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Prolonged emergency and derogation of human rights: Why the European Court should raise its immunity system

  • Triestino Mariniello
Abstract

States of emergency pose the most significant challenges to the safeguarding of fundamental rights and civil liberties. Crises are generally characterized by a strengthening of the executive to the detriment of judicial authority and parliamentary oversight. One of the immediate consequences of emergencies is the absence of effective domestic mechanisms of supervision of the executive. The gradual replacement of the judicial role with police operations represents a symptom of how prolonged emergencies prompt the eclipse of legal certainty and lead to the rapid and irreversible degradation of public institutions.

This Article addresses the difficult compromise between defending national interests and protecting individual rights during public emergencies. It analyzes the common features across the recent derogations and exceptional measures of Ukraine, France, and Turkey. The derogations submitted by the three countries in question, together with the exceptional measures adopted for counter-terrorism purposes, substantially restrict several fundamental rights enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights (Convention). In particular, preventive detention measures, with the suspension of the habeas corpus otherwise approved by the three States, not only enable police forces to use arbitrary and unlimited use of force, but also seriously affect the protection of absolute and non-derogable rights. The Article concludes that, as the recent emergency laws and their widespread and apparently indiscriminate implementation present the risk of destabilizing the whole European system of protection, it becomes ever more necessary that the European Court of Human Rights depart from its previous jurisprudence and adopt a more rigorous and principled scrutiny of the derogation conditions under Article 15 of the Convention.

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Triestino Mariniello is a Senior Lecturer in Law at Edge Hill University (UK), Email: mariniet@edgehill.ac.uk.

The author is grateful to Marie-Laure Basilien-Gainche, Mariagiulia Giuffrè, Zeynep Kivilcim, Peter Langford, and Idil Isil Gul for their comments on earlier drafts. All errors remain the author’s own. This Article covers legal developments, to the best of the author’s knowledge, up to May 23, 2018.

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1 Montesquieu, De l’esprit des lois, at Chapter 4, 190 (1748).

2 Eur. Consult. Ass., Note Verbale, JJ7979C Tr./005-185 (June 10, 2015) (reporting Ukraine’s reservations from the Convention). On June 5, 2015, Ukraine also submitted to the United Nations Secretary General its derogation from the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) under Article 4(3). See Reservations and Declarations for Treaty No.005-Conventions for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Council of Europe, https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/005/declarations (last visited Dec. 27, 2018).

3 Eur. Consult. Ass., supra note 2.

4 Eur. Consult. Ass., Note Verbale, JJ8045C Tr./005-191 (Nov. 25, 2015) (reporting France’s reservations from the Convention). On December 3, 2015, French authorities communicated to the United Nations the French derogation from the ICCPR.

5 Eur. Consult. Ass., supra note 4.

6 Eur. Consult. Ass., Note Verbale, JJ8187C Tr./005-191 (July 22, 2016) (reporting Turkey’s reservations from the Convention). On August 11, 2016, the United Nations published Turkey’s notification of derogation from the ICCPR.

7 See Eur. Consult. Ass., supra note 6.

8 With regard to the British derogation, see, inter alia, Ireland v. UK, App. No. 5310/71 (Jan. 18, 1978), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/; Brannigan and McBride v. UK, App. No. 14553/89, 14554/89 (May 26, 1993), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/. With respect to Turkey, see inter alia Aksoy v. Turkey, App. No. 21987/93 (Dec. 18, 1996), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/; Demir and others v. Turkey, App. No. 71/1997/855/1062–1064 (Sep. 23, 1998), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/; Nuray Şen v. Turkey, App. No. 41478/98 (June 17, 2003), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/; Bilen c. Turqui, App. No. 34482/97 (Feb. 21, 2006), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/.

9 See A. and others v. UK, App. No. 3455/05 (Feb. 19, 2009), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/.

10 Communication from the Permanent Representation of Turkey Registered at the Secretariat General on 24 July 2016 - or. Engl., Council of Europe, http://www.coe.int/ (last visited Dec. 27, 2018). The recent derogation marks the first time that Turkey has submitted derogations that are not formally linked to the Kurdish Separatist Movement.

