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Is response time predictive of choice? An experimental study of threshold strategies

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Andrew Schotter  and
Isabel Trevino
Andrew Schotter*
Affiliation:
New York University, New York, USA
Isabel Trevino*
Affiliation:
University of California, San Diego, San Diego, USA
*
andrew.schotter@nyu.edu
itrevino@ucsd.edu
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Abstract

This paper investigates the usefulness of non-choice data, namely response times, as a predictor of threshold behavior in a simple global game experiment. Our results indicate that the signals associated to the highest or second highest response time at the beginning of the experiment are both unbiased estimates of the threshold employed by subjects at the end of the experiment. This predictive ability is lost when we move to the third or higher response times. Moreover, the response time predictions are better than the equilibrium predictions of the game. They are also robust, in the sense that they characterize behavior in an “out-of-treatment” exercise where we use the strategy method to elicit thresholds.

Keywords

Response timeThreshold strategiesGlobal games

JEL classification

D89: Other C9: Design of Experiments C71: Cooperative Games

Information

Type
Original Paper
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 24 , Issue 1 , March 2021 , pp. 87 - 117
Copyright
Copyright © 2020 Economic Science Association

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