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Volunteers and Pseudo-Volunteers: The Effect of Recruitment Method in Dictator Experiments

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Catherine C. Eckel  and
Philip J. Grossman
Catherine C. Eckel*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg, VA 24061, USA
Philip J. Grossman*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, St. Cloud State University, St. Cloud, MN 56301-4498, USA
*
email: eckelc@vt.edu
email: pgrossman@stcloudstate.edu
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Abstract

We report the results of experiments that test for behavioral differences between volunteer subjects recruited in the usual way and pseudo-volunteer subjects in experiments conducted during class time. In a series of dictator games, we find that psuedo-volunteers are more generous on average than their volunteer counterparts, and that non-monetary factors such as religious or altruistic preferences have a greater effect on the giving behavior of pseudo-volunteers.

Keywords

experimental methodologydictator gamecharitable giving

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 3 , Issue 2 , October 2000 , pp. 107 - 120
Copyright
Copyright © 2000 Economic Science Association

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