1 The Court began its work on Jan. 1, 1990.Google Scholar

2 Nevertheless, the Fundamental Law contains some guidelines for interpretation. Thus, it refers to the so-called necessity-proportionality test developed by the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court. See 2011 Magyarország Alaptörvénye (Art. I, para. 3 of the Fundamental Law of 2011) (Hung.).Google Scholar

3 See Schiemann, J. W., The Politics of Pact-Making: Hungary's Negotiated Transition to Democracy in Comparative Perspective 37–84 (2005).Google Scholar

4 See A Magyar Köztársaság Alkotmánya [Constitution of the Republic of Hungary] Act No. XXXI (as amended 1989).Google Scholar

5 András, Jakab, The Republic of Hungary: Commentary, in Constitutions of the Countries of the World 8 (R. Wolfrum & R. Grote eds., 2008).Google Scholar

6 See Schwartz, Herman, The Struggle for Constitutional Justice in Post-Communist Europe 77 (2000); András Körösényi Et Al., The Hungarian Political System 119, 122–23 (2009).Google Scholar

7 See generally Gábor, Halmai, Grundlagen und Grundzüge staatlichen Verfassungsrecht: Ungarn, in 1 Handbuch Ius Publicum Europaeum 693 (Armin von Bogdandy, Pedro Cruz Villalón & Peter M. Huber eds., 2007).Google Scholar

8 On the major characteristic of this model, see Louis Favoreu, Les Cours Constitutionnelles 16–31 (1986).Google Scholar

9 See László Sólyom, Az alkotmánybíráskodás kezdetei Magyarországon [The Beginnings of Constitutional Review in Hungary] 114–15 (2001). See generally László Sólyom & Georg Brunner, Constitutional Judiciary in a New Democracy: The Hungarian Constitutional Court (2000).Google Scholar

10 E.g. the members of the Constitutional Court may not pursue political activities or make political statements, and only those who have not filled leading political or governmental positions in the former four years can be elected.Google Scholar

11 See Halmai, Gábor, The Hungarian Approach to Constitutional Review: The End of Activism? The First Decade of the Hungarian Constitutional Court, in Constitutional Justice, East and West: Democratic Legitimacy and Constitutional Courts in Post-Communist Europe in a Comparative Perspective 189, 189–211 (Wojciech Sadurski ed., 2002); Schwartz, supra note 6, at 87–108.Google Scholar

12 In Hungarian literature, the term, “jurisdictional activism,” refers to the efforts of the Court to extend its powers, while “interpretive activism” means its practice of relying on extra-constitutional sources in its reasoning.Google Scholar

13 It is certain, however, that the Court acted as a sovereign, quasi-lawmaker also in legal areas where it could have been grounded on a well-established and crystallized body of law. Its conceptual innovations have extended, for example, to criminal procedure and private law, stressing that the constitutional concepts of property or the guarantees of criminal law are independent of their traditional approaches. See generally, e.g., Balogh Zsolt, Alapjogi tesztek az Alkotmánybíróság gyakorlatában [Tests of Fundamental Rights Protection in the Jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court] in A megtalált alkotmány? A magyar alapjogi bíráskodás első kilenc éve [The Constitution Found? The First Nine Years of Hungarian Constitutional Review on Fundamental Rights] 123 (Gábor Halmai ed., 2000).Google Scholar

14 As the minority opinion argued in the Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] 23/1990 X. 31 (Hung.) [hereinafter known as Death Penalty Case].Google Scholar

15 For example, in the first abortion decision, the Court did not undertake the decision about the constitutional status of the fetus, and declared that this issue is a “legislative question” to be determined by the Parliament. Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] 64/1991 XII. 17 (Hung.).Google Scholar

16 See generally Kommers, Donald P., Germany: Balancing Rights and Duties, in Interpreting Constitutions: A Comparative Study 178 (Jeffrey Goldsworthy ed., 2007).Google Scholar

