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Designing feedback in voluntary contribution games: the role of transparency

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Bernd Irlenbusch ,
Rainer Michael Rilke  and
Gari Walkowitz
Bernd Irlenbusch
Affiliation:
Department of Corporate Development and Business Ethics, University of Cologne, Cologne, Germany
Rainer Michael Rilke*
Affiliation:
Economics Group, WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management, Vallendar, Germany
Gari Walkowitz
Affiliation:
TUM School of Governance, Technical University of Munich & Center Digitization, Munich, Germany
*
rainer.rilke@whu.edu
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Abstract

We analyze the effects of limited feedback on beliefs and contributions in a repeated public goods game setting. In a first experiment, we test whether exogenously determined feedback about a good example (i.e., the maximum contribution in a period) in contrast to a bad example (i.e., the minimum contribution in a period) induces higher contributions. We find that when the type of feedback is not transparent to the group members, good examples boost cooperation while bad examples hamper it. There is no difference when the type of feedback is transparent. In a second experiment, feedback is endogenously chosen by a group leader. The results show that a large majority of the group leaders count on the positive effect of providing a good example. This is true regardless whether they choose the feedback type to be transparent or non-transparent. Half of the group leaders make the type of feedback transparent. With endogenously chosen feedback about good examples no difference in contributions can be observed among transparent and non-transparent feedback selection. In both experiments feedback shapes subjects’ beliefs. With exogenously chosen feedback, transparent feedback tends to reduce beliefs when good examples are provided as feedback and tends to increase beliefs in when bad examples are provided as feedback compared to the respective non-transparent cases. Our results shed new light on the design of feedback provision in public goods settings.

Keywords

Feedback designTransparencyPublic goodsImperfect conditional cooperationExperiment

JEL classification

H41: Public Goods C92: Laboratory, Group Behavior D82: Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design

Information

Type
Original Paper
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 22 , Issue 2 , 15 June 2019 , pp. 552 - 576
Copyright
Copyright © 2018 Economic Science Association

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Footnotes

Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-018-9575-2) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

We would like to thank Julian Conrads, Patrick Kampkötter, David Cooper, two anonymous referees, and participants of the Research Seminar in Applied Microeconomics at the University of Cologne for helpful comments. We are grateful to Katrin Recktenwald for her excellent research assistance. Financial support of the German Research Foundation through the research unit “Design and Behavior” (FOR 1371) and of the University of Cologne by the Center of Social and Economic Behavior (C-SEB) is gratefully acknowledged.

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