds.), Intra-Party Politics and Coalition Governments, London: Routledge, pp. 119–136.Google Scholar
Dockendorff, A. (2019), ‘Who is ready to climb the hill? The effect of legislative activity on promotion to higher offices in Chile’, The Journal of Legislative Studies 25(2): 169–187.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dubin, J.A. and Rivers, D. (1989), ‘Selection bias in linear regression, logit and probit models’, Sociological Methods & Research 18(2–3): 360–390.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dumont, P., Fiers, S. and Dandoy, R. (2008), ‘Ups and downs of ministerial careers in a partitocratic federal state’, in Dowding, K. and Dumont, P. (Eds.), The Selection of Ministers in Europe: Hiring and Firing, London: Routledge, pp. 125–146.Google Scholar
Fenno, R.F. (1978), Home Style: House Members in Their Districts, Boston: Little Brown and Co.Google Scholar
Ferejohn, J. (1986), ‘Incumbent performance and electoral control’, Public Choice 50(1): 5–25. doi: 10.1007/BF00124924 CrossRefGoogle Scholar
François, A. and Navarro, J. (2019), ‘Voters reward hard-working MPs: empirical evidence from the French legislative elections’, European Political Science Review: 11(4): 469–483.Google Scholar
Frech, E., Goet, N.D. and Hug, S. (2020), ‘Shirking and slacking in parliament’, Legislative Studies Quarterly. doi: 10.1111/lsq.12288 Google Scholar
Gouglas, A., Maddens, B. and Brans, M. (2018), ‘Determinants of legislative turnover in Western Europe, 1945–2015’, European Journal of Political Research 57(3): 637–661.Google Scholar
Heckman, J. (1974), ‘Shadow prices, market wages, and labor supply’, Econometrica 42(4): 679–694. doi: 10.2307/1913937 CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Heckman, J. (1979), ‘Sample selection bias as a specification error’, Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society 47(1): 153–161.Google Scholar
Hermansen, S.S.L. (2016), ‘Striving for influence’, Party Politics 24(4): 382–396. doi: 10.1177/1354068816663036 CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Herrick, R. and Moore, M.K. (1993), ‘Political ambition’s effect on legislative behavior: schlesinger’s typology reconsidered and revisited’, The Journal of Politics 55(3): 765–776.Google Scholar
Hibbing, J.R. (1986), ‘Ambition in the house: behavioral consequences of higher office goals among US representatives’, American Journal of Political Science 30(3): 651–665.10.2307/2111094CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Høyland, B., Hobolt, S.B. and Hix, S. (2019), ‘Career ambitions and legislative participation: the moderating effect of electoral institutions’, British Journal of Political Science 49(2): 491–512.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jenny, M. and Müller, W.C. (2012), ‘Parliamentary roles of MPs in sharp and soft focus. Interviews and behavioral records compared’, in Blomgren, M. and Rozenberg, O. (Eds.), Parliamentary Roles in Modern Legislatures, London: Routledge: pp. 145–161.Google Scholar
Laver, M. and Shepsle, K.A. (1999), ‘How political parties emerged from the primeval slime: party cohesion, party discipline, and the formation of governments’, in Bowler, S., Farrell, D.M. and Katz, R.S. (Eds.), Party Discipline and Parliamentary Government, Columbus: Ohio State University, pp. 23–48.Google Scholar
Louwerse, T. and Otjes, S. (2016), ‘Personalised parliamentary behaviour without electoral incentives: the case of the Netherlands’, West European Politics 39(4): 778–799.10.1080/01402382.2015.1111041CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Louwerse, T. and Van Vonno, C. (2021), ‘Moving up or down: parliamentary activity and candidate selection’, The Journal of Legislative Studies 28(2): 216–242.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Martin, S. (2010), ‘Electoral rewards for personal vote cultivation under PR-STV’, West European Politics 33(2): 369–380.10.1080/01402380903539003CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Martin, S. (2014), ‘Why electoral systems don’t always matter: the impact of ‘mega-seats’ on legislative behaviour in Ireland’, Party Politics 20(3): 467–479.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Martin, S., Saalfeld, T. and Strøm, K. (2014), ‘Introduction’, in Martin, S., Saalfeld, T. and Strøm, K. (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Legislative Studies, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 1–28.Google Scholar
Mayhew, D.R. (1974), Congress: The Electoral Connection, New Haven: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