17 See András Sajó, Reading the Invisible Constitution: Judicial Review in Hungary, 15 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 253, 253–67 (1995). See generally Death Penalty Case, supra note 14.Google Scholar

18 See cases cited infra notes 51–52.Google Scholar

19 See Ely, John Hart, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 1–41 (1980); Dennis J. Goldford, The Political Character of Constitutional Interpretation, 23 Polity 255, 255–81 (1990).Google Scholar

20 See Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] 56/1991 XI.8. (Hung.).Google Scholar

21 See Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] 9/1992 I.30. (Hung.).Google Scholar

22 See, e.g., Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] 3/1991 II. 7. (Hung.); Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] 31/2001 VII. 11. (Hung.).Google Scholar

23 See Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] 4/1993 II. 12. (Hung.); Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] 1/1999 II. 24. (Hung.).Google Scholar

24 See Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] 31/2001 VII. 11. (Hung.); Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] 95/B/2001 (Hung.).Google Scholar

25 See generally Cole, Taylor, Three Constitutional Courts: A Comparison, in Politics in Europe: Comparisons and Interpretations 246 (Arend Lijphart ed., 1969).Google Scholar

26 See A Magyar Köztársaság Alkotmánya [Constitution of the Republic of Hungary] art. 54, para. 1.Google Scholar

27 See Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] 23/1990 X. 31. (Hung.).Google Scholar

28 Some commentators suppose that Catholic theology had an influence on the Court's discovering the principle of the indivisibility of the right to life and human dignity. See generally Tóth Gábor Attila, Az emberi méltósághoz való jog és az élethez való jog [The right to life and the right to human dignity], in Emberi jogok [Human Rights] 310 (Gábor Halmai & Tóth Gábor Attila eds., 2003).Google Scholar

29 Death Penalty Case, supra note 14. The Court has never clarified what is the “unrestrictable” content of the right to human dignity, when all unenumerated rights, derived from it, can be limited by law.Google Scholar

30 Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] 8/1990 IV. 23. (Hung.).Google Scholar

31 See Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] 57/1991 XI. 8. (Hung.).Google Scholar

32 See Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] 19/1992 I. 30. (Hung.); Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] 1/1994 I. 7. (Hung.).Google Scholar

33 See Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] 58/2001 XII. 7. (Hung.).Google Scholar

34 See Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] 22/1992 IV. 10. (Hung.).Google Scholar

35 See Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] 21/1996 V. 17. (Hung.).Google Scholar

36 See Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] 14/1995 III. 13. (Hung.). The Court consistently insisted on protecting the traditional view of marriage as the union of a man and a woman. See Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] 154/2008 XII. 17. (Hung.).Google Scholar

37 See Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] 64/1991 XII. 17.; Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] 48/1998 XI. 23. (Hung.).Google Scholar

38 See Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] 4/1993 II. 12. (Hung.).Google Scholar

39 See Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] 970/B/1994 (Hung.).Google Scholar

40 See Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] 47/2007 VII. 3. (Hung.).Google Scholar

41 This is the most famous case, since the first president of the Court, László Sólyom confirmed it himself in an interview: “A ‘nehéz eseteknél’ a bíró erkölcsi felfogása jut szerephez [In ‘hard cases,’ the judge's moral perception plays a role].” Interview with László Sólyom, President of the Constitutional Court, in 1 Fundamentum (1997). Sólyom also acknowledged that the Court's concept of the rule of law reflects the German and the Anglo-Saxon approach of this concept. See Sólyom, supra note 9, at 142.Google Scholar

42 See Dupré, Catherine, Importing Human Dignity from German Constitutional Case Law, in The Constitution Found? The First Nine Years of the Hungarian Constitutional Review on Fundamental Rights 215, 215–21 (Gabor Halmai ed., 2000).Google Scholar

43 For more details see Szente, Zoltán, Hungary: Unsystematic and Incoherent Borrowing of Law: The Use of Foreign Judicial Precedents in the Jurisdprudence of the Constitutional Court, 1999–2010, in The Use of Foreign Precedents by Constitutional Judges 253, 266–69 (Tania Groppi & Marie-Claire Ponthoreau eds., 2013).Google Scholar

