¹ See Grundgesetz [GG] [Basic Law] art. 1.1 (F.R.G.) (“Human dignity is inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all state authority.”).Google Scholar

² See Bundesverfassung der Schweizerischen EIdgenossenshcaft [BV], Constitution féedérale de la Confédération Suisse [Cst] [Constiution] art. 7 (Switz.).Google Scholar

³ Giovanni Biaggini, BV: Bundesverfassung der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft art. 7, para. 2(2007).Google Scholar

⁴ Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 1, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1, 9 (“Human dignity is inviolable. It must be respected and protected.”). This was made mandatory through Art. 6 TEU, as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon. See Treaty of Lisbon, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1, 13.Google Scholar

⁵ Hannah Arendt, Element und Ursprünge totaler Herrschaft 601 (1986).Google Scholar

⁶ For an overview about such comments see Matthias Mahlmann, Elemente einer ethischen Grundrechtstheorie 100 (2008).Google Scholar

⁷ Peter Schneider, Die Menschenrechte in staatlicher Ordnung, in Philosophie der Menschenrechte und der Grundrechte des Staatsbürgers, 77, 83 (1964); Horst Dreier, 1 Grundgesetz: Kommentar, art. 1 para. 49 (2d ed. 2004).Google Scholar

⁸ See Günter Dürig, Der Grundrechtssatz von der Menschenwürde, 81 Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts 117, 119 (1956); Günter Dürig, in Grundgesetz: Kommentar GG art. 1, para 15, 16 (Theodor Maunz & Günter Dürig eds.) [hereinafter Maunz/ Dürig], original commentary; see also Winfried Brugger, Menschenwürde, Menschenrechte, Grundrechte 12 (1997).Google Scholar

⁹ See Christoph Enders, Die Menschenwürde in der Verfassungsordnung 399 n. 130 (1997).Google Scholar

¹⁰ Matthias Herdegen, in Maunz/Dürig, supra note 8, art. 1, para 44, 45 (where the former held position on the admissibility of torture is abandoned after considerable critique).Google Scholar

¹¹ Christopher McCrudden, Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights, 19 Eur. J. Int'l L. 655 (2008). For some thoughts from the international discussion, see Jochen Abr Frowein, Human Dignity in International Law, in The Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse 121 (David Kretzmer & Eckart Klein eds., 2002); Jens Meyer-Ladewig, Menschenwürde und Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention [Human Dignity and the European Convention on Human Rights], 57 Neue Juristiche Wochenshcrift 981 (2004); Christian Walter, Menschenwürde im nationalen Recht, Europarecht und Völkerrecht [Human Dignity in National Law, European Law and International Law], in Menschenwürde in der säkularen Verfassungsordnung [Human Dignity in a Secular Constitutional System] 127 (Petra Bahr & Hans Michael Heinig eds., 2006); David Feldman, Human Dignity as a Legal Value—Part I, 1999 Pub. L. 682 (1999); David Feldman, Human Dignity as a Legal Value—Part II, 2000 Pub. L. 61 (2000); Jordan J. Paust, Human Dignity as a Constitutional Right, 27 How. L. J. 145 (1984); William A. Parent, Constitutional Values and Human Dignity, in The Constitution of Rights: Human Dignity and American Values 47 (Michael J. Meyer & William A. Parent eds., 1992); Frederick Schauer, Speaking of Dignity, in Constitution of Rights, supra, at 178; Louis Henkin, Human Dignity and Constitutional Rights, in Constitution of Rights, supra, at 210; Maxine D. Goodman, Human Dignity in Supreme Court Constitutional Jurisprudence, 84 Neb. L. Rev. 740 (2006). For an attempt to connect dignity, liberty and equality see Susanne Baer, Dignity, Liberty and Equality: A Fundamental Rights Triangle of Constitutionalism, 59 U. Toronto L. J. 417 (2009).Google Scholar

¹² Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan Chap. 10 (C. B. MacPherson, ed., Penguin 1985) (1651).Google Scholar

¹³ Schopenhauer, Arthur, Preisschrift über das Fundament der Moral 64 (1841). Schopenhauer adds (anticipating much contemporary critique about the vagueness of the concept):Google Scholar

