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Cultural Differences in Ultimatum Game Experiments: Evidence from a Meta-Analysis

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Hessel Oosterbeek ,
Randolph Sloof  and
Gijs Van De Kuilen
Hessel Oosterbeek*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, University of Amsterdam and the Tinbergen Institute, The Netherlands
Randolph Sloof
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, University of Amsterdam and the Tinbergen Institute, The Netherlands
Gijs Van De Kuilen
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, University of Amsterdam and the Tinbergen Institute, The Netherlands
*
email: h.oosterbeek@uva.nl
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Abstract

This paper reports the findings of a meta-analysis of 37 papers with 75 results from ultimatum game experiments. We find that on average the proposer offers 40% of the pie to the responder. This share is smaller for larger pie sizes and larger when a strategy method is used or when subjects are inexperienced. On average 16% of the offers is rejected. The rejection rate is lower for larger pie sizes and for larger shares offered. Responders are less willing to accept an offer when the strategy method is employed. As the results come from different countries, meta-analysis provides an alternative way to investigate whether bargaining behavior in ultimatum games differs across countries. We find differences in behavior of responders (and not of proposers) across geographical regions. With one exception, these differences cannot be attributed to various cultural traits on which for instance the cultural classifications of Hofstede (1991) and Inglehart (2000) are based.

Keywords

ultimatum gamemeta-analysiscultural differences

JEL classification

C78: Bargaining Theory • Matching Theory Z10: General C91: Laboratory, Individual Behavior
Type
Research Article
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 7 , Issue 2 , June 2004 , pp. 171 - 188
Copyright
Copyright © 2004 Economic Science Association

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Footnotes

*

NWO-program SCHOLAR.

