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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 06 March 2019
The Russian government is accused of hacking emails circulating among senior members of Hilary Clinton's campaign team to support President Trump's election in 2016. This was not the first time the United States was the target of massive cyber espionage: The Chinese government is believed to have gained sensitive information on 22.1 million US government employees through “cyber intrusions” in 2014. This Article will examine whether cyber espionage of this kind is unlawful under public international law and will conclude that it is. Specifically, such espionage can result in a violation of territorial sovereignty and will likely violate the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other States. Yet, based on the controversial “clean-hands-doctrine,” past US actions in the realms of cyber espionage and intervention may well invalidate any claims it asserts against Russia or China.
1 See Cyber Definitions, NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, https://ccdcoe.org/cyber-definitions.html (providing a definition for “cyber espionage” by country); Ella Shoshan, Applicability of International Law on Cyber Espionage Intrusions 14–15 (2014) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Stockholm University) (on file with author).Google Scholar
2 See Office of the Director of Nat'l Intelligence, Background to “Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in recent US Elections:” The Analytical Process and Cyber Incident Attribution (Jan. 6, 2017), https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/3254229-ICA-2017-01.html#document/p1; Luke Harding, Top Democrat's Emails Hacked By Russia After Aide Made Typo, Investigation Finds, The Guardian (Dec. 14, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/dec/14/dnc-hillary-clinton-emails-hacked-russia-aide-typo-investigation-finds; Sanger, David E., Obama Strikes Back at Russia for Election Hacking, New York Times (Dec. 29, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/29/us/politics/russia-election-hacking-sanctions.html?_r=1.Google Scholar
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5 The principle of sovereign equality will not be discussed here, as its application does currently not seem relevant to the allegations made against Russia and China; for more details on this issue, see Questions Relating to the Seizure and Detention of Certain Documents and Data (Timor-Leste v. Australia), General List No. 156, Order (March 3, 2014), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/156/18078.pdf (focusing especially on para. 27).Google Scholar
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10 Islands of Palmas Case (Neth. v. U.S.), 1928 R.I.A.A. 829, 838 (1928).Google Scholar
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12 For the purposes of the discussion here, it is irrelevant whether the alleged cyber espionage was undertaken by government officials or by private actors at the Russian/Chinese governments' behest.Google Scholar
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16 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7.Google Scholar
17 Charter of the Organization of American States, Apr. 30, 1948, 119 U.N.T.S. 47; see also Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance art. 8, May 14, 1955, 219 U.N.T.S. 23.Google Scholar
18 G.A. Res. 2131 (XX), Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty (Dec. 21, 1965).Google Scholar
19 Id. Google Scholar
20 G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (Oct. 24, 1970).Google Scholar
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22 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 168, para. 162 (Dec. 19).Google Scholar
23 U.K. v. Alb., 1949 I.C.J. at 34–5.Google Scholar
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25 Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. at para. 205 (emphasis added); see also Shull, supra note 21, at 4.Google Scholar
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27 Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. at para. 205; see also Shull, supra note 21, at 4.Google Scholar
28 Shoshan, supra note 1, at 45–7; Shull, supra note 21, at 6–7; Pål Wrange, Intervention in National and Private Cyberspace and International law, Stockholm Faculty of L. Research Paper Series No. 23 8–9 (2017). However, Wrange bases this analysis on the assumption that the agent, even when operating remotely from his own country, is violating the domestic laws of the target State, which in turn allows the author to conclude that the agent is guilty of an illegal intervention. Schmalenbach, supra note 26, at 30 (mentioning the same argument but leaving it open to question whether the author agrees with it).Google Scholar
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33 See, e.g., U.N. Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, U.N. Doc. A/63/677, (Jan. 12, 2009).Google Scholar
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35 See, e.g., Bright, Martin, Ed Vulliamy & Peter Beaumont, Revealed: US Dirty Tricks to Win Vote on Iraq, The Guardian (Mar. 2, 2003), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/mar/02/usa.iraq. The authors refer to a memo describing the US spying on UN diplomats that represent then-sitting States of the Security Council. The authors further explain that:Google Scholar
The memo is directed at senior NSA officials and advises them that the agency is “mounting a surge” aimed at gleaning information not only on how delegations on the Security Council will vote on any second resolution on Iraq, but also “policies,” “negotiating positions,” “alliances” and “dependencies”—the “whole gamut of information that could give US policymakers an edge in obtaining results favourable to US goals or to head off surprises.”
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37 Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare 45 (Schmitt, Michael N. ed., 2013).Google Scholar
38 A definition was provided by Judge Hudson in his Individual Opinion in the River Meuse Case before the PCIJ: “It would seem …that where two parties have assumed an identical or a reciprocal obligation, one party which is engaged in a continuing non-performance of that obligation should not be permitted to take advantage of a similar non-performance of that obligation by the other party.” See Diversion of Water from the River Meuse (Neth. v. Belg.), Judgement, 1937 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 70, at para. 323 (June 28).Google Scholar
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40 Glenn Greenwald, No Place to Hide: Edward Snowden, the NSA, and the U.S. Surveillance State (2014); Marcel Rosenbach & Holger Stark, Der NSA Komplex (2015).Google Scholar
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