¹ Beloff, Michael, Tim Kerr & Marie Demetriou, Sports Law 5 (1999). According to these authors, the term “sports law” is “a valid description of a system of law governing the practice of sports.” They also note that “the public's limitless enthusiasm for sport and its importance to our cultural heritage makes sports law more than mere private law” (Id., 4).Google Scholar

² See Chappelet, Jean-Loup & Kübler-Mabbott, Brenda, The International Olympic Committee and the Olympic System: The governance of sport (2008); and Alexandre Miguel Mestre, The Law of the Olympic Games (2009).Google Scholar

³ David, Paul, A Guide to the World Anti-Doping Code: A Fight for the Spirit of Sport (2008).Google Scholar

⁴ An overview is in Franck Latty, La LEX SPORTIVA. Recherche sur le droit transnational (2007); and in Lorenzo Casini, Il diritto globale dello sport (2010).Google Scholar

⁵ Foster, Ken, Is There a Global Sports Law?, 2 Entertainment and Sports Law Journal 1, 4 (2003), who describes “global sports law” as a “transnational autonomous legal order created by the private global institutions that govern international sport,” “a contractual order, with its binding force coming from agreements to submit to the authority and jurisdiction of international sporting federation” and not “governed by national legal systems” (id., 2). This author considers “global sports law” a significant example of spontaneous global law without a State, according to the definition provided by Global Law Without a State (Gunther Teubner ed., 1997); and Teubner, Gunther, Un droit spontané dans la société mondiale, in: Le droit saisi par la mondialisation, 197 (Charles-Albert Morand ed., 2001).Google Scholar

⁶ It is worth noting that private law theory in the sport context has been functionally linked to the necessity of safeguarding the autonomy of sports from interference by public authorities.Google Scholar

⁷ From this perspective, the case of doping control measures is highly significant. The establishment of the WADA, by the IOC and by States, and the process of harmonization undertaken with the approval of the World Anti-Doping Code, have in fact led to the creation of a uniform regulatory system, and, at the same time, of a dense network of national bodies, mainly of a public nature.Google Scholar

⁸ The Court of Arbitration for Sport 1984–2004 (Ian S. Blackshaw, Robert C.R. Siekmann & Janwillem Soek eds, 2006); Rigozzi, Antonio, L'arbitrage international en matière de sport 132 (2005); Merone, Aniello, Il Tribunale arbitrale dello sport (2009); and Stebler, Simone, Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS), in: Institutional Arbitration. Tasks and Powers of Different Arbitration Institutions, 255 (Pascale Gola, Claudia Götz Staehelin & Karin Graf eds, 2009).Google Scholar

⁹ Nafziger, James A.R., Lex Sportiva and CAS, in: The Court of Arbitration for Sport 1984–2004, 409 (Ian S. Blackshaw, Robert C.R. Siekmann & Janwillem Soek eds, 2006); Rigozzi (note 8), 628; and Massimo Coccia, Fenomenologia della controversia sportiva e dei suoi modi di risoluzione, Rivista di diritto ed Economia dello Sport 605, 621 (1997), adopt instead a wider definition of the lex sportiva (i.e., referred to the large amount of customary private norms developed through international and national sports arbitrations). See also Michael Beloff, Is there a lex sportiva?, 5 Sweet &Maxwell's International Sports Law Review 49 (2005); Foster, Ken, Lex Sportiva and Lex Ludica: the Court of Arbitration for Sport's Jurisprudence, 3 Entertainment and Sports Law Journal (available at: http://go.warwick.ac.uk/eslj/issues/volume3/number2/foster); and Sports law (Lex sportiva) in the World. Regulations and Implementation (Dimitrios P. Panagiotopoulos ed., 2004).Google Scholar

¹⁰ See Carbone, Sergio M., Il contributo della lex mercatoria alla precisazione della lex sportiva, in: Diritto internazionale dello sport, 227 (Edoardo Greppi & Michele Vellano eds, 2006); Röthel, Anne, Lex mercatoria, lex sportiva, lex technica - Private Rechtsetzung jenseits des Nationalstaats?, 62 JuristenZeitung 755 (2007); and Die Privatisierung des Privatrechts – Rechtliche Gestaltung ohne staatlichen Zwang (Carl-Heinz Witt, Matthias Casper, Liane Bednarz, Martin Gebauer, Jan Gernoth, Markus Grahn, Jens Haubold, Stefan Huber, Götz Schulze, Christoph Teichmann & Nika Witteborg eds, 2003); and Druzin, Bryan H., Law Without The State: The Theory of High Engagement and The Emergence of Spontaneous Legal Order Within Commercial Systems, 42 Georgetown Journal of International Law 559 (2010).Google Scholar