References

References

Abbink, K., Bolton, G.E., Sadrieh, A., and Tang, Fang-Fang (2001). “Adaptive Learning Versus Punishment in Ultimatum Bargaining.” Games and Economic Behavior. 37, 1–25.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Abbink, K., Sadrieh, A., and Zamir, S. (1999). “The Covered Response Ultimatum Game.” SFB Discussion Paper B-416.Google Scholar
Anderson, L.R., Rodgers, YV, and Rodriguez, R.R. (2000). “Cultural Differences in Attitudes Towards Bargaining.” Economics Letters. 69, 45–54.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Andreoni, J., Castillo, M., and Petrie, R. (2000). “What do Bargainers’ Preferences Look Like? Exploringa Convex Ultimatum Game.” American Economic Review, forthcoming.Google Scholar
Binmore, K., McCarthy, J., Ponti, G., Samuelson, L., and Shaked, A. (2002). “A Backward Induction Experiment.” Journal of Economic Theory. 104, 48–88.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bethwaite, J. and Tompkinson, P. (1996). “The Ultimatum Game and Non-Selfish Utility Functions.” Journal of Economic Psychology. 17, 259–271.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Blount, S. (1995). “When Social Outcomes aren't Fair: The Effect of Causal Attributions on Preference.” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes. 63, 131–144.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bornstein, G. and Yaniv, I. (1998). “Individual and Group Behavior in the Ultimatum Game: Are Groups More “Rational” Players? Experimental Economics. 1, 101–108.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Boyes, W.J. (1996). “Understanding, Fairness and Reputation in the Ultimatum Game.” Economic Notes. 25, 21–32.Google Scholar
Brandts, J., Saijo, T., and Schram, A. (1997). “A Four Country Comparison of Spite and Cooperation in Voluntary Contribution Mechanisms.” Working Paper (University of Amsterdam).Google Scholar
Buchan, N.R., Croson, R.T.A., and Johnson, E.J. (1999). “Understanding What's Fair: Contrasting Perceptions of Fairness in Ultimatum Bargaining in Japan and the United States.” Discussion paper, University of Wisconsin. Cameron, L.A. (1999). “Raising the Stakes in the Ultimatum Game: Experimental Evidence from Indonesia.” Economic inquiry. 37, 47–59.Google Scholar
Carter, J.R. and Irons, M.D. (1991). “Are Economists Different, and If So, Why?” Journal of Economic Perspectives. 5, 171–177.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Carter, J.R. and McAloon, S.A. (1996). “A Test for Comparative Income Effects in an Ultimatum Bargaining Experiment.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 31, 369–380.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Croson, R.T.A. (1996). “Information in Ultimatum Games: An Experimental Study.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 30, 197–213.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Eckel, C.C. and Grossman, PJ. (2001). “Chivalry and Solidarity in Ultimatum Games.” Economic Inquiry. 39, 171–188.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Egger, M. and Smith, G.D. (1997). “Meta-Analysis: Potentials and Problem.” British Medical Journal. 315, 1371–1374.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ellingsen, T. and Johannesson, M. (2001). “Sunk Costs, Fairness, and Disagreement.” Mimeo, Stockholm University.Google Scholar
Fershtman, C. and Gneezy, U. (2001a). “Strategic Delegation: An Experiment.” Rand Journal of Economics. 32, 352–368.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fershtman, C. and Gneezy, U. (2001b). “Discrimination in a Segmented Society: An Experimental Approach.” Quarterly Journal of Economics. 116, 351–378.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Forsythe, R., Horowitz, J.L., Savin, N.E., and Sefton, M. (1994). “Fairness in Simple Bargaining Experiments.” Games and Economic Behavior. 6, 347–369.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gneezy, U. and Güth, W. (2003). On Competing Rewards Standards: An Experimental Study of Ultimatum Bargaining.” Journal of Socio-Economics, forthcoming.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Grosskopf, B. (2003). “Reinforcement and Directional Learning in the Ultimatum Game with Responder Competition.” Experimental Economics, forthcoming.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Güth, W., Marchand, N., and Rulliere, J.-L. (1999). “On the Reliability of Reciprocal Fairness; An Experimental Study.” Discussion Paper, Humboldt University Berlin.Google Scholar
Güth, W., Schmittberger, R., and Schwarze, B. (1982). “An experimental Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 3, 367–388.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Güth, W. and Tietz, R. (1990). “Ultimatum Bargaining Behavior: A Survey and Comparison of Experimental Results.” Journal of Economic Psychology. 11, 417–449.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Güth, W. and van Damme, E. (1998). “Information, Strategic Behavior, and Fairness in Ultimatum Bargaining: An Experimental Study.” Journal of Mathematical Psychology. 42, 227–247.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Harrison, G.W. and McCabe, K.A. (1996). “Expectations and Fairness in a Simple Bargaining Experiment.” International Journal of Game Theory. 25, 303–327.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Henrich, J. (2000). “Does Culture Matter in Economic Behavior? Ultimatum Game Bargaining Among the Machiguenga of the Peruvian Amazon.” American Economic Review. 90, 973–979.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Henrich, J., Boyd, R., Bowles, S., Camerer, C., Fehr, E., Gintis, H., and McElreath, R. (2001). “In search of Homo Economicus: Behavioral Experiments in 15 Small-Scale Societies.” AER Papers and Proceedings. 91, 73–78.Google Scholar
