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Self-control, commitment and peer pressure: a laboratory experiment

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Aurélie Bonein  and
Laurent Denant-Boèmont
Aurélie Bonein*
Affiliation:
CREM - University Rennes 1, Rennes, France
Laurent Denant-Boèmont*
Affiliation:
CREM - University Rennes 1, Rennes, France
*
aurelie.bonein@univ-rennes1.fr
laurent.denant-boemont@univ-rennes1.fr
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Abstract

This paper focuses on the relationship between individual self-control and peer pressure. To this end, we performed a laboratory experiment that proceeded in two parts. The first part involved an individual real-effort task in which subjects could commit themselves to a particular level of performance while being tempted by an alternative recreational activity. The second part consisted of bargaining in a power-to-take game in which previously earned revenues were at stake. The experimental treatments involved variations in the available information provided to peers about previous individual behavior. The results show that many subjects make a serious commitment. Further, the subsequent revelation of commitment level induces subjects to increase the credible components of their commitment decisions. Past individual behaviors also play a role in bargaining because (i) partners who have committed themselves benefit from lower rates of both take and destruction and (ii) partners who have succumbed to temptation suffer from higher rates of both take and destruction.

Keywords

Self-controlTemptationCommitmentWillpowerLaboratory experimentPeer pressure

JEL classification

D63: Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement C91: Laboratory, Individual Behavior C92: Laboratory, Group Behavior

Information

Type
Original Paper
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 18 , Issue 4 , December 2015 , pp. 543 - 568
Copyright
Copyright © 2015 Economic Science Association

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Footnotes

Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (doi:https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-014-9419-7) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

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