¹¹ Latty (note 4), 31, links the concept of lex sportiva to “les règles transnationales opérant dans le domaine du sport” and to the “manière dont elles s'agencent les unes par rapport aux autres,” so that it reveals “la présence d'un ordre juridique transnational sportif unitaire” (id., 39). On sports law as “transnational law,” also Bruno Simma, The Court of Arbitration for Sport (1988), in: The Court of Arbitration for Sport 1984–2004, 21 (Ian S. Blackshaw, Robert C.R. Siekmann & Janwillem Soek eds, 2006).Google Scholar

¹² Frankfurt, Oberlandesgericht, D. Baumann / D.L.V., 18 April 2001, 8 Zeitschrift für Sport und Recht 161 (2001); on these aspects, see Andreas Wax, Internationales Sportrecht: Unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des Sportvölkerrechts 173 (2009), who deals with the concept of a lex sportiva internationalis. Google Scholar

¹³ Swiss Federal Court, 20 December 2005, BGE 132 II 285, para. 1.3 (“The rules of (international) sport federations may only be applied by means of a reference to their substantive law and therefore can only be recognized as an agreement between the parties, over which mandatory national laws take precedence.”)Google Scholar

¹⁴ According to James A.R. Nafziger, International Sports Law 1 (2004), “international sports law” means a process that includes “a more or less distinctive body of rules, principles, institutions and procedures to govern important consequences of transnational sports activity.” For Foster (note 5), 4, international sports law embraces “general principles of law that are automatically applicable to sport.” Ola O. Olatawura, Fundamental Doctrines of International Sport Law, International Sports Journal 130 (2008), describes “international sport law” as “the specialized branch of transnational law that globally regulates private and public participants conduct and claims in sport.” In French legal scholarship, Alegría Borras, Existe-il un droit international du sport?, in: Noveaux itinéraires en droit. Hommage à François Rigaux, 187 (1993); and Karaquillo, Jean-Pierre, Droit international du sport, 309 Recueil des Cours, 9 (2004). In Germany, Wax (note 12). In Italy, Diritto internazionale dello sport (Edoardo Greppi & Michele Vellano eds, 2006); formerly, Massimo Severo Giannini, Ancora sugli ordinamenti giuridici sportivi (1996), in: 9 Scritti 1991–96, 441 (Massimo Severo Giannini ed., 2006), who wrote that in sport the term “international” refers to a “diritto superstatale,” meaning not the “diritto proprio di un ordinamento giuridico a sé,” but “una normativa interstato e superstato” (id., 444).Google Scholar

¹⁵ These issues are widely analyzed by Latty (note 4), 416, and Casini (note 4), 226.Google Scholar

¹⁶ See Teubner, Gunther, Global Private Regimes: Neo-Spontaneous Law and Dual Constitution of Autonomous Sector?, in: Public Governance of the Age of Globalization, 71 (Karl-Heinz Ladeur ed., 2004); and Schepel, Harm, The Constitution of Private Governance. Product Standards in the Regulation of Integrating Markets (2005).Google Scholar

¹⁷ Joseph und seine brüder, a four-part novel by Thomas Mann, written from 1926 to 1943.Google Scholar

¹⁸ The history of the CAS is illustrated in The Court of Arbitration for Sport 1984–2004 (Ian S. Blackshaw, Robert C.R. Siekmann & Janwillem Soek eds, 2006); see also Daniel H. Yi, Turning Medals Into Medal: Evaluating The Court Of Arbitration of Sport As An International Tribunal, 6 Asper Review of International Trade & Business Law 289 (2006); Rigozzi (note 8), 132.Google Scholar

¹⁹ According to Kéba Mbaye, this formula comes directly from Juan Antonio Samaranch, and it is reported in the Swiss Federal Court decision A. et B. v. Comité International Olympique, Fédération Internationale de Ski et Tribunal Arbitral du Sport, 4P.267/2002, 27 May 2003, BGE 129 III 445, 462. That was the famous case Lazutina/Danilova, in which the Swiss Court acknowledged that the CAS had gained its independence from the IOC after the 1993–94 reform.Google Scholar

²⁰ Latty (note 4), 65; citing François Alaphilippe, Légitimité et légalité des structures internationales du sport: une toile de fond, Revue juridique et économique du sport 15 (1993).Google Scholar

²¹ For these data, see http://www.tas-cas.org/statistics.Google Scholar

²² The Panel had jurisdiction over all disputes between national athletic federations affiliated to the IAAF, or between national member federation and the IAAF Council or Congress, see Laura Tarasti, Legal Solutions in the International Doping Cases – Awards by the IAAF Arbitration Panel 1985–1999 (2000); and Vedder, Christoph, The Heritage of Two Decades of Arbitration in Doping-Related Disputes, in: The Court of Arbitration for Sport 1984– 2004, 266 (Ian S. Blackshaw, Robert C.R. Siekmann & Janwillem Soek eds, 2006).Google Scholar

²³ Swiss Federal Court, Gundel v. Fédération Equestre Internationale, 15 March 1993, BGE 119 II 271.Google Scholar