Hoffman, E., McCabe, K., Shachat, K., and Smith, V.L. (1994). “Preferences, Property Rights, and Anonymity in Bargaining Games.” Games and Economic Behavior. 7, 346–380.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hoffman, E., McCabe, K., and Smith, V.L. (1996). “On Expectations and the Monetary Stakes in Ultimatum Games.” International Journal of Game Theory. 25, 289–301.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hoffman, E., McCabe, K., and Smith, V.L. (2000). “The impact of Exchange Context on the Activation of Equity in Ultimatum Games.” Experimental Economics. 3, 5–9.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hofstede, G. (1991). Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind. New York: McGraw-Hill.Google Scholar
Hunter, J.E. and Schmidt, F.L. (1990). Methods in Meta-Analysis—Correcting Errors and Bias in Research Findings. London: Sage.Google Scholar
Huntington, S.P. (1996). The Clash of Civilazations and the Remaking of World Order. New York: Simon and Schuster.Google Scholar
Inglehart, R. (2000). “Culture and Democracy.” In Harrison, L.E. and Huntington, S.P. (eds.), Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress. New York: Basic Books.Google Scholar
Kachelmeier, S.J. and Shehata, M. (1992). “Culture and Competition: A Laboratory Market Comparison Between China and the West.” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 19, 145–168.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kagel, J., Kim, C., and Moser, D. (1996). “Ultimatum Games with Asymmetric Information and Asymmetric Payoffs.” Games and Economic Behavior. 13, 100–110.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J.L., and Thaler, R.H. (1986a). “Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics.” Journal of Business. 59, S285–S300.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J.L., and Thaler, R.H. (1986b). “Fairness as a Constraint on Profit-Seeking: Entitlements in the Market.” American Economic Review. 76, 728–741.Google Scholar
Lensberg, T. and van der Heijden, E. (1998). “A Cross-Cultural Study of Reciprocity, Trust and Altruism in a Gift Exchange Experiment.” CentER Discussion Paper 9877, Tilburg University.Google Scholar
List, J.A. and Cherry, T.L. (2000). “Learning to Accept in Ultimatum Games: Evidence from an Experimental Design that Generates Low Offers.” Experimental Economics. 3, 11–29.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Messick, D.M., Moore, D.A., and Bazerman, M.H. (1997). “Ultimatum Bargaining with a Group: Understanding the Importance of the Decision Rule.” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes. 69, 87–101.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Meyer, H.-D. (1992). “Norms and Self-Interest in Ultimatum Bargaining: The Prince's Prudence.” Journal of Economic Psychology. 13, 215–232.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mitzkewitz, M. and Nagel, R. (1993). “Experimental Results on Ultimatum Games with Incomplete Information.” International Journal of Game Theory. 22, 171–198.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mullen, B. and Miller, N. (1991). “Meta-Analysis.” In: Judd, C.M., Smith, E.R., and Kidder, L.H. (eds.), Research Methods in Social Relations, 6th ed. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich College Publishers.Google Scholar
Munier, B. and Zaharia, C. (1998). “High Stakes do Change Acceptance Behavior in Ultimatum Bargaining Games: Experimental Evidence from France and Romania.” Discussion paper, ENS Cachan.Google Scholar
Okada, A. and Riedl, A. (1999). “When Culture does not Matter: Experimental Evidence from Coalition Formation Ultimatum Games in Austria and Japan.” Discussion Paper, University of Amsterdam.Google Scholar
Oppewal, H. and Tougareva, E. (1992). “A Three-Person Ultimatum Game to Investigate Effects of Differences in Need, Sharing Rules and Observability on Bargaining Behaviour.” Journal of Economic Psychology. 13, 203–213.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ortona, G. (1991). “The ultimatum Game. Some New Experimental Evidence.” Economic Notes. 20, 324–334.Google Scholar
Rapoport, A. and Sundali, J.A. (1996). “Ultimatums in Two-Person Bargaining with One Sided Uncertainty: Offer Games.” International Journal of Game Theory. 25, 475–494.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rapoport, A., Sundali, J.A., and Seale, D.A. (1996). “Ultimatums in Two-Person Bargaining with One-Sided Uncertainty: Demand Games.” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 30, 173–196.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Robert, C. and Carnevale, PJ. (1997). “Group Choice in Ultimatum Bargaining.” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes. 72, 256–279.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Roth, A.E. and Erev, I. (1995). “Learning in Extensive-form Games: Experimental Data and Simple Dynamic Models in the Intermediate Term.” Games and Economic Behavior. 8, 164–212.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Roth, A.E., Prasnikar, V., Okuno-Fujiware, M., and Zamir, S. (1991). “Bargaining and Market Behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh and Tokyo: An Experimental Study.” American Economic Review. 81, 10681095.Google Scholar