11 Eur. Consult. Ass., supra note 2.

12 Eur. Consult. Ass., supra note 4.

13 Press Unit, European Court of Human Rights, Derogation in Time of Emergency (August 2018), http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_Derogation_ENG.pdf.

14 See inter alia, David Harris et al., Law of the European Convention on Human Rights (3d ed. 2014); Giuseppe Cataldi, Art. 15, in Commentario Breve Alla Convenzione Europea Dei Diritti Dell’uomo 555 (Sergio Bartole et al. eds., 2012); Jan-Peter Loof, Crisis Situations, Counter-Terrorism and Derogation from the European Convention of Human Rights: A Threat Analysis, in Margins of Conflict: the ECHR and Transitions to and from Armed Conflict 35 (Antoine Buyse ed., 2010); Stefan Kirchner, Human Rights Guarantees During States of Emergency: The European Convention on Human Rights, 3 Baltic J.L. & Pol. 1 (2010); Peter Duffy, Note on Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights, in Droits Intangibles et Etats D’exception 203, 206–07 (Daniel Prémont ed., 1996); Christoph Schreuer, Derogation of Human Rights in Situations of Public Emergency: The Experience of the European Convention on Human Rights, Yale J. World Pub. Ord. 113 (1982); Joan F. Hartman, Derogation from Human Rights Treaties in Public Emergencies – A Critique of Implementation by the European Commission and Court of Human Rights and the Human Rights Committee of the United Nations, 22 Harv. Int’l. L. Rev. 1 (1981).

15 Fox, Campbell and Hartley v. UK, App. No. 12244/86; 12245/86; 12383/86, para. 28 (Aug 30, 1990), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/.

16 Cataldi, supra note 14.

17 See, inter alia, Lawless v. Ireland (No. 3), App. No. 332/57, para. 28 (July 1, 1961), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/.

18 Council of Europe, the Greek Case: Report to the Sub-commission 70 (Greek Case) (1969), Vol. I, Part I, https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Denmark_v_Greece_I.pdf.

19 See A. and others, App. No. 3455/05 at para. 179.

20 Id. at para. 179–80.

21 See Brannigan, App. No. 14553/89, 14554/89 at para. 43; Aksoy, App. No. 21987/93 at para. 68; Demir, App. No. 71/1997/855/1062–1064 at para. 43; Ireland, App. No. 5310/71 at para. 207; Lawless, App. No. 332/57 at 85.

22 See Ireland, App. No. 5310/71 at para. 207.

23 Id.

24 See in particular Oren Gross & Fionnuala Nì Aolain, From Discretion to Scrutiny: Revisiting the Application of the Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Context of Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights, 23 Hum. Rts. Q. 625 (2001).

25 See Greek Case, supra note 18, at 18.

26 See A. and others, App. No. 3455/05 at para. 185.

27 See, inter alia, Ireland, App. No. 5310/71 at para. 207; Brannigan and McBride, App. No. 14553/89; 14554/89, para. 43; Aksoy, App. No. 21987/93 at para. 68.

28 See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 15(1), Dec. 10, 1948, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Convention].

29 See Harris, supra note 14, at 844.

30 See Brannigan and McBride, App. No. 14553/89, 14554/89 at paras. 68–73.

31 Convention art. 15(3).

32 See Press Unit, supra note 13.

34 See Brannigan and McBride, App. No. 14553/89, 14554/89 at paras. 30–32.

35 See Lawless, App. No. 332/57 at para. 17.

36 See Greek Case, supra note 18.

37 See Aksoy, App. No. 21987/93 at paras. 8–9, 31.

38 See Gross & Nì Aolain, supra note 24, at 646.

39 See A. and others, App. No. 3455/05 at para. 103.

40 Colin Warbrick, The Principles of the ECHR and the Response of States to Terrorism, 3 Eur. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 287, 311 (2002).

41 See Eur. Consult. Ass., supra note 2, at 3.

42 Id.

43 Id.

44 Id.

45 Id.

46 Rep. on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine, Office of the U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights para. 17 (2016), https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/Ukraine15thReport.pdf.