²⁴ The Court in fact observed that the IOC “est compétent pour modifier le Statut du TAS; il supporte en outre les frais de fonctionnement de ce tribunal et joue un rôle considérable dans la désignation de ses membres” (BGE 119 II 280).Google Scholar

²⁵ See Kane, Diane, Twenty Years On: An Evaluation of the Court of Arbitration for Sport (2003), in: The Court of Arbitration for Sport 1984-2004, 455, 458 (Ian S. Blackshaw, Robert C.R. Siekmann & Janwillem Soek eds, 2006).Google Scholar

²⁶ Art. S1 Statutes of the Bodies Working for the Settlement of Sports-related Disputes. Therefore the CAS can be likened to institutions such as the International Court of Arbitration (ICC), the International Centre for the Settlement of the Investment Disputes (ICSID) or, for the USA, the American Association of Arbitration (AAA).Google Scholar

²⁷ R27 CAS Procedural Rules.Google Scholar

²⁸ Id. Google Scholar

²⁹ See http://www.tas-cas.org/en/20questions.asp/4-3-218-1010-4-1-1/5-0-1010-13-0-0.Google Scholar

³⁰ And “Such agreement may be on a one-off basis or appear in a contract or the statutes or regulations of a sports organization. Parties may agree in advance to submit any future dispute to arbitration by the CAS, or they can agree to have recourse to the CAS after a dispute has arisen” (http://www.tas-cas.org/en/20questions.asp/4-3-219-1010-4-1-1/5-0-1010-13-0-0).Google Scholar

³¹ There are also two field offices, one in New York and the other in Sydney.Google Scholar

³² See Art. S4 Statutes of the Bodies Working for the Settlement of Sports-related Disputes: The ICAS is composed of 20 members, namely high-level jurists appointed in the following manner: a. 4 appointed by the International Sports Federations, viz. 3 by the Summer Olympic IFs and 1 by the Winter Olympic IFs, chosen from within or from outside their membership; b. 4 appointed by the Association of the National Olympic Committees, chosen from within or from outside its membership; c. 4 appointed by the IOC, chosen from within or from outside its membership; d. 4 appointed by the 12 members of the ICAS listed above, after appropriate consultation with a view to safeguarding the interests of the athletes; e. 4 appointed by the 16 members of the ICAS listed above and chosen from among personalities independent of the bodies designating the other members of the ICAS. Some say, however, that these mechanisms would give to the Olympic movement even more influence on the CAS than before: on these aspects, Yi (note 18), 316.Google Scholar

³³ According to the Art. S6 Statutes of the Bodies Working for the Settlement of Sports-related Disputes, ICAS adopts and amends its Statute and the Statute of the CAS; it looks after the financing of the CAS; it supervises the activities of the CAS Court Office; if it deems such action appropriate, it sets up regional or local, permanent or ad hoc arbitration structures; it may create a legal aid fund to facilitate access to CAS arbitration for natural persons without sufficient financial means; it may take any other action which it deems likely to protect the rights of the parties and, in particular, to best guarantee the total independence of the arbitrators and to promote the settlement of sports-related disputes through arbitration.Google Scholar

³⁴ Before the 1994 reform, the list included only 60 personalities. The personalities designated by the ICAS appear on the CAS list for a renewable period of four years. The ICAS reviews the complete list every four years; the new list enters into force on 1 January of the following year. In establishing the list of CAS arbitrators, the ICAS shall call upon personalities with full legal training, recognized competence with regard to sports law and/or international arbitration, a good knowledge of sport in general and a good command of at least one CAS working language. In addition, in designating the arbitrators the ICAS shall respect, in principle, the following distribution: 1/5th shall be selected from among the persons proposed by the IOC, chosen from within its membership or from outside; 1/5th shall be selected from among the persons proposed by the IFs, chosen from within their membership or outside; 1/5th shall be selected from among the persons proposed by the NOCs, chosen from within their membership or outside; 1/5th shall be chosen, after appropriate consultations, with a view to safeguarding the interests of the athletes; 1/5th shall be chosen from among persons independent of the bodies responsible for proposing arbitrators in conformity with Art. S14. In appointing the personalities who appear on the list of arbitrators, the ICAS shall, wherever possible, ensure fair representation of the continents and of the different juridical cultures. (Arts S13 et seq. Statutes of the Bodies Working for the Settlement of Sports-related Disputes). In 2009, the list of arbitrators included around 300 personalities; some of them appeared also in a special list regarding soccer (http://www.tas-cas.org/arbitrators-genlist).Google Scholar

³⁵ Art. S3 Statutes of the Bodies Working for the Settlement of Sports-related Disputes.Google Scholar

³⁶ The CAS includes a Court Office composed of a Secretary General and one or more Counsel, who replace the Secretary General when required (Art. S22 Statutes of the Bodies Working for the Settlement of Sports-related Disputes). The activities of the CAS Court Office are supervised by the ICAS, which appoints the CAS Secretary General.Google Scholar

