¹ Levinas, Emmanuel, Totality and Infinity: Essay on Exteriority 21 (1969). The famous question of “whether we are not duped by morality” opens Levinas' first major work, Totality and Infinity. Levinas distinguishes between morality and ethics. He intends to establish the latter as philosophy's first discipline before metaphysics and, in the tradition of Friedrich Nietzsche's critique of morality, specifically before any normative moral philosophy. While the word ethics stems from the Greek term ēthikē and can refer to a theoretical meta-reflection upon morality, and in Levinas' case, a theory that focuses on the relation between the subject and the Other—whose characteristic quality is an irreducible strangeness that cannot be subject to any identification and especially not to moral judgment—the terms morality and morals stem from the Latin word mores, and allude more directly to general norms which are supposed to guide moral behavior. Section D of this essay refers to the relation between ethics and normative morality, which Levinas introduces by the so-called Third—a term that represents the general claims on a subject by moral norms and the general law as it is executed by legal institutions. The Third is seen as introducing a tension with the singular claim by the Other. For an introduction to Emmanuel Levinas' theories, see Bernhard Waldenfels' reflection upon the relation between ethics and normative morality, whereby he suggests an “ethical-moral époché that takes the self-evidence off morality.” Bernhard Waldenfels, Schattenrisse der Moral 10 (2006).Google Scholar

² Kant, Immanuel, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals 394, 412 (1785) (describing the timeless validity of moral values). On the distinction between value and price in economy, see Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals (1797), in which Kant determines the price as the public judgment on the value of something as determined from exchanges. See also Simmel, infra note 40.Google Scholar

³ See Neckel, Sighard, Der unmoralische Tausch. Eine Soziologie der Käuflichkeit, in 120 Kursbuch 9-16 (Hans M. Enzensberger ed., 1995).Google Scholar

⁴ See generally Nietzsche, Friedrich, On the Genealogy of Morality (2006). For an introduction to the critique of morality by Nietzsche and its link to the ethics of Emmanuel Levinas, see Bernhard Waldenfels, in DeutschFranzösische Gedankengänge (1995). On the method of a genealogy of morality, see Volker Gerhardt, Die Perspektive des Perspektivismus, in 18 Nietzsche-Studien 260–81 (1989). Last but not least, see Michel Foucault's seminal work on discourse analysis, which is also rooted in his readings of Nietzsche. Michel Foucault, Nietzsche, Genealogy, History, in Language, Countermemory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews 139–64 (Donald Bouchard ed., 1980).Google Scholar

⁵ Benjamin, Walter, Capitalism as Religion, in The Frankfurt School on Religion: Key Writings by the Major Thinkers 259 (Eduardo Mendieta ed., 2005) (alluding to the fact that economy and morality are intertwined to the extent that both refer to an eternal logic of rebalancing a debt that can never entirely be compensated for). On this problematic connection between moral guilt and economic debt, see Werner Hamacher, Guilt History: Benjamin's Sketch “Capitalism as Religion,” in 32 diacritics 81–106 (2002).Google Scholar

⁶ Hénaff, Marcel, The Price of Truth: Gift, Money, and Philosophy 398 (2010).Google Scholar

⁷ Sandel, Michael, What Money Can't Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets 7 (2012).Google Scholar

⁸ Wieland, Josef, Die Governance der Korruption, in Korruption: Unaufgeklärter Kapitalismus—Multidisziplinäre Perspektiven zu Funktionen und Folgen der Korruption 43, 43 (Stephan Jansen & Birger Priddat eds., 2005) (translation by Author).Google Scholar

⁹ Klitgaard, Robert, Gifts and Bribes, in Strategy and Choice 211 (Richard Zeckhauser ed., 1991).Google Scholar

¹⁰ Homann, Karl, Unternehmensethik und Korruption, 49 Zeitschrift für betriebswirtschaftliche Forschung (zfbf) 187, 192 (1997).Google Scholar