44 Many times, the Court refers not only to the respective foreign judicial cases, but also describes the relevant legal regime of some countries, like Germany, France, or Britain.Google Scholar

45 See Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] 22/2003 IV. 28. (Hung.).Google Scholar

46 See Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] 65/2007 X. 18. (Hung.).Google Scholar

47 See Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] 32/2008 III. 12. (Hung.).Google Scholar

48 Nevertheless, in some politically hard cases, the Court long delayed its decision, like in case of the Police Act of 1994, Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] 47/2003 X. 27. (Hung.); Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] 905/B/2003 (Hung.); Media Law of 1996, Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] 46/2007 VI. 27. (Hung.).Google Scholar

49 See Posner, Richard A., The Problems of Jurisprudence 71–123 (1990); Susan J. Brison & Walter SinnottArmstrong, Contemporary Perspectives on Constitutional Interpretation 20 (1993).Google Scholar

50 See Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] 16/1991 IV. 20. (Hung.); Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] 28/1991 VI. 3. (Hung.).Google Scholar

51 See Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] 14/2000 V.12. (Hung.).Google Scholar

52 Another decision, approving the penalization of the breach of national symbols, is also an example of the changing practice, see Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] 13/2000 V. 12. (Hung.).Google Scholar

53 See Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court]29/1997 IV. 29. (Hung.); Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] 52/1997 X. 14. (Hung.).Google Scholar

54 See Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] 30/2000 X. 11. (Hung.).Google Scholar

55 See Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] 63/2003 XII. 15. (Hung.).Google Scholar

56 See Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] 38/2000 X. 31. (Hung.). Similarly, the Court declared that not all violations of the Standing Orders of Parliament result in the annulment of the law. See Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] 109/2008 IX. 26. (Hung.).Google Scholar

57 See A Magyar Köztársaság Alkotmánya [Constitution of the Republic of Hungary] Act No. XXXII, art. 43, para. 4 (as amended 1989).Google Scholar

58 See A Magyar Köztársaság Alkotmánya [Constitution of the Republic of Hungary] art. 20, para. 2.Google Scholar

59 Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] 23/1990 X. 31. (Hung.) (Sólyom, J., dissenting).Google Scholar

60 See Cole, supra note 25.Google Scholar

61 The intentionalist judge always seeks the original intent of the framers, examining what effects they wanted to reach with wording. See Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. Rev. 209, 209–16 (1980). Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law 17 (1997) (“It is the law that governs, not the intent of the lawgiver.”).Google Scholar

62 Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Interpretation: Textual Meaning, Original Intent, and Judicial Review 35 (1999).Google Scholar

63 Like the “right to work” clause. See A Magyar Köztársaság Alkotmánya [Constitution of the Republic of Hungary] art. 70/B, para. 1.Google Scholar

64 See sources cited supra notes 48–49.Google Scholar

65 See Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] 30/1992 V.26. (Hung.).Google Scholar

66 See Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] 38/1993 VI. 11. (Hung.).Google Scholar

67 Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] 55/1994 XI. 10. (Hung.).Google Scholar

68 A Magyar Köztársaság Alkotmánya [Constitution of the Republic of Hungary] art. 8, para. 2.Google Scholar

69 See Szente, , supra note 43, at 262–64.Google Scholar

70 See Sólyom, supra note 9, at 154, 219, 226, 417–18, 442, 474; Gábor Halmai & Tóth Gábor Attila, Az emberi jogok általános kérdései [The general questions of human rights], in Emberi jogok [Human Rights] 113, 113–14 (Gábor Halmai & Tóth Gábor Attila eds., 2003).Google Scholar

71 See Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] 11/1992 III. 5. (Hung.).Google Scholar

72 See Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] 6/1998 III.11. (Hung.); Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] 14/2004 V.7. (Hung.).Google Scholar