³⁷ See Blackshaw, Ian S., Mediating Sports Disputes: National and International Perspectives (2009).Google Scholar

³⁸ Art. S20 Statutes of the Bodies Working for the Settlement of Sports-related Disputes. Arts R27-R37 CAS Procedural Rules establish provisions as to Application of Rules, Seat, Language, Representation and Assistance, Notifications and Communications, Time limits, Independence and Qualifications of Arbitrators, Challenge, Removal, Replacement, Provisional and Conservatory Measures.Google Scholar

³⁹ See Arts R27-R37 and R38-46 CAS Procedural Rules.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ See Arts R27-R37 and R47-59 CAS Procedural Rules.Google Scholar

⁴¹ Such assignment may not be contested by the parties or raised by them as a cause of irregularity. See The Proceedings before the Court of Arbitration for Sport, CAS & FSA/SAV Conference Lausanne 2006 (Antonio Rigozzi & Michele Bernasconi eds, 2007); and Merone (note 8), 105.Google Scholar

⁴² The early experiences of the CAS Olympic games ad hoc division are analyzed by Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, Arbitration at the Olympics – Issues of fast-track dispute resolution and sports law (2001).Google Scholar

⁴³ Latty (note 4), 296.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ Marchetti, Barbara, Il sistema di risoluzione delle dispute del WTO: amministrazione, corte o tertium genus?, Rivista trimestrale di diritto pubblico 933 (2008).Google Scholar

⁴⁵ Nafziger (note 9); 409, and Foster (note 9).Google Scholar

⁴⁶ For instance, TAS 2007/A/1424, Federación Española de Bolos (FEB) v. Fédération Internationale des Quilleurs (FIQ) & Federació Catalana de Bitlles i Bowling (FCBB), Award of 23 April 2008, para. 17; TAS 2004/A/776, Federacio Catalana de Patinatge (FCP) v. International Roller Sports Federation (FIRS), Award of 15 July 2005, para. 15; or CAS 2002/O/373, Canadian Olympic Committee (COC) & Beckie Scott / International Olympic Committee (IOC), Award of 18 December 2003, para. 14.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ See Arts 15.4, 45.6 and 59 of the Olympic Charter.Google Scholar

⁴⁸ See, for instance, Art. 62, para. 3 of FIFA Statutes or Art. 36 of Fédération Internationale de Basketball Amateur (FIBA) General Statutes or Arts 74 et seq. of Union Cycliste Internationale (UCI) Constitution.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ See, for instance, Art. 13 of the World Anti-Doping Code.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ The role of the CAS as the “the more suitable regulator” to supervise the international sport system is argued by Marcus Mazzucco & Hilary Findlay, The Supervisory Role of the Court of Arbitration for Sport in Regulating the International Sport System, 1 International Journal of Sport and Society 131 (2010).Google Scholar

⁵¹ CAS 2007/A/1370, FIFA v. Superior Tribunal de Justiça Desportiva do Futebol & Confederação Brasileira de Futebol & Mr. Ricardo Lucas Dodô; CAS 2007/A/1376, WADA v. Superior Tribunal de Justiça Desportiva do Futebol & Confederação Brasileira de Futebol & Mr. Ricardo Lucas Dodô, para. 88.Google Scholar

⁵² See http://www.tas-cas.org/d2wfiles/document/422/5048/0/rules%20English%20(2008.07.04).pdf.Google Scholar

⁵³ With regard to the principle of procedural fairness, for instance, CAS 2008/O/1455, Boxing Australia v. AIBA, Award of 16 April 2008.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ Latty (note 4), 320. In CAS-JO[-TUR] 06/008, Isabella Dal Balcon v. Comitato Olimpico Nazionale Italiano (CONI) & Federazione Italiana Sport Invernali (FISI), for instance, the activity of Italian National Olympic Committee and Italian National Skiing Federation, which had excluded an athlete from the Olympic team, was judged “arbitrary” and “unfair.”Google Scholar

⁵⁵ CAS 98/200, AEK Athens & S.K. Slavia Prague v. UEFA, Award of 20 August 1999, para. 58.Google Scholar

⁵⁶ CAS 2008/A/1480, especially para. 56 et seq. Google Scholar

⁵⁷ CAS 94/129, USA Shooting & Q. v. Union Internationale de Tir (UIT), 23 May 1995, para. 34. See also, ex plurimis, CAS ad hoc Division (O.G. Atlanta) 96/005, A., W. and L. v. NOC Cape Verde (NOC CV), 1 August 1996: “Any person at risk of withdrawal of accreditation should be notified in advance of the case against him and given the opportunity to dispute it, in accordance with the elementary rules of natural justice and due process.”Google Scholar

⁵⁸ CAS 2001/A/317, A. v. Fédération Internationale de Luttes Associées (FILA), 9 July 2001; citing CAS 91/53 G. v. FEI, Award of 15 January 1992, Digest, 79, 86.Google Scholar