Aber dieser von allen Kantianern so unermüdlich nachgesprochene Satz, ‘man dürfe den Menschen immer nur als Zweck, nie als Mittel behandeln,’ ist zwar ein bedeutend klingender und daher für alle die, welche gern eine Formel haben mögen, die sie alles fernern Denkens überhebt, überaus geeigneter Satz; aber beim Lichte betrachtet, ist es ein höchst vager, unbestimmter, seine Absicht ganz indirekt erreichender Ausspruch, der für jeden Fall seiner Anwendung erst besonderer Erklärung, Bestimmung und Modifikation bedarf, so allgemein genommen aber ungenügend, wenig sagend und noch dazu problematisch ist.Google Scholar

Arthur Schopenhauer, Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung 477 (1819/1844).Google Scholar

¹⁴ Friedrich Nietzsche, Fünf Vorreden zu fünf ungeschriebenen Büchern, in Kritische Studienausgabe 776 (Critical Study Edition Vol. 1, 1999) (1872) (five prefaces to five unwritten books 1872).Google Scholar

¹⁵ For a fuller statement see Mahlmann, supra note 6, at 97.Google Scholar

¹⁶ See Plato, Nomoi [Laws] IV 716d (2005); Plato, Theaitetos [Theaetetus] 176b (2005); Plato, Politeia [The Republic] 611e–612a, 613 (2005); Plato, Alkibiades [Alcebiades] 132e–133c (2005).Google Scholar

¹⁷ See the conclusions drawn from of the earlier stoic thought by Cicero, De officiis [On Duties] 1, 105 (1999).Google Scholar

¹⁸ Chrysipp, Stoicum Veterum Fragmenta III, 323.Google Scholar

¹⁹ Sophocles, Antigone verse 332 (1995).Google Scholar

²⁰ Genesis, 2:7.Google Scholar

²¹ Genesis, 1:26, 27.Google Scholar

²² Yair Lorberbaum, Blood and the Image of God: On the Sanctity of Life in Biblical and Early Rabbinic Law, Myth, and Ritual, in The concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse, supra note 11, at 55.Google Scholar

²³ Genesis, 9:6.Google Scholar

²⁴ Mischna Makkoth I, x, 9 Der Babylonische Talmud (Lazarus Goldschmidt trans., 1996).Google Scholar

²⁵ Id. at note 17.Google Scholar

²⁶ Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, II–II, 64, 2.Google Scholar

²⁷ Id. Google Scholar

²⁸ Martin Luther, Über das 1. Buch, Mose, Predigten 1527 [About the 1st Book of Moses, Sermons 1527], in 24 Werke, Kritische Gesamtausgabe [Works, Complete Critical Edition] 51 (1900); 14 Martin Luther, Predigten über das erste Buch Mose, gehalten 1523/24 [Preachings on the First Book of Moses, held 1523–24], in 14 Werke, Kritische Gesamtausgabe 111 (1895); Martin Luther, Vorlesungen über 1. Mose von 1535-45 [Lectures on the First Book of Moses of 1535-45], in 42 Werke, Kritische Gesamtausgabe 166 (1911).Google Scholar

²⁹ For example, the Chairperson of the Council of the Evangelical Church in Germany till 2009. Bishop Wolfgang Huber, Gerechtigkeit und Recht 274, 296, 302 (1996).Google Scholar

³⁰ See, e.g., Concilium Vaticanum II, Constitutio Pastoralis Gaudium et spes, 24, Acta Apostolicae Sedis 58, 1966, 1050; Catechismus Catholicae Ecclesiae, 357: “Humanum individuum, quia est imaginem Dei, dignitatem habet personae: non est solum res aliqua, sed aliquis” (emphasis in the original); id. 1929. For the protestant tradition, see, for example, Helmut Thielicke, 1 Theologische Ethik 821, 823 (1951).Google Scholar

³¹ J.B. Carman, Duties and Rights in Hindu Society, in Human Rights and the World's Religions 113 (Leroy S. Rouner ed., 1988); Kana Mitra, Human Rights in Hinduism, 19 J. Ecumenical Stud. 77 (1982); Vasudha Narayanan, Hindu Ethics and Dharma, in Ethics in World Religions 177, 181 (Joseph Runzo & Nancy M. Martin eds., 2001); Harold Coward, Human Rights and the World's Mayor Religions: The Hindu Tradition 33 (2005).Google Scholar