73 From the mid-1990s the Court declined to further elaborate upon the hierarchy of basic rights.Google Scholar

74 See Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] 61/1992 XI. 20. (Hung).Google Scholar

75 See Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] 20/1990 X.4. (Hung.); Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] 7/1991 II.28. (Hung.); Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] 11/1992 III.5. (Hung.); see also Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] 30/1992 V. 26. (Hung.); Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] 11/1993 II.27. (Hung.); Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] 56/1994 XI. 10. (Hung.); Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] 6/1998 III. 11. (Hung.); Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] 18/2000 VI. 6. (Hung.); Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] 13/2001 V. 14. (Hung.); Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] 27/2002 VI. 28. (Hung.); Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] 13/2003 IV. 9. (Hung.); Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] 20/2005 V. 26. (Hung.); see also Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] 11/2007 III. 7. (Hung.); Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] 144/2008 XI. 26. (Hung.).Google Scholar

76 See Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] 43/1995 VI.30 (Hung.); Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] 45/1995 VI. 30. (Hung.).Google Scholar

77 See Sólyom, supra note 9, at 117.Google Scholar

78 See Kis, János, Constitutional democracy 278–84 (2003).Google Scholar

79 See Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] 11/1992 III. 5. (Hung.).Google Scholar

80 See Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] 53/1993 X. 13. (Hung.).Google Scholar

81 See Kis, supra note 78, at 285–97.Google Scholar

82 See Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] 27/1998 VI. 16. (Hung.).Google Scholar

83 See Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] 59/2007 X. 17. (Hung.).Google Scholar

84 The Socialist Party prevented their re-election, and, against custom, after their retirement, they did not receive the Order of Merit of the Republic of Hungary [Magyar Köztársasági Érdemrend].Google Scholar

85 See Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] 7/1991 XI. 8. (Hung) (repealing the final judgment of an ordinary court because it had been based on an unconstitutional law, although the Constitutional Court obviously did not have such a power).Google Scholar

86 See Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] 23/1998 VI. 9. (Hung.) (declaring that the Parliament is bound to make proper procedural rules of constitutional remedies for individual judicial cases).Google Scholar

87 See Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] 42/2005 XI. 14. (Hung.); Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] 70/2006 XII. 13. (Hung.).Google Scholar

88 See Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] 2/1993 I. 22. (Hung.) (stating that a national referendum cannot be held about the dissolution of parliament because the Constitution exhaustively enumerates the cases for dissolution, and so this new method would be an “implicit constitutional amendment”).Google Scholar

89 The Act No. LIX. of 1997 on the amendment of the Constitution excluded explicitly only “the provisions of the Constitution on national referenda and popular initiatives” from the possible subjects of a national referendum. A Magyar Köztársaság Alkotmánya [Constitution of the Republic of Hungary] art. 28/C, para. 5, pt. c.Google Scholar

90 See e.g., Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] 7/2004 III.24. (Hung.) (invalidating the law on the reorganization of the Hungarian Financial Supervisory Authority because the statute failed to ensure the continuous work of this public authority).Google Scholar

91 The interpretive doctrine of socialist legal theory was based, more or less, on the classical categorization of Savigny, distinguishing (a) the grammatical, (b) the logical, and (c) the historic methods of interpretation, sometimes completed by (d) the systematic method. See Friedrich Carl von Savigny, Vorlesungen über juristische Methodologie 1802–42 91–95, 215–46 (2004). On the reception of these methods, see generally Szabó Imre, A jogszabályok értelmezése [The interpretation of Legal Rules] (1960).Google Scholar

92 Szente, supra note 43, at 270.Google Scholar

93 Just like mainstream American legal scholars, most members of the Hungarian Constitutional Court have never believed that there could be an authoritative method of constitutional interpretation that would lead to the proper choice in each constitutional dispute. See generally Jackson, Vicki C. & Greene, Jamal, Constitutional Interpretation in Comparative Perspective: Comparing Judges or Courts?, in Comparative Constitutional Law 604 (Tim Ginsburg & Rosalind Dixon eds., 2011).Google Scholar