¹¹ Priddat, Birger, Schwarze Löcher der Verantwortung, Korruption: Die negative Variante von Public-Private Partnership, in Korruption: Unaufgeklärter Kapitalismus: Multidisziplinäre Perspektiven zu Funktionen und Folgen der Korruption 85 (Stephan Jansen & Birger Priddat eds., 2005).Google Scholar

¹² See Baecker, Dirk, Ämter, Themen und Kontakte: Zur Form der Politik im Netzwerk der Gesellschaft, in Der bewegte Staat 9 (Birger Priddat ed., 2000).Google Scholar

¹³ See generally Korruption als Ordnung zweiter Art (Birger Priddat & Michael Schmid eds., 2011).Google Scholar

¹⁴ Priddat, , supra note 11, at 90.Google Scholar

¹⁵ Priddat, Birger, Korruption als Second-Life-Economy, in Korruption als Ordnung zweiter Art 61 (Birger Priddat & Michael Schmid eds., 2011).Google Scholar

¹⁶ Walzer, Michael, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality 97 (1983).Google Scholar

¹⁷ Sandel, , supra note 7, at 7.Google Scholar

¹⁸ Id. at 46.Google Scholar

¹⁹ Id. at 14.Google Scholar

²⁰ See generally Boissevain, Jeremy, Friends of Friends: Networks, Manipulators, and Coalitions (1974).Google Scholar

²¹ Streck, Bernhard, Geben und Nehmen. Oder die Korruption in den Tiefen der Menschheit, 120 Kursbuch 1, 5 (1995).Google Scholar

²² Id. at 5 (translation by author).Google Scholar

²³ Nietzsche, , supra note 4, at 7.Google Scholar

²⁴ Aristotle, , Nicomachean Ethics, bk. II, at 1129 (H. Rackham trans., Loeb Classical Library ed. 1926) (c. 384 B.C.E.).Google Scholar

²⁵ Seele, Peter, Ökonomische Philosophie: Ein Plädoyer für die Rehabilitierung einer alten Disziplin, 14/1 Information Philosophie 30, 32 (2014).Google Scholar

²⁶ Bachmann, Viktoria, Der Grund des guten Lebens: Eine Untersuchung der paradigmatischen Konzepte von Sokrates, Aristoteles und Kant 133 (2013).Google Scholar

²⁷ Heimann, Raul, Die Frage nach der Gerechtigkeit: Platons Politeia I und die Gerechtigkeitstheorien von Aristoteles, Hobbes und Nietzsche 174 (2015).Google Scholar

²⁸ See generally Heidbrink, Ludger, Verena Rauen, Warum Wirtschaftsphilosophie? Eine kontroverse Auseinandersetzung, in 3.3 Was ist? Wirtschaftsphilosophische Erkundungen (Wolf-Dieter Enkelmann & Birger Priddat eds., 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).Google Scholar

²⁹ Aristotle, , supra note 24, at 10.Google Scholar

³⁰ Nietzsche, , supra note 4, at 46.Google Scholar

³¹ Id. at 45.Google Scholar

³² Mauss, Marcel, The Gift: Forms and Functions of Exchange in Archaic Societies (1966). Mauss studied archaic systems of gift exchange. One essential finding is that a thing that becomes a gift takes a power that almost forces the receiver to reciprocate. He refers generally to three types of archaic gift exchange, which often serve as the classical examples in current research on the gift: (1) the kula, the exchange of gifts on the Trobriand Islands; (2) the agonal exchange of potlatsch of indigenous peoples in North America; and, (3) the hau system used by the Maori in New Zealand. For further reading on philosophical conceptions of gift exchange based on the work by Mauss, see Theorien der Gabe zur Einführung (Iris Därmann ed., 2010). One major problem in the philosophical approaches to gift exchange is the question of whether there can be a gift which is not based on the economic principles of reciprocity and rebalancing to debt. In particular, Jacques Derrida has approached this question in his monograph Given Time: I. Counterfeit money (1992). For Derrida, the only gift which would be a “true”—i.e., non-economic gift—could be an unforeseen event, which is not part of any calculation or anticipation of the future and which would open the only possibility for the absolute new that cannot be part of any economic calculation, since it cannot refer to any former experience and thus cannot be anticipated in any way. This conception by Derrida has been criticized by Marcel Hénaff, who claims that Derrida applies the homo oeconomicus model to Mauss' description of archaic gift exchanges (Derrida refers to the potlatsch system in particular); although this economic model of human behavior, according to Hénaff, is inadequate for archaic gift exchanges, because, as will also be discussed in this essay, their goal was the establishment of mutual recognition, an idea which Hénaff transfers into an ethical theory.Google Scholar