³² Mahatma Ghandi, Young India, 19 January 1921, in Was ist Hinduismus 126 (2006).Google Scholar

³³ Robert E. Florida, Human Rights and the World's Major Religions: The Buddhist Tradition 9 (2005) Kenneth K. Inada, The Buddhist Perspective on Human Rights, 19 J. Ecumenical Stud. 72 (1982); Kenneth K. Inada, A Buddhist Response to the Nature of Human Rights, J. Buddhist Ethics 55 (1995); Damien Keown, Are there “Human Rights” in Buddhism?, J. Buddhist Ethics 11, 13 (1995).Google Scholar

³⁴ Suttanipata 143–152, 149, in Die Reden Gotamo Buddhos. Sammlungen in Versen: Die Sammlung der Bruchstücke. Die Lieder der Mönche und Nonnen. Der Wahrheitspfad (Karl Eugen Neumann trans., 1957).Google Scholar

³⁵ The XIV Dalai Lama, Speech at Non-Governmental Organizations United Nations World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna, Austria: Human Rights and Universal Responsibility(June 15, 1993) reprinted in Damien Keown et al., Buddhism and Human Rights xvii–xviii (1998):Google Scholar

Recently some Asian governments have contended that the standards of human rights laid down in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are those advocated by the West and cannot be applied to Asia and other parts of the Third World because of differences in culture and differences in social and economic development. I do not share this view and I am convinced that the majority of Asian people do not support this view either, for it is the inherent nature of all human beings to yearn for freedom, equality and dignity…. As a Buddhist monk, I try to develop compassion within myself, not simply as a religious practice, but on a human level as well. To encourage myself in this altruistic attitude, I sometimes find it helpful to imagine myself standing as a single individual on one side, facing a huge gathering of all other human beings on the other side. Then I ask myself, “Whose interests are more important?” To me it is quite clear that however important I may feel I am, I am just one individual while others are infinite in number and importance.

Id.

³⁶ Ke Meng, Mong Dsi 132 (Richard Wilhelm trans., 1921); Kwong-loi Shun, Mencius and Early Chinese Thought 136 (1997).Google Scholar

³⁷ Qu'ran 2:30. On the debate on variations of translations, see Rotraud Wielandt, Menschenwürde und Freiheit in der Reflexion zeitgenössischer muslimischer Denker, in Freiheit der Religion 187 (Johannes Schwartländer ed., 1993).Google Scholar

³⁸ From the German debate see Christoph Enders, Die Menschenwürde in der Verfassungsordnung 177 (1997); Josef Isensee, Menschenwürde: die säkulare Gesellschaft auf der Suche nach dem Absoluten, 131 Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts 173, 206 (2006).Google Scholar

³⁹ Immanuel Kant, Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft 3 (Akademie Ausgabe Bd. VI, 1914) (1793) (“Die Moral, so fern sie auf dem Begriffe des Menschen al seines freien, eben darum aber auch sich selbst durch seine Vernunft an unbedingte Gesetze bindenden Wesens gegründet ist, bedarf weder der Idee eines anderen Wesens über ihm, um seine Pflicht zu erkennen, noch einer anderen Triebfeder als des Gesetzes selbst, um sie zu beobachten.”); Immanuel Kant, Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason 57 (George Di Giovanni trans., 2001) (same).Google Scholar

⁴⁰ Immanuel Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten 434 (Akademie Ausgabe Bd. IV, 1911) (1785).Google Scholar

⁴¹ Id. at 429; Immanuel Kant, Metaphysik der Sitten (Akademie Ausgabe Bd. VI, 1914) at 462.Google Scholar

