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Illusion of control and the pursuit of authority

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Randolph Sloof  and
Ferdinand A. von Siemens
Randolph Sloof*
Affiliation:
University of Amsterdam, Roetersstraat 11, 1018 WB Amsterdam, The Netherlands Tinbergen Institute, Gustav Mahlerplein 117, 1082 MS Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Ferdinand A. von Siemens*
Affiliation:
Goethe University Frankfurt, Grueneburgplatz 1, 60323 Frankfurt, Germany CESifo, Poschingerstrasse 5, 81679 Munich, Germany
*
r.sloof@uva.nl
vonsiemens@econ.uni-frankfurt.de
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Abstract

We measure participants’ willingness to pay for transparently useless authority—the right to make a completely uninformed task decision. We further elicit participants’ beliefs about receiving their preferred outcome if they make the decision themselves, and if another participant makes the decision for them. We find that participants pay more to make the decision themselves if they also believe that they can thus increase the probability of getting their preferred outcome. Illusion of control therefore exists in a controlled laboratory environment with monetary incentives and is connected to peoples’ pursuit of authority.

Keywords

Control preferencesIllusion of controlAllocation of decision rights

JEL classification

D23: Organizational Behavior • Transaction Costs • Property Rights C91: Laboratory, Individual Behavior D80: General

Information

Type
Original Paper
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 20 , Issue 3 , September 2017 , pp. 556 - 573
Copyright
Copyright © 2016 Economic Science Association

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