Ruffle, B.J. (1998). “More is Better, but Fair is Fair: Tipping in Dictator and Ultimatum Games.” Games and Economic Behavior. 23, 247–265.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schotter, A., Weiss, A., and Zapater, I. (1996). “Fairness and Survival in Ultimatum and Dictatorship Games.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 31, 37–56.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Siegel, S. and Castellan, N.J. (1988). Nonparametric Statistics for the Behavioral Sciences. New York: McGrawHill Book Company.Google Scholar
Slembeck, T. (1999). “Reputations and Fairness in Bargaining: Experimental Evidence from a Repeated Ultimatum Game with Fixed Opponents.” Discussion Paper, University of St.Gallen.Google Scholar
Slembeck, T. (1999). “As if Playing Fair; Experimental Evidence on the Role of Information in Ultimatum Bargaining.” Discussion Paper, University of St.Gallen.Google Scholar
Slonim, R. and Roth, A.E. (1998). “Learning in High Stakes Ultimatum Games: An Experiment in the Slovak Republic.” Econometrica. 66, 569–596.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Solnick, S.J. (2001). “Gender Differences in the Ultimatum Game.” Economic inquiry. 39, 189–200.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Solnick, S.J. and Schweitzer, M.E. (1999). “The Influence of Physical Attractiveness and Gender on Ultimatum Game Decisions.” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes. 79, 199–215.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Suleiman, R. (1996). “Expectations and Fairness in a Modified Ultimatum Game.” Journal of Economic Psychology. 17, 531–554.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Thaler, R.H. (1988). “Anomalies; The Ultimatum Game.” Journal of Economic Perspectives. 2, 195–206.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tompkinson, P. and Bethwaite, J. (1995). “The Ultimatum Game: Raising the Stakes.” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 27, 439–451.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Weg, E. and Smith, V. (1993). “On the Failure to Induce Meager Offers in Ultimatum Games.” Journal of Economic Psychology. 14, 17–32.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Winter, E. and Zamir, S. (1997). “An Experiment with Ultimatum Bargaining in a Changing Environment.” Discussion paper, University of Haifa.Google Scholar
Abbink, K., Bolton, G.E., Sadrieh, A., and Tang, Fang-Fang (2001). “Adaptive Learning Versus Punishment in Ultimatum Bargaining.” Games and Economic Behavior. 37, 1–25.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Abbink, K., Sadrieh, A., and Zamir, S. (1999). “The Covered Response Ultimatum Game.” SFB Discussion Paper B-416.Google Scholar
Anderson, L.R., Rodgers, YV, and Rodriguez, R.R. (2000). “Cultural Differences in Attitudes Towards Bargaining.” Economics Letters. 69, 45–54.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Andreoni, J., Castillo, M., and Petrie, R. (2000). “What do Bargainers’ Preferences Look Like? Exploringa Convex Ultimatum Game.” American Economic Review, forthcoming.Google Scholar
Binmore, K., McCarthy, J., Ponti, G., Samuelson, L., and Shaked, A. (2002). “A Backward Induction Experiment.” Journal of Economic Theory. 104, 48–88.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bethwaite, J. and Tompkinson, P. (1996). “The Ultimatum Game and Non-Selfish Utility Functions.” Journal of Economic Psychology. 17, 259–271.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Blount, S. (1995). “When Social Outcomes aren't Fair: The Effect of Causal Attributions on Preference.” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes. 63, 131–144.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bornstein, G. and Yaniv, I. (1998). “Individual and Group Behavior in the Ultimatum Game: Are Groups More “Rational” Players? Experimental Economics. 1, 101–108.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Boyes, W.J. (1996). “Understanding, Fairness and Reputation in the Ultimatum Game.” Economic Notes. 25, 21–32.Google Scholar
Brandts, J., Saijo, T., and Schram, A. (1997). “A Four Country Comparison of Spite and Cooperation in Voluntary Contribution Mechanisms.” Working Paper (University of Amsterdam).Google Scholar
Buchan, N.R., Croson, R.T.A., and Johnson, E.J. (1999). “Understanding What's Fair: Contrasting Perceptions of Fairness in Ultimatum Bargaining in Japan and the United States.” Discussion paper, University of Wisconsin. Cameron, L.A. (1999). “Raising the Stakes in the Ultimatum Game: Experimental Evidence from Indonesia.” Economic inquiry. 37, 47–59.Google Scholar
