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Incremental approaches to establishing trust

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Robert Kurzban ,
Mary L. Rigdon  and
Bart J. Wilson
Robert Kurzban*
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Pennsylvania, 3720 Walnut St., Philadelphia, USA
Mary L. Rigdon*
Affiliation:
Research Center for Group Dynamics, Institute for Social Research, The University of Michigan, 426 Thompson St., 48106 Ann Arbor, USA
Bart J. Wilson*
Affiliation:
Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science, George Mason University, 4400 University Drive, MSN 1B2, 22030 Fairfax, USA
*
e-mail: kurzban@psych.upenn.edu
e-mail: mrigdon@umich.edu
e-mail: bwilson3@gmu.edu
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Abstract

We investigate cooperation using an incremental investment game in which the first-mover has the ability to make small, but increasing incremental investments in their counterpart. Our experiment is designed to test whether establishing trust in small increments is more effective than alternatives, including a one-shot investment game, a decrease only condition where the amount the first-mover sends to the second-mover must be less than the amount previously sent, and an unrestricted condition where the first-mover is not restricted by the amount previously sent. Although results were mixed, broadly, iteration affords greater cooperation than one-shot games and, when given the choice, participants seem to prefer to build trust gradually. Implications for institutional design are discussed.

Keywords

Investment gameTrustReciprocityBargainingCooperationExperimental economics

JEL classification

C91: Laboratory, Individual Behavior C72: Noncooperative Games

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 11 , Issue 4 , December 2008 , pp. 370 - 389
Copyright
Copyright © 2008 Economic Science Association

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