⁵⁹ CAS OG 04/009, H.O.C. & N. Kaklamanakis v. I.S.A.F., 24 August 2004.Google Scholar

⁶⁰ On these aspects, Michael S. Straubel, Doping Due Process: A Critique of the Doping Control Process in International Sport, 106 Dickinson Law Review 523 (2002); and Panagiotopoulos, Dimitrios, International Sports Rules’ Implementation-Decisions’ Executability: The Bliamou Case, 15 Marquette Sports Law Review 1 (2004).Google Scholar

⁶¹ See Lever, Jeremy, Why Procedure Is More Important than Substantive Law, 48 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 285 (1999); and Jerry L. Mashaw, Due Process in the Administrative State (1986).Google Scholar

⁶² “A procedural violation is not enough in and by itself to set aside an appealed decision (see CAS 2001/A/345, Digest of CAS Awards III, 240 and the references quoted therein); it must be ascertained that the procedural violation had a bearing on the outcome of the case. Whenever a procedural defect or unfairness in the internal procedure of a sporting body could be cured through the due process accorded by the CAS, and the appealed decision's ruling on the merits was the correct one, CAS panels had no hesitation in confirming the appealed decision” (CAS 2004/A/777, ARcycling AG v. Union Cycliste Internationale (UCI), 31 January 2005, para. 56). See also CAS 2006/A/1175, D. v. International Dance Sport Federation, Award of 26 June 2007, para. 18: “the virtue of an appeal system which allows for a full rehearing before an appellate body is that issues relating to the fairness of the hearing before the tribunal of first instance “fade to the periphery” (CAS 98/211, B. v. Fédération Internationale de Natation, CAS Digest II, 255, 264, citing Swiss doctrine and case law).” See Arts R44.2 and R57CAS Procedural Rules, which establish provisions regarding Hearing.Google Scholar

⁶³ Judgment of 22 March 2007, that annulled CAS 2005/A/951, Cañas v. ATP, Award of 23 May, because “le droit d'ětre entendu du recourant a été méconnu par le TAS. Etant donné la nature formelle de ce droit …, la sentence attaquée doit ětre annulée, sans égard au sort qui sera réservé aux arguments subsidiaires avancés par le recourant.” Following this decision, the CAS has anyhow confirmed its precedent award: CAS 2005/A/951, Cañas v. ATP, 23 May 2007, Revised award). See also Swiss Federal Tribunal, 4A_400/2008, Judgment of 9 February 2009, 1ère Cour de droit civil: “[L]e TAS a-t-il violé le droit d'ětre entendu du recourant. Semblable violation a eu une incidence concrète sur la situation juridique de cette partie, puisque celle-ci ne dispose d'aucun moyen pour faire sanctionner par le Tribunal fédéral l'application erronée, voire arbitraire, de la LES [Loi fédérale suisse du 6 octobre 1989 sur le service de l'emploi et la location de services] qui a entraîné le rejet de sa demande pécuniaire” (para. 3.2).Google Scholar

⁶⁴ “Principles of sports law” or “Principia sportiva” are often referred to by the CAS (see, ex plurimis, CAS 98/200, AEK Athens & S.K. Slavia Prague v. UEFA (note 55), para. 158). The most famous ones are probably the “fairness and integrity of international competitions” and the “fair play.” On the “strict liability” principle, see Janwillem Soek, The Strict Liability Principle and The Human Rights of Athletes in Doping Cases (2007). A complete list of such principles is in Latty (note 4), 305; see also Eric Loquin, L'utilisation par les arbitres du TAS des principes généraux du droit et le développement d'une Lex sportiva, in: The Proceedings before the Court of Arbitration for Sport, CAS & FSA/SAV Conference Lausanne 2006, 85, 101 (Antonio Rigozzi & Michele Bernasconi eds, 2007); and Merone (note 8), 233.Google Scholar

⁶⁵ See Fumagalli, Luigi, La circolazione internazionale dei lodi sportivi: il caso del Tribunale arbitrale dello sport, Rivista di diritto ed Economia dello Sport 364 (1994); and Oschütz, Frank, Sportschiedsgerichtsbarkeit. Die Schiedsverfahren des Tribunal Arbitral du Sport vor dem Hintergrund des schweizerischen und deutschen Schiedsverfahrensrechts (2005).Google Scholar

⁶⁶ On these aspects, see the trilogy written by Raj Bhala, The Myth about Stare Decisis and International Trade Law, 14 American University International Law Review 845 (1999); Bhala, Raj, The Precedent Setters: De Facto Stare Decisis in WTO Adjudication, 9 Journal of Transnational Law & Policy 1 (1999); and Bhala, Raj, Power of the Past: Towards De Jure Stare Decisis in WTO Adjudication, 33 George Washington International Law Review 873 (2001). See also Ingo Venzke, Making General Exceptions: The Spell of Precedents in Developing Article XX GATT into Standards for Domestic Regulatory Policy, in this issue; and Marc Jacob, Precedents: Lawmaking Through Adjudication, in this issue.Google Scholar