⁴² Immanuel Kant, Metaphysik der Sitten at 314.Google Scholar

⁴³ Immanuel Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten at 435.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ For a detailed reconstruction see Mahlmann, supra note 6, at 152.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ Kant, supra note 40, at 428, 436; Immanuel Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft 435 (Akademie Ausgabe Bd. V, 1913) (1790); Christine M. Korsgaard, Creating the Kingdom of Ends 122 (1996). “[R]egress on conditions,” based on human nature with a “value-conferring status”: “The unconditioned condition of the goodness of anything is rational nature, or the power of rational choice….” Id.at 123.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ See Kant, supra note 40, at 433, 435, 462.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ Immanuel Kant, Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft 23 note (Akademie Ausgabe Bd. VI, 1914) (1793); Immanuel Kant, Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason in, Religion and Rational Theology 72 (Allen W. Wood & George Di Giovanni eds., 2001) (same).Google Scholar

⁴⁸ Immanuel Kant, Kritik der praktischen Vernunft 86 (Akademie Ausgabe Bd. V, 1913) (1788).Google Scholar

⁴⁹ Mahlmann, supra note 6, at 160.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ Theodor W. Adorno & Max Horkheimer, Die Dialektik der Aufklärung 92 (1969) (“Es ist der übliche Versuch des bürgerlichen Denkens, die Rücksicht, ohne welche Zivilisation nicht existieren kann, anders zu begründen als durch materielles Interesse und Gewalt, sublime und paradox wie keiner zuvor, und ephemer wie alle.”).Google Scholar

⁵¹ Adorno illustrates this by formulas like: “There shall be no torture; there shall be no concentration camps,” asserting that such sentences should not be rationalized. Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialektik 281 (1997).Google Scholar

⁵² A central reference point appears in Emmanuel Levinas, Totalité et Inifini 173 (1961).Google Scholar

⁵³ Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (1989).Google Scholar

⁵⁴ Jürgen Habermas writes about dignity: “Sie ist nicht eine Eigenschaft, die man von Natur aus ‘besitzen’ kann wie Intelligenz oder blaue Augen; sie markiert vielmehr diejenige ‘Unantastbarkeit,’ die allein in den interpersonalen Beziehungen reziproker Anerkennung, im egalitären Umgang von Personen miteinander eine Bedeutung haben kann.” Jürgen Habermas, Die Zukunft der menschlichen Natur 62 (2004).Google Scholar

⁵⁵ Hasso Hofmann, Die versprochene Menschenwürde, 118 Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts 353 (1993).Google Scholar

⁵⁶ Rainer Forst, Toleranz im Konflikt 420 (2003); Rainer Forst, Die Würde des Menschen und das Recht auf Rechtfertigung, 53 Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 589 (2005).Google Scholar

⁵⁷ Avishai Margalit, The Decent Society (1996).Google Scholar

⁵⁸ Ronald Dworkin, Life's Dominion (1994).Google Scholar

⁵⁹ Niklas Luhmann, Grundrechte als Institution 48 (1965); Niklas Luhmann, Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft 1075 (1997).Google Scholar

⁶⁰ Mahlmann, supra note 6, at 262.Google Scholar

⁶¹ Samuel Pufendorf, De Officio Hominis VII, § 1 (1673).Google Scholar

⁶² Thomas Mann, Einführung in den Zauberberg, in 11 Gesammelte Werke in dreizehn Bänden 617 (1990) (“Der Gral ist ein Geheimnis, aber auch die Humanität ist das. Denn der Mensch selbst ist ein Geheimnis, und alle Humanität beruht auf der Ehrfurcht vor dem Geheimnis des Menschen.”)Google Scholar

⁶³ Problems abound. Among the most discussed are the indeterminacy of the scope of the right; its conceptualization as a subjective right and not only objective law, hermeneutical yardstick and the like; its horizontal effect; the protection of the species character through dignity clauses; the beginning and end of the (prenatal or postmortem?) protection of human beings through dignity clauses; its relation to particularly contentious legal questions like abortion, biomedical research (especially on embryos), new techniques of reproduction, or torture; the question of possible limitations or—alternatively—the absolute character of dignity clauses; the conditions for engagement in an interference; the relative or universalistic character of concretizations of human dignity, and the relation of interpretations of human dignity to the idea of the neutrality of the state. For a detailed doctrinal unfolding of human dignity as a legal concept considering these and other questions see Mahlmann, supra note 6, at 282.Google Scholar

⁶⁴ Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts § 166 (1820).Google Scholar

