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Non-hierarchical policy coordination in multilevel systems

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 July 2010

Nicole Bolleyer  and
Tanja A. Börzel
Nicole Bolleyer*
Affiliation:
Department of Politics, University of Exeter, Exeter, UK
Tanja A. Börzel*
Affiliation:
Center for European Integration, Free University of Berlin, Berlin, Germany
*
* E-mail: N.Bolleyer@exeter.ac.uk; europe@zedat.fu-berlin.de
* E-mail: N.Bolleyer@exeter.ac.uk; europe@zedat.fu-berlin.de
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Abstract

In theory, lower-level governments (provinces, regional governments, or member states) operating in multilevel systems within and beyond the nation-state can choose from a wide repertoire of modes of policy coordination to solve collective problems non-hierarchically. These modes range from unilateral policy emulation over informal intergovernmental agreements to binding interstate law. The modes that governments are willing and capable to use, however, vary considerably across multilevel systems which affects governments’ collective problem-solving capacity. This paper argues that the nature of executive–legislative relations in lower-level governments is crucial to account for this variation. The presence (or absence) of power sharing shapes the willingness of lower-level governments to enter agreements that greatly constrain individual government autonomy. Power-concentrating governments, as opposed to power-sharing ones, tend to avoid such agreements. The type of power sharing affects the capacity to enter agreements that require legislative approval. Compulsory power-sharing governments, as opposed to voluntary power-sharing governments, should find it difficult to enter such agreements, since this type of power sharing invites inter-branch divides. To substantiate these arguments, we apply them to Canada, Switzerland, the United States, and the European Union.

Keywords

multilevel governanceintergovernmental relationsnon-hierarchical policy coordinationcomparative federalism

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
European Political Science Review , Volume 2 , Issue 2 , July 2010 , pp. 157 - 185
Copyright
Copyright © European Consortium for Political Research 2010

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