⁶⁷ Comments to Arts 3.1 (Burdens and Standards of Proofs), 3.2.4 (as to drawing an inference adverse to the Athlete or other Person who is asserted to have committed an anti-doping rule violation), and 4.2.2 (Specific substances).Google Scholar

⁶⁸ “In order to determine whether there exists a decision or not, the form of a communication has no relevance… . What is decisive is whether there is a ruling—or, in the case of a denial of justice, an absence of ruling where there should have been a ruling—in the communication.” (CAS 2004/A/748).Google Scholar

⁶⁹ R47 CAS Procedural Rules. See, ex multis, CAS 2008/A/1583, Sporting Lisboa e Benfica Futebol SAD v. UEFA, & FC Porto Futebol SAD; CAS 2008/A/1584, Vitória Sport Clube de Guimarães v. UEFA, & FC Porto Futebol SAD, Award of 15 September 2008, para. 5.1: “there must be a ‘decision’ of a federation, association or another sports-related body”; “the (internal) legal remedies available” must have been exhausted prior to appealing to the CAS; the parties must have agreed to the competence of the CAS”; on these aspects, Michele Bernasconi, When is a “Decision” an Appealable Decision?, in: The Proceedings before the Court of Arbitration for Sport, CAS & FSA/SAV Conference Lausanne 2006, 261 (Antonio Rigozzi & Michele Bernasconi eds, 2007).Google Scholar

⁷⁰ Here there is a different legitimacy compared with those international judicial institutions addressed in Armin von Bogdandy & Ingo Venzke, On the Democratic Legitimation of International Judicial Lawmaking, in this issue. This is due to the peculiar nature of the CAS, that is, it is neither a Court or a pure Arbitration body.Google Scholar

⁷¹ Karaquillo, Jean-Pierre, Le rôle du Tribunal du sport en tant qu'instance d'appel externe aux fédérations sportives, in: The Proceedings before the Court of Arbitration for Sport, CAS & FSA/SAV Conference Lausanne 2006, 33 (Antonio Rigozzi & Michele Bernasconi eds, 2007).Google Scholar

⁷² R57 CAS Procedural Rules. An in-depth analysis of these issues is in Rigozzi (note 8), 552.Google Scholar

⁷³ See McLaren, Richard H., Sports Law Arbitration by CAS: is it the Same as International Arbitration?, 29 Pepperdine Law Review 101 (2001).Google Scholar

⁷⁴ See CAS 96/156, F. v. FINA, Award of 10 November 1997, in which the need of ensuring an international review of national federations’ decisions is underlined.Google Scholar

⁷⁵ This point is raised by Rigozzi (note 8), 552, who observed that the CAS appeal procedure is not a “procédure appellatoire à proprement parler.”Google Scholar

⁷⁶ CAS 2007/A/1370, FIFA v. Superior Tribunal de Justiça Desportiva do Futebol & Confederação Brasileira de Futebol & Mr Ricardo Lucas Dodô (note 51), para. 71.Google Scholar

⁷⁷ And this despite of R33 CAS Procedural Rules, according to which “Every arbitrator shall be and remain independent of the parties and shall immediately disclose any circumstances likely to affect his independence with respect to any of the parties.”Google Scholar

⁷⁸ R58 CAS Procedural Rules.Google Scholar

⁷⁹ And this is what almost all federations did. An exception is in CAS 2006/A/1190, WADA v. Pakistan Cricket Board & Akhtar & Asif, Award of 28 June 2006, regarding cricket.Google Scholar

⁸⁰ Though it is doubtful that athletes are truly free to decide whether to sign or not these ad hoc clauses embodied in sporting institutions’ statutes. Sports legal orders, therefore, have developed additional forms of legitimacy than consensus, namely involving public authority, for instance, the hybrid public and private anti-doping regime.Google Scholar

⁸¹ Supra section C.I.Google Scholar

⁸² Several cases are reported by Rigozzi (note 8), 644.Google Scholar

⁸³ CAS 98/200, AEK Athens & S.K. Slavia Prague v. UEFA (note 55).Google Scholar

⁸⁴ Latty (note 4), 308.Google Scholar

⁸⁵ See Alter, Karen J., Delegating to International Courts: Self-Binding vs. Other-Binding Delegation, 71 Law & Contemporary Problems 37 (2008); for some data, see the Project on International Courts and Tribunals (http://www.pict-pcti.org/).Google Scholar

⁸⁶ David (note 3), 36.Google Scholar

⁸⁷ Anderson, Jack, 'Taking Sports Out Of The Courts': Alternative Dispute Resolution and the International Court of Arbitration for Sport, 10 Journal of Legal Aspects of Sport 123 (2000).Google Scholar