⁶⁵ On this matter Mahlmann, supra note 6.Google Scholar

⁶⁶ This formulation is ascribed in the concrete German post-war context to G. Dürig, though there are similar formulations by others at that time. See Günter Dürig, Die Menschenauffassung des Grundgesetzes, 7 Juristische Rundschau 259 (1952); Günter Dürig, Der Grundrechtssatz von der Menschenwürde, 81 Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts 117, 127 (1956); Günter Dürig, in Maunz/Dürig, supra note 8, art. 1, para 28; Jens Kersten, Das Klonen von Menschen 425(2004) (some discussion about Dürig's thought).Google Scholar

⁶⁷ BVerfGE 27, 1 (6). This jurisprudence was slowly developed. See Mahlmann, supra note 6, at 179.Google Scholar

⁶⁸ BVerfGE 45, 187 (228).Google Scholar

⁶⁹ BVerwGE 31, 236 (237.)Google Scholar

⁷⁰ For a detailed reconstruction, Mahlmann, supra note 6, at 179.Google Scholar

⁷¹ BVerfGE 45, 187.Google Scholar

⁷² BVerfG, Case No. 1 BvR 1359/05, Dec. 27, 2005, http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/rk20051227_1bvr135905.html.Google Scholar

⁷³ See the dissenting opinion of justices Mahrenholz and Sommer in the second abortion decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court. BVerfGE 88, 203 (347). These justices underlined explicitly the growing importance of the dignity of women in the debate leading to the reform of abortion after the Court's first abortion decision. For the first case see BVerfGE 39, 1. This debate is mirrored in the majority opinion and the dissenting vote. See BVerfGE 88, 203 (254, 340).Google Scholar

⁷⁴ For a detailed discussion of the matter Mahlmann, supra note 6, at 198, 312.Google Scholar

⁷⁵ For the permissibility of torture in some constellations from the German debate: Winfried Brugger, Darf der Staat ausnahmsweise foltern?, 35 Der Staat 67 (1996); Winfried Brugger, Vom unbedingten Verbot der Folter zum bedingten Recht auf Folter?, 55 Juristen Zeitung 165, 167 (2000); Fabian Wittreck, Menschenwürde und Folterverbot, 56 Die Öffentliche Verwaltung 873 (2003). In international debate see Alan Dershowitz, Why Terrorism Works: Understanding the Threat, Responding to the Challenge 131 (2002). On the debate, see Sanford Levinson, Torture: A Collection (rev. ed. 2006); Dietmar von Pfordten, Ist staatliche Folter als fernwirkende Nothilfe ethisch erlaubt?, in Ist Folter erlaubt? 149 (Wolfgang Lenzen ed., 2005); Ralf Poscher, Menschenwürde im Staatsnotstand, in Menschenwürde in der säkularen Verfassungsordnung, supra note 11, at 215, 222; Michael Walzer, Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands, in Torture: A Collection, supra, at 61 (emphasizing the dilemmatic structure of the problem).Google Scholar

⁷⁶ LG Frankfurt, Neue Juristiche Wochenschrift 692 (2005); ECrtHR, 30 June 2008, appl. No. 22978/05, Gäfgen v. Germany confirmed that there has been a violation of Art. 3 ECHR which was remedied by the German state through the legal reaction to the threat of torture.Google Scholar

⁷⁷ Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, art. 2.2, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, 113. The ECrtHR underlines for the ECHR: “Art. 3 of the Convention enshrines one of the most fundamental values of a democratic society. It prohibits in absolute terms torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, irrespective of the circumstances and the victim's behaviour,” Nevmerzhitsky v. Ukraine, App. No. 54825/00, 43 Eur. H.R. Rep. 32, para. 79 (2005). On the absolute nature and lacking possibility of derogation see Ireland v. United Kingdom, Case No. 5310/71, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at para. 163 (1978).Google Scholar

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⁷⁹ For a more detailed discussion, see Mahlmann, supra note 6, at 321.Google Scholar

⁸⁰ Mahlmann, supra note 6, at 288.Google Scholar

⁸¹ On cosmopolitanism in the theory of human rights, see Mahlmann, supra note 6, at 487.Google Scholar