³³ See generally Malinowski, Bronislaw, Argonauts of the Western Pacific (1922).Google Scholar

³⁴ Hénaff, supra note 6, at 6. Hénaff even applies the logic of exchange that characterizes corruption explicitly to the constitution of philosophy itself by asking to what extent philosophical knowledge can be the object of transactions.Google Scholar

³⁵ Hénaff, Marcel, Die Gabe der Philosophen: Gegenseitigkeit neu denken 56 (2014). For the original, see Le Don des philosophes: Repenser la reciprocite (2012).Google Scholar

³⁶ Id. (translation by author).Google Scholar

³⁷ Id. at 62.Google Scholar

³⁸ Hénaff, supra note 6, at 6.Google Scholar

³⁹ Id. at 394.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ See generally Simmel, Georg, Philosophie des Geldes (1989).Google Scholar

⁴¹ In this context, Hénaff follows Marx' theory on the accumulation of capital. See Karl Marx, The Capital: Critique of Political Economy (1887).Google Scholar

⁴² See generally Kant, , supra note 2.Google Scholar

⁴³ Hénaff, supra note 6, at 393.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ Walzer, , supra note 16, at 26.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ Hénaff, supra note 6, at 392.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ Id. at 397. An interesting critique of a concept of justice that is based on public order (as presupposed by, for example, John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971)) can be found in the following essay: Wolfgang Kersting, Herrschaftslegitimation, politische Gerechtigkeit und transzendentaler Tausch: Eine kritische Einführung in das politische Denken Ottfried Höffes, in Gerechtigkeit als Tausch? Auseinandersetzung mit der politischen Philosophie Ottfried Höffes 16 (Wolfgang Kersting ed., 1997).Google Scholar

⁴⁷ Priddat, , supra note 15, at 90.Google Scholar

⁴⁸ Hénaff, supra note 6, at 397.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ Id. at 398.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ Levinas, , supra note 1, at 219.Google Scholar

⁵¹ Levinas, Emmanuel, Ethics and Infinity—Conversations with Philippe Nemo 98 (1985).Google Scholar

⁵² Id. at 90.Google Scholar

⁵³ Aristotle, , Nicomachean Ethics, V.1, 1129 a3–19 (trans. Rackham).Google Scholar

⁵⁴ Id. at V.14, 1137 a26–b10.Google Scholar

⁵⁵ Id.at V.14, 1137 b10–29.Google Scholar

⁵⁶ Levinas, , supra note 1, at 23.Google Scholar

⁵⁷ Husserl, Edmund, Cartesianische Meditationen, Eine Einleitung in die Phänomenologie 97 (1995).Google Scholar

⁵⁸ By exteriority, Levinas means an absolute transcendence that cannot be integrated into a synthetic whole by any ontological, dialectical or metaphysical procedure.Google Scholar

⁵⁹ See generally Thomas Bedorf, Dimensionen des Dritten: Sozialphilosophische Modelle zwischen Ethischem und Politischem (2003); Pascal Delhom, Der Dritte: Levinas Philosophie zwischen Verantwortung und Gerechtigkeit (2000).Google Scholar

⁶⁰ Levinas, , supra note 1, at 212.Google Scholar

⁶¹ Levinas, Emmanuel, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence 165 (1981).Google Scholar

⁶² Levinas, , supra note 1, at 212; Levinas, supra note 61, at 165.Google Scholar