⁸⁸ See Art. 63 FIFA Statutes.Google Scholar

⁸⁹ CAS/A/1149 and CAS/A/1211, World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v. Federación Mexicana de Fútbol (FMF) and Mr. José Salvador-Carmona Alvarez, Award of 16 May 2007; citing CAS 96/156, F. v. FINA, Award of 10 November 1997; TAS 98/214, B. v. Fédération Internazionale de Judo (FIJ), Award of 17 March 1999; CAS 2005/A/872, UCI v. Muñoz and Federación Colombiana de Ciclismo; TAS 2006/A/1119, Union Cycliste Internationale (UCI) v. L. & Real Federación Española de Ciclismo (RFEC), Award of 19 December 2006; and TAS 2006/A/1120, Union Cycliste Intertationale (UCI) v. G. & Real Federación Española de Ciclismo (RFEC), Award of 19 December 2006.Google Scholar

⁹⁰ CAS/A/1149 and CAS/A/1211 WADA v. FMF and Mr. José Salvador-Carmona Alvarez (note 89), para. 26.Google Scholar

⁹¹ TAS 2006/A/1119, UCI v. L. & RFEC (note 89), para. 30.Google Scholar

⁹² Id., para. 30; cited by CAS/A/1149 and CAS/A/1211, WADA v. FMF and Mr. José Salvador-Carmona Alvarez (note 89).Google Scholar

⁹³ See Art. 3 UNESCO Convention.Google Scholar

⁹⁴ Casini, Lorenzo, Global Hybrid Public-Private Bodies: The World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), in: Symposium on “Global Administrative Law in the Operations of International Organizations, 6 International Organizations Law Review, 411 (Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, Lorenzo Casini, Benedict Kingsbury eds, 2009); and Henne, Kathryn, WADA, the Promises of Law and the Landscapes of Antidpoing Regulation, 33 Political and Legal Anthropology Review 306 (2010).Google Scholar

⁹⁵ See Ravjani, Abbas, The Court of Arbitration for Sport: A Subtle Form of International Delegation, 2 Journal of International Media & Entertainment Law 241 (2002). On the notion of “international delegation,” see Curtis A. Bradley & Judith G. Kelley, The Concept of International Delegation, 71 Law & Contemporary Problems 1 (2008).Google Scholar

⁹⁶ Art. 18 Arbitration rules for the Olympic Games.Google Scholar

⁹⁷ The effects of such decisions, however, might be particularly devastating in terms of money and reputation. See Giulia Mannucci, La natura dei lodi del Tribunale arbitrale dello sport tra fenomenologia sportiva e ordinamento generale, Diritto amministrativo 229 (2010).Google Scholar

⁹⁸ The situation may be different with regard to criminal proceedings, especially in doping cases and in countries where doping is regulated not only by sports rules, but also by criminal law (such as in Italy, where an interesting case emerged during the Winter Olympics of Turin 2006, though without any specific dispute: see Thomas Schultz, La lex sportiva se manifeste aux Jeux olympiques de Turin: suprématie du droit non étatique et boucles étranges, JusLetter of 20 February 2006). In any event, CAS jurisdiction refers only to sports aspects, and there is low risk of overlapping with domestic criminal proceedings.Google Scholar

⁹⁹ See Mitten, Matthew J., Judicial Review of Olympic and International Sports Arbitration Awards: Trends and Observations, 9 Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal 51 (2009); and Rigozzi (note 8), 655. As to the USA, Maureen A. Weston, Simply a Dress Rehearsal? U.S. Olympic Sports Arbitration and De Novo Review at the Court of Arbitration for Sport, 38 Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law 99 (2009).Google Scholar

¹⁰⁰ Amongst the most recent cases, see the following decisions issued by the Swiss Bundesgericht I. zivilrechtliche Abteilung, 4A_456/2009, Decision of 3 May 2010; 4A_490/2009, Decision of 13 April 2010; 4A_358/2009, Decision of 6 November 2009; 4A_400/2008, Decision of 9 February 2009. This increase is due to the growing number of cases decided by the CAS, and also by the rising importance of sports disputes, which produce significant legal and economic effects.Google Scholar

¹⁰¹ This is why the New South Wales Court of Appeal, Raguz v. Sullivan [2000] NSWCA 240, dismissed an appeal filed against a CAS award issued in Sydney, observing that the CAS arbitration rules are “transnational, universal, global,” and their application “is not dependent on a territorial nexus, nor is restricted territorially”: see Damian Sturzaker & Kate Godhard, The Olympic Legal Legacy, 2 Melbourne Journal of International Law 245 (2001).Google Scholar

¹⁰² Art. 190, ann. 2, Loi fédérale du 18 décembre 1987 sur le droit international privé. See Rigozzi (note 8), 684; and Merone (note 8), 155.Google Scholar

