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The Russian Oligarchs, from Yeltsin to Putin

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 September 2015

Chaim Shinar
Chaim Shinar*
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E-mail: shinarch@012.net.il
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Abstract

Yeltsin’s oligarchy1 was 15, or even 20 or even 50, very rich people who featured all the time in the mass media. They were very ambitious. They were prepared to go openly i1nto the government or Duma, or to finance a political party. They were well known because they were popular. However, it would be difficult to argue that they controlled any part of the real economy.

Type
Articles
Information
European Review , Volume 23 , Issue 4 , October 2015 , pp. 583 - 596
Copyright
© Academia Europaea 2015 

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References

References and Notes

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