47 Eur. Consult. Ass., supra note 2, at 3.

48 Id. Military and civil administrations may:

[S]et limits on remaining on the streets and in other public places within a period of 24 hours without specific documents; to temporarily restrict or prohibit the movement of vehicles and pedestrians on the streets, roads and terrain areas; to organize the checking of identification documents of individuals; and, if necessary, the searching of personal belongings, vehicles, baggage and cargo, office premises and private dwellings of citizens . . . .

49 Id.

50 Eur. Consult. Ass., supra note 4.

51 Loi No. 55-385 du 3 avril 1955 relative à l’état d’urgence [Law No. 55-385 of 3 April 1955 on the State of Emergency], https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000695350. For a detailed examination of the French Emergency Law, see Rémi Barrue-Belou, Causes of Historical Precedents for Implementing the State of Emergency, 1 Journal du Droit Administratif (2016).

52 Loi No. 55-385 du 3 avril 1955 relative à l’état d’urgence [Law No. 55-385 of 3 April 1955 on the State of Emergency], https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000695350; France: New Emergency Powers Threaten Rights. Parliament Should Ensure New Powers Not Misused, Human Rights Watch (Nov. 24, 2015), https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/11/24/france-new-emergency-powers-threaten-rights.

53 Administrative searches stopped in May 2016; see Eur. Consult. Ass., supra note 4. Nevertheless, searches have been reintroduced with judicial review in July 2016.

54 France: New Emergency Powers Threaten Rights. Parliament Should Ensure New Powers Not Misused, supra note 52.

55 Loi No. 55-385 du 3 avril 1955 relative à l’état d’urgence [Law No. 55-385 of 3 April 1955 on the State of Emergency], https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000695350.

56 Eur. Consult. Ass., Notification de Déclaration, JJ8285C Tr./005-202 (Dec. 21, 2016) (providing France’s communication to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe regarding the extension of the state of emergency that the French government first declared in November 24, 2015).

57 Id. See also Les assignations à résidence hors état d’urgence du projet de loi antiterroriste votées à l’Assemblée, Huffington Post (Sept. 27, 2017), http://www.huffingtonpost.fr/2017/09/27/les-assignations-a-residences-hors-etat-durgence-du-projet-de-loi-antiterroriste-votees-a-lassemblee_a_23224161/.

58 Loi No. 55-385 du 3 avril 1955 relative à l’état d’urgence [Law No. 55-385 of 3 April 1955 on the State of Emergency], https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000695350.

59 Loi No. 2015-1556 du 30 novembre 2015 relative aux mesures de surveillance des communications électroniques internationals [Law No. 2015–1556 of November 30th, 2015 Relating to the Measures of Surveillance of the International Electronic Communications], http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do;jsessionid=998EACDA05B79BB46ECB1B480CC1846E.tpdila07v_2?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000031549747&dateTexte=&oldAction=rechJO&categorieLien=id&idJO=JORFCONT000031549744.

60 See Eur. Consult. Ass., supra note 56 (“This is why the state of emergency was extended by Act No. 2016-1767 of 19 December 2016 extending the application of the Act No. 55-385 of 3 April 1955 regarding the state of emergency until 15 July 2017”).

61 Loi 2017–1510 du 30 octobre 2017 renforçant la sécurité intérieure et la lutte contre le terrorisme [Law 2017-1510 of October 30, 2017 Strengthening Domestic Security and the Fight Against Terrorism] https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/eli/loi/2017/10/30/INTX1716370L/jo/texte. For a critical analysis of the new French Anti-Terrorism Law, see Erika Asgeirsson, French Anti-terror Bill Threatens to Extend State of Emergency Abuses, Just Security (Aug. 2, 2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/43771/french-anti-terror-bill-threatens-normalize-state-emergency/.

62 Loi 2017-1510 du 30 octobre 2017 renforçant la sécurité intérieure et la lutte contre le terrorisme [Law 2017-1510 of October 30, 2017 Strengthening Domestic Security and the Fight Against Terrorism] https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/eli/loi/2017/10/30/INTX1716370L/jo/texte.

