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Subject pool effects in a corruption experiment: A comparison of Indonesian public servants and Indonesian students

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Vivi Alatas ,
Lisa Cameron ,
Ananish Chaudhuri ,
Nisvan Erkal  and
Lata Gangadharan
Vivi Alatas*
Affiliation:
World Bank, Jakarta 12190, Indonesia
Lisa Cameron*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, University of Melbourne, Melbourne, VIC 3010, Australia
Ananish Chaudhuri*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, University of Auckland, Private Bag 92019, Auckland, New Zealand
Nisvan Erkal*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, University of Melbourne, Melbourne, VIC 3010, Australia
Lata Gangadharan*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, University of Melbourne, Melbourne, VIC 3010, Australia
*
e-mail: valatas@worldbank.org
e-mail: lcameron@unimelb.edu.au
e-mail: a.chaudhuri@auckland.ac.nz
e-mail: n.erkal@unimelb.edu.au
e-mail: latag@unimelb.edu.au
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Abstract

We report results from a corruption experiment with Indonesian public servants and Indonesian students. Our results suggest that the Indonesian public servant subjects have a significantly lower tolerance of corruption than the Indonesian students. We find no evidence that this is due to a selection effect. The reasons given by the subjects for their behaviour suggest that the differences in behavior across the subject pools are driven by their different real life experiences. For example, when abstaining from corruption, public servants more often cite the need to reduce the social costs of corruption as a reason for their actions, and when engaging in corruption, they cite low government salaries or a belief that corruption is a necessary evil in the current environment. In contrast, students give more simplistic moral reasons. We conclude by emphasizing that results obtained from different subject pools can complement each other in illuminating different aspects of the same problem.

Keywords

CorruptionExperimentsSubject pool effects

JEL classification

D73: Bureaucracy • Administrative Processes in Public Organizations • Corruption O12: Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development K42: Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law C91: Laboratory, Individual Behavior

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 12 , Issue 1 , March 2009 , pp. 113 - 132
Copyright
Copyright © 2008 Economic Science Association

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Footnotes

We would like to thank Charles Noussair and the participants of the Experimental Economics Workshop (2006) at the University of Melbourne for their comments. Daniel Piccinin and Revy Sjahrial have provided excellent research assistance. We are grateful to the Australian Research Council and the World Bank for their financial assistance.

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