Meserve, S.A., Pemstein, D. and Bernhard, W.T. (2009), ‘Political ambition and legislative behavior in the European Parliament’, The Journal of Politics 71(3): 1015–1032.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Miquel, G.P.I. and Snyder, J.M. Jr (2006), ‘Legislative effectiveness and legislative careers’, Legislative Studies Quarterly 31(3): 347–381.Google Scholar
Mondak, J.J. (1995), ‘Competence, integrity, and the electoral success of congressional incumbents’, The Journal of Politics 57(4): 1043–1069.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Müller, W.C. (2000), ‘Political parties in parliamentary democracies: making delegation and accountability work’, European Journal of Political Research 37: 309–333.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Papp, Z. (2019), ‘Same species, different breed: the conditional effect of legislator activities in parliament on re-selection in a mixed-member electoral system’, Parliamentary Affairs 72(1): 59–75.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Plummer, M. (2003), JAGS: A Program for Analysis of Bayesian Graphical Models using Gibbs Sampling. Paper presented at the Proceedings of the 3rd international workshop on distributed statistical computing.Google Scholar
Put, G.-J., Smulders, J. and Maddens, B. (2021), ‘Party nomination strategies in flexible-list systems: do preference votes matter for realistic list positions?’, Party Politics 27(2): 376−382. doi: 10.1177/1354068819858590 CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Saalfeld, T. and Strøm, K. (2014), ‘Political parties and legislators’, in Martin, S., Saalfeld, T. and Strøm, K. (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Legislative Studies, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 371–398.Google Scholar
Schlesinger, J.A. (1966), Ambition and Politics: Political Careers in the United States, Chicago: Rand McNally.Google Scholar
Schobess, R. (2021), ‘Behind the scenes: what is parliamentary performance and how can we measure it?’, Parliamentary Affairs. doi: 10.1093/pa/gsab024 Google Scholar
Searing, D. (1994), Westminster’s World: Understanding Political Roles, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Shepsle, K.A. (1988), ‘Representation and governance: the great legislative trade-off’, Political Science Quarterly 103(3): 461–484. doi: 10.2307/2150759 CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sieberer, U. (2010), ‘Behavioral consequences of mixed electoral systems: deviating voting behavior of district and list MPs in the German Bundestag’, Electoral Studies 29(3): 484–496.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stone, W.J., Maisel, L.S. and Maestas, C.D. (2004), ‘Quality counts: extending the strategic politician model of incumbent deterrence’, American Journal of Political Science 48(3): 479–495.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Strøm, K. (1997), ‘Rules, reasons and routines: legislative roles in parliamentary democracies’, in Müller, W.C. and Saalfeld, T. (Eds.), Members of Parliament in Western Europe. Roles and Behavior, London: Frank Cass, pp. 155–174.Google Scholar
Tavits, M. (2009), ‘The making of mavericks: local loyalties and party defection’, Comparative Political Studies 42(6): 793–815.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Timpone, R.J. (1998), ‘Structure, behavior, and voter turnout in the United States’, American Political Science Review 92(1): 145–158.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Treib, O. and Schlipphak, B. (2019), ‘Who gets committee leadership positions in the European Parliament? Evidence from the 2014 selection process’, European Union Politics 20(2): 219–238.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Vivyan, N. and Wagner, M. (2012), ‘Do voters reward rebellion? The electoral accountability of MPs in Britain’, European Journal of Political Research 51(2): 235–264.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Volden, C. and Wiseman, A.E. (2009), Legislative Effectiveness in Congress, Ohio: The Ohio State University.Google Scholar
Wauters, B., Thijssen, P., Van Aelst, P. and Pilet, J.-B., (2016), ‘Centralized personalization at the expense of decentralized personalization. The decline of preferential voting in Belgium (2003−2014)’, Party Politics. doi: 10.1177/1354068816678882 Google Scholar
Yildirim, T.M., Kocapınar, G. and Ecevit, Y.A. (2019), ‘Staying active and focused? The effect of parliamentary performance on candidate renomination and promotion’, Party Politics 25(6): 794−804. doi: 10.1177/1354068817740338 CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Supplementary material: PDF

Schobess and de Vet supplementary material

Schobess and de Vet supplementary material
Download Schobess and de Vet supplementary material(PDF)
PDF 139.7 KB