63 Id. at art. 1.

64 Id. at art. 3.

65 See Conseil Constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 2017-691QPC, Feb. 16, 2018 (Fr.). The Court decided to extend the period of time granted by the legislator to the person affected by the measure to challenge the house arrest before the administrative court.

66 Id. at para. 15.

67 Lizzie Dearden, Turkey dismisses 7,400 more police, soldiers and public sector workers a year after failed coup, INDEPENDENT (July 15, 2017), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/turkey-coup-attempt-recep-tayyip-erdogan-one-year-anniversary-7400-dismissed-gulen-purge-latest-a7842606.html.

68 Turkey: Events of 2016, Human Rights Watch, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2017/country-chapters/turkey (last visited Dec. 28, 2018).

69 See Eur. Consult. Ass., supra note 6.

70 Id. The last communication of the notice of derogation for a further three months was submitted on January 19, 2018; see Council of Europe, Notification of Declaration, JJ8592C Tr./005-217 (Jan. 19, 2018).

71 See Turk. Const. arts. 120–21.

72 Decree on Measures to be Taken Under State Emergency, Law No. 667, (July 22, 2016) (Turk.), https://rm.coe.int/168069661d.

73 See Decree Law No. 684 Dated 23 January 2017 on Specific Regulations Under the State of Emergency, art. 10 (Turk.), https://rm.coe.int/16806fab6b.

74 See Decree on Measures to be Taken Under State Emergency, Law No. 667, art. 6(1)(d) (July 22, 2016) (Turk.), https://rm.coe.int/168069661d.

75 European judges have recently found that the fundamental rights of two Turkish individuals that were arrested after the attempted coup were violated.

76 Mercan v. Turkey, App. No. 56511/16 (Nov. 17, 2016), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/.

77 Id. at para. 15.

78 Id. at paras. 13–14, 16.

79 Zihni v. Turkey, App No. 59061/16 (Dec. 8, 2016), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/.

80 Id. at para. 18.

81 See Mercan, App. No. 56511/16 at paras. 30–34; Zihni, App. No. 59061/16 at paras. 29–31.

82 Mercan v. Turkey, App. No. 56511/16, paras. 26–27 (Nov. 17, 2016), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/; and Zihni, App. No. 59061/16 at paras. 26–28.

83 Mercan, App. No. 56511/16 at para. 21; Zihni, App No. 59061/16 at paras. 10, 11, 25.

84 Zihni, App No. 59061/16 at para. 29.

85 Özkan v. Turkey, App. No. 28745/11 (Oct. 1, 2013), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/; Leyla Zana v. Turkey, App. No. 58756/09 (Oct. 1, 2013), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/; Schmick v. Turkey, App. No. 25963/14 (Apr. 7, 2015), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/; X v. Turkey, App. No. 61042/14 (May 19, 2015), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/; Duran v. Turkey, App. No. 79599/13 (May 19, 2015), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/; Berker and others v. Turkey, App. No. 54769/13 (Oct. 20, 2015), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/.

86 Çatal v. Turkey, App. No. 2873/17 (Mar. 10, 2017), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/.

87 Id. at para. 9. See also 543 More Judges, Prosecutors Dismissed in Coup Attempt Probe, Hurriyet Daily News (Sept. 1, 2016), http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/543-more-judges-prosecutors-dismissed-in-coup-attempt-probe-103468.

88 See Çatal, App. No. 2873/17 at para. 22.

89 Id.

90 Id.

91 Id. at para. 28.

92 Id.

93 Koksal v. Turkey, App. No. 2873/17 (June 12, 2017), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/.

94 Id. at para. 19.

95 Id. at para. 29.

96 Id. at para. 30.

97 European Court of Human Rights, Annual Report of the European Court of Human Rights 8 (2017), https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Annual_report_2017_ENG.pdf.

98 Id.

99 Michael O’Boyle, Can the ECtHR Provide an Effective Remedy Following the Coup d’état and Declaration of Emergency in Turkey?, Ejiltalk (Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.ejiltalk.org/can-the-ecthr-provide-an-effective-remedy-following-the-coup-detat-and-declaration-of-emergency-in-turkey/.