¹⁰³ See Benvenisti, Eyal & Downs, George, National Courts, Domestic Democracy, and the Evolution of International Law, 20 EJIL 59 (2009); and Kingsbury, Benedict, Weighing Global Regulatory Rules and Decisions in National Courts, Acta Juridica 90 (2009). More generally, as to the relationships between courts, Yuval Shany, The competing jurisdictions of international courts and tribunals (2003); Shany, Yuval, Regulating jurisdictional relations between national and international courts (2007); and Cassese, Sabino, I tribunali di Babele. I giudici alla ricerca di un nuovo ordine globale (2009).Google Scholar

¹⁰⁴ Claudia Pechstein is a famous German speed skater and winner of many Olympic medals. In 2009, she was banned from all competitions for two years after high levels of reticulocytes were found in her blood (no forbidden substances were actually found, therefore this was a case of doping based on “circumstantial evidence”). Pechstein appealed the ban before the CAS, which dismissed her appeal (CAS 2009/A/1912, Claudia Pechstein v. International Skating Union; and CAS 2009/A/1913, Deutsche Eisschnelllauf Gemeinschaft e.V. v. International Skating Union, Award of 25 November 2009; see also CAS ad hoc Division OG 10/04, Claudia Pechstein v. DOSB & IOC, Award of 18 February 2010); she also appealed the CAS award and filed a complaint against the International Skate Union before the Swiss Federal Court, in both cases unsuccessfully at least to date (see Swiss Bundesgericht I. zivilrechtliche Abteilung, 4A_612/2009, Decision of 10 February 2010).Google Scholar

¹⁰⁵ Most recently, see the 2009 decisions issued in Canada, by the Supreme Court of British Columbia and the British Columbia Court of Appeal, regarding the Vancouver Organizing Committee. On these aspects, see Mazzucco & Findlay (note 50).Google Scholar

¹⁰⁶ See Akech, Migai, The Maurice Odumbe Investigation and Judicial Review of the Power of International Sports Organizations, 6 Entertainment and Sports Law Journal (2008), available at: http://go.warwick.ac.uk/eslj/issues/volume6/number2/akech.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁷ The Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP) adopted by ICANN, for instance, refers to a different arbitration body, such as the WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center), but does not exclude the right to bring the dispute “to a court of competent jurisdiction for independent resolution” (Art. 4(k) UDRP): see David Lindsay, International Domain Name Law. ICANN and the UDRP 95 (2007).Google Scholar

¹⁰⁸ Latty (note 4), 308.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁹ Alter (note 85), 38; Yuval Shany, No Longer a Weak Department of Power? Reflections on the Emergence of a New International Judiciary, 20 EJIL 73 (2009); and Brown, Chester, A Common Law of International Adjudication (2007).Google Scholar

¹¹⁰ Ravjani (note 95), 244, who refers to a “low visibility delegation” made by States.Google Scholar

¹¹¹ This point emerges in several CAS decisions, and it is more generally discussed by Gus Van Harten, The Public-Private Distinction in the International Arbitration of Individual Claims Against the State, 56 International Comparative Law Quarterly 371 (2007).Google Scholar

¹¹² See Sabino Cassese, Il diritto globale 137 (2009).Google Scholar

¹¹³ Arts 26, 27, 28 and 33 ILO Constitution.Google Scholar

¹¹⁴ Art. IV on “Accountability and Review” of the ICANN Bylaws.Google Scholar

¹¹⁵ See Mauro Cappelletti, Dimensioni della giustizia nelle società contemporanee: studi di diritto giudiziario comparato 39 (1994), who observed an extraordinary expansion of constitutional and transnational justice, due to the need to control political power and to protect fundamental rights.Google Scholar

¹¹⁶ Cass, Deborah Z., The ‘Constitutionalization’ of International Trade Law: Judicial Norm-Generation as the Engine of Constitutional Development in International Trade, 12 EJIL 39 (2001); see also Judith L. Goldstein & Richard H. Steinberg, Regulatory Shift: The Rise of Judicial Liberalization at the WTO, in: The Politics of Global Regulation, 211, 227 (Walter Mattli & Ngaire Woods eds, 2009).Google Scholar

¹¹⁷ Cassese (note 103).Google Scholar

¹¹⁸ This is mostly due to the “specificity” of sport. However, it is most likely that there will soon be a more intensive dialogue between the CAS and other courts, such as the European Court of Justice or the European Court for Human Rights: the number of sports cases that may affect antitrust regulation or fundamental rights of the athletes, in fact, has been increasing. The increasing economic and commercial relevance of sport could also involve the WTO system in a more significant way than what happened to date (e.g., in the dispute U.S. — Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WTO DS285, regarding the cross-border supply of gambling and betting services).Google Scholar

¹¹⁹ Riles, Annelise, The Anti-Network: Private Global Governance, Legal Knowledge, and the Legitimacy of the State, 56 American Journal of Comparative Law 605, 629 (2008); and Meidinger, Errol, Competitive Supragovernmental Regulation: How Could It Be Democratic?, 8 Chicago Journal of International Law 513, 516 (2008).Google Scholar