Carter, J.R. and Irons, M.D. (1991). “Are Economists Different, and If So, Why?” Journal of Economic Perspectives. 5, 171–177.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Carter, J.R. and McAloon, S.A. (1996). “A Test for Comparative Income Effects in an Ultimatum Bargaining Experiment.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 31, 369–380.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Croson, R.T.A. (1996). “Information in Ultimatum Games: An Experimental Study.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 30, 197–213.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Eckel, C.C. and Grossman, PJ. (2001). “Chivalry and Solidarity in Ultimatum Games.” Economic Inquiry. 39, 171–188.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Egger, M. and Smith, G.D. (1997). “Meta-Analysis: Potentials and Problem.” British Medical Journal. 315, 1371–1374.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ellingsen, T. and Johannesson, M. (2001). “Sunk Costs, Fairness, and Disagreement.” Mimeo, Stockholm University.Google Scholar
Fershtman, C. and Gneezy, U. (2001a). “Strategic Delegation: An Experiment.” Rand Journal of Economics. 32, 352–368.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Fershtman, C. and Gneezy, U. (2001b). “Discrimination in a Segmented Society: An Experimental Approach.” Quarterly Journal of Economics. 116, 351–378.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Forsythe, R., Horowitz, J.L., Savin, N.E., and Sefton, M. (1994). “Fairness in Simple Bargaining Experiments.” Games and Economic Behavior. 6, 347–369.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gneezy, U. and Güth, W. (2003). On Competing Rewards Standards: An Experimental Study of Ultimatum Bargaining.” Journal of Socio-Economics, forthcoming.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Grosskopf, B. (2003). “Reinforcement and Directional Learning in the Ultimatum Game with Responder Competition.” Experimental Economics, forthcoming.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Güth, W., Marchand, N., and Rulliere, J.-L. (1999). “On the Reliability of Reciprocal Fairness; An Experimental Study.” Discussion Paper, Humboldt University Berlin.Google Scholar
Güth, W., Schmittberger, R., and Schwarze, B. (1982). “An experimental Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 3, 367–388.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Güth, W. and Tietz, R. (1990). “Ultimatum Bargaining Behavior: A Survey and Comparison of Experimental Results.” Journal of Economic Psychology. 11, 417–449.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Güth, W. and van Damme, E. (1998). “Information, Strategic Behavior, and Fairness in Ultimatum Bargaining: An Experimental Study.” Journal of Mathematical Psychology. 42, 227–247.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Harrison, G.W. and McCabe, K.A. (1996). “Expectations and Fairness in a Simple Bargaining Experiment.” International Journal of Game Theory. 25, 303–327.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Henrich, J. (2000). “Does Culture Matter in Economic Behavior? Ultimatum Game Bargaining Among the Machiguenga of the Peruvian Amazon.” American Economic Review. 90, 973–979.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Henrich, J., Boyd, R., Bowles, S., Camerer, C., Fehr, E., Gintis, H., and McElreath, R. (2001). “In search of Homo Economicus: Behavioral Experiments in 15 Small-Scale Societies.” AER Papers and Proceedings. 91, 73–78.Google Scholar
Hoffman, E., McCabe, K., Shachat, K., and Smith, V.L. (1994). “Preferences, Property Rights, and Anonymity in Bargaining Games.” Games and Economic Behavior. 7, 346–380.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hoffman, E., McCabe, K., and Smith, V.L. (1996). “On Expectations and the Monetary Stakes in Ultimatum Games.” International Journal of Game Theory. 25, 289–301.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hoffman, E., McCabe, K., and Smith, V.L. (2000). “The impact of Exchange Context on the Activation of Equity in Ultimatum Games.” Experimental Economics. 3, 5–9.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hofstede, G. (1991). Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind. New York: McGraw-Hill.Google Scholar
Hunter, J.E. and Schmidt, F.L. (1990). Methods in Meta-Analysis—Correcting Errors and Bias in Research Findings. London: Sage.Google Scholar
Huntington, S.P. (1996). The Clash of Civilazations and the Remaking of World Order. New York: Simon and Schuster.Google Scholar
Inglehart, R. (2000). “Culture and Democracy.” In Harrison, L.E. and Huntington, S.P. (eds.), Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress. New York: Basic Books.Google Scholar
Kachelmeier, S.J. and Shehata, M. (1992). “Culture and Competition: A Laboratory Market Comparison Between China and the West.” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 19, 145–168.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kagel, J., Kim, C., and Moser, D. (1996). “Ultimatum Games with Asymmetric Information and Asymmetric Payoffs.” Games and Economic Behavior. 13, 100–110.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J.L., and Thaler, R.H. (1986a). “Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics.” Journal of Business. 59, S285–S300.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J.L., and Thaler, R.H. (1986b). “Fairness as a Constraint on Profit-Seeking: Entitlements in the Market.” American Economic Review. 76, 728–741.Google Scholar
Lensberg, T. and van der Heijden, E. (1998). “A Cross-Cultural Study of Reciprocity, Trust and Altruism in a Gift Exchange Experiment.” CentER Discussion Paper 9877, Tilburg University.Google Scholar
