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A minimum effort coordination game experiment in continuous time

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Ailin Leng Open the ORCID record for Ailin Leng [Opens in a new window] ,
Lana Friesen ,
Kenan Kalayci  and
Priscilla Man
Ailin Leng*
Affiliation:
School of Economics, University of Queensland, St Lucia Brisbane, Australia
Lana Friesen*
Affiliation:
School of Economics, University of Queensland, St Lucia Brisbane, Australia
Kenan Kalayci*
Affiliation:
School of Economics, University of Queensland, St Lucia Brisbane, Australia
Priscilla Man*
Affiliation:
School of Economics, University of Queensland, St Lucia Brisbane, Australia
*
ailin.leng@uqconnect.edu.au
l.friesen@uq.edu.au
k.kalayci@uq.edu.au
t.man@uq.edu.au
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Abstract

We conduct an experiment on a minimum effort coordination game in a (quasi-)continuous time-frame, where effort choices can be switched freely during a 60-s period. The cooperation levels of the continuous time treatments are not significantly different from the discrete time treatments. Providing subjects with the information on the effort choices of all group members increases the average effort level in continuous time only. The minimum effort level in continuous time with full information feedback is also substantially higher than that with limited information feedback, but the difference is statistically insignificant. With limited information feedback, subjects rarely coordinate to increase their efforts simultaneously to change the group minimum within a period. Our findings imply that continuous time games are not behaviorally equivalent to infinitely repeated discrete time games.

Keywords

Continuous timeMinimum effort gameCoordination gameInformationLaboratory experiment

JEL classification

D70: General C92: Laboratory, Group Behavior C72: Noncooperative Games

Information

Type
Original Paper
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 21 , Issue 3: Special Issue in Honor of John Van Huyck , September 2018 , pp. 549 - 572
Copyright
Copyright © 2017 Economic Science Association

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Footnotes

Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-017-9550-3) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

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