List, J.A. and Cherry, T.L. (2000). “Learning to Accept in Ultimatum Games: Evidence from an Experimental Design that Generates Low Offers.” Experimental Economics. 3, 11–29.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Messick, D.M., Moore, D.A., and Bazerman, M.H. (1997). “Ultimatum Bargaining with a Group: Understanding the Importance of the Decision Rule.” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes. 69, 87–101.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Meyer, H.-D. (1992). “Norms and Self-Interest in Ultimatum Bargaining: The Prince's Prudence.” Journal of Economic Psychology. 13, 215–232.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mitzkewitz, M. and Nagel, R. (1993). “Experimental Results on Ultimatum Games with Incomplete Information.” International Journal of Game Theory. 22, 171–198.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mullen, B. and Miller, N. (1991). “Meta-Analysis.” In: Judd, C.M., Smith, E.R., and Kidder, L.H. (eds.), Research Methods in Social Relations, 6th ed. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich College Publishers.Google Scholar
Munier, B. and Zaharia, C. (1998). “High Stakes do Change Acceptance Behavior in Ultimatum Bargaining Games: Experimental Evidence from France and Romania.” Discussion paper, ENS Cachan.Google Scholar
Okada, A. and Riedl, A. (1999). “When Culture does not Matter: Experimental Evidence from Coalition Formation Ultimatum Games in Austria and Japan.” Discussion Paper, University of Amsterdam.Google Scholar
Oppewal, H. and Tougareva, E. (1992). “A Three-Person Ultimatum Game to Investigate Effects of Differences in Need, Sharing Rules and Observability on Bargaining Behaviour.” Journal of Economic Psychology. 13, 203–213.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ortona, G. (1991). “The ultimatum Game. Some New Experimental Evidence.” Economic Notes. 20, 324–334.Google Scholar
Rapoport, A. and Sundali, J.A. (1996). “Ultimatums in Two-Person Bargaining with One Sided Uncertainty: Offer Games.” International Journal of Game Theory. 25, 475–494.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rapoport, A., Sundali, J.A., and Seale, D.A. (1996). “Ultimatums in Two-Person Bargaining with One-Sided Uncertainty: Demand Games.” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 30, 173–196.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Robert, C. and Carnevale, PJ. (1997). “Group Choice in Ultimatum Bargaining.” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes. 72, 256–279.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Roth, A.E. and Erev, I. (1995). “Learning in Extensive-form Games: Experimental Data and Simple Dynamic Models in the Intermediate Term.” Games and Economic Behavior. 8, 164–212.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Roth, A.E., Prasnikar, V., Okuno-Fujiware, M., and Zamir, S. (1991). “Bargaining and Market Behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh and Tokyo: An Experimental Study.” American Economic Review. 81, 10681095.Google Scholar
Ruffle, B.J. (1998). “More is Better, but Fair is Fair: Tipping in Dictator and Ultimatum Games.” Games and Economic Behavior. 23, 247–265.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schotter, A., Weiss, A., and Zapater, I. (1996). “Fairness and Survival in Ultimatum and Dictatorship Games.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 31, 37–56.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Siegel, S. and Castellan, N.J. (1988). Nonparametric Statistics for the Behavioral Sciences. New York: McGrawHill Book Company.Google Scholar
Slembeck, T. (1999). “Reputations and Fairness in Bargaining: Experimental Evidence from a Repeated Ultimatum Game with Fixed Opponents.” Discussion Paper, University of St.Gallen.Google Scholar
Slembeck, T. (1999). “As if Playing Fair; Experimental Evidence on the Role of Information in Ultimatum Bargaining.” Discussion Paper, University of St.Gallen.Google Scholar
Slonim, R. and Roth, A.E. (1998). “Learning in High Stakes Ultimatum Games: An Experiment in the Slovak Republic.” Econometrica. 66, 569–596.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Solnick, S.J. (2001). “Gender Differences in the Ultimatum Game.” Economic inquiry. 39, 189–200.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Solnick, S.J. and Schweitzer, M.E. (1999). “The Influence of Physical Attractiveness and Gender on Ultimatum Game Decisions.” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes. 79, 199–215.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Suleiman, R. (1996). “Expectations and Fairness in a Modified Ultimatum Game.” Journal of Economic Psychology. 17, 531–554.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Thaler, R.H. (1988). “Anomalies; The Ultimatum Game.” Journal of Economic Perspectives. 2, 195–206.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tompkinson, P. and Bethwaite, J. (1995). “The Ultimatum Game: Raising the Stakes.” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 27, 439–451.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Weg, E. and Smith, V. (1993). “On the Failure to Induce Meager Offers in Ultimatum Games.” Journal of Economic Psychology. 14, 17–32.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Winter, E. and Zamir, S. (1997). “An Experiment with Ultimatum Bargaining in a Changing Environment.” Discussion paper, University of Haifa.Google Scholar