100 Tuvan Gumrukcu & Gulsen Solaker, Turkey Dismisses 45 More Judges and Prosecutors in Post-Coup Probe, Reuters (Apr. 3, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-security-judges/turkey-dismisses-45-more-judges-and-prosecutors-in-post-coup-probe-aa-idUSKBN17523R.

101 See Decision of the Constitutional Court in its Plenary Sitting (August 4, 2016), http://www.constitutionalcourt.gov.tr/inlinepages/press/PressReleases/detail/pdf/2016-12.pdf. See also, 2 Constitutional Court Judges Arrested in Turkey, All Military Judges Suspended, RT (July 20, 2016), https://www.rt.com/news/352349-turkey-judges-prosecutors-coup-crackdown/.

102 See Zihni, App No. 59061/16 at para. 15.

103 The Venice Commission has reported that individual applications to the Constitutional Court are not available to public officials who have been dismissed under Emergency Decrees; in this regard, see generally Eur. Consult. Ass., Opinion on Emergency Decree Laws Nos. 667–676 Adopted Following the Failed Coup of 15 July 2016, Opinion No. 865/2016 (July 15, 2016), http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2016)037-e.

104 See Koksal, App. No. 2873/17 at para. 29.

105 See European Court of Human Rights, supra note 97, at 12.

106 Three members are appointed by the Prime Minister from public officials, a member by the Minister of Justice from judges and prosecutors in the Ministry of Justice, a member by the Minister of the Interior from the directors of the public administration, and two members by the Superior Council of the Judiciary.

107 See Kerem Altiparmak, is the State of Emergency Inquiry Commission, Established by Emergency Decree 685, an Effective Remedy? (Feb 23, 2017), http://www.ihop.org.tr/en/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/IS-THE-STATE-OF-EMERGENCY-INQUIRY-COMMISSION.pdf.

108 The Koksal decision was issued by the Court on June 12, 2017, while the rules of procedure of the Commission were published on July 12, 2017 and the Commission could start to receive applications on July 17, 2017.

109 Valentina Rita Scotti, Il Golpe in Turchia e la Corte europea dei dritti umani: brevi note critiche sulle decisioni di irricevibilità per il mancato previo esperimento dei rincorsi interni (2017) https://www.osservatorioaic.it/images/rivista/pdf/Scotti%20definitivo.pdf.

110 Memorandum on the Human Rights Implications of the Measures Taken under the State of Emergency in Turkey para. 29 (Oct. 7, 2016), https://rm.coe.int/ref/CommDH(2016)35.

111 Amnesty International, No End in Sight: Purged Public Sector Workers Denied a Future in Turkey 4 (May 22, 2017), https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/EUR4462722017ENGLISH.PDF.

112 Id. at 7.

113 Id. at 4.

114 Alpay v. Turkey, App. No. 16538/17 (Mar. 20, 2018), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/; and Altan v. Turkey, App. No. 13237/17 (Mar. 20, 2018), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/.

115 Massimo Frigo, The Constitutional Conflict in Turkey: Is There Still an Effective Remedy for Human Rights Violations?, Opiniojuris (Jan. 26, 2018), http://opiniojuris.org/2018/01/26/the-constitutional-conflict-in-turkey-is-there-still-an-effective-remedy-for-human-rights-violations/.

116 See Başak Çalı, Will Legalism be the End of Constitutionalism in Turkey, Verfassungsblog (Jan. 22, 2018), https://verfassungsblog.de/will-legalism-be-the-end-of-constitutionalism-in-turkey/.

117 Id. See Alpay, App. No. 16538/17 at para. 39.

118 See Alpay, App. No. 16538/17 at para. 75; Altan, App. No. 13237/17 at para. 91.

119 See Alpay, App. No. 16538/17 at para. 75; Altan, App. No. 13237/17 at para. 91.

120 See Alpay, App. No. 16538/17 at paras. 76–77; Altan, App. No. 13237/17 at paras. 93–94 (Mar. 20, 2018).

121 See Alpay, App. No. 16538/17 at para. 121; Altan, App. No. 13237/17 at para. 142.

122 Akdivar and others v. Turkey, App. No. 21893/93, para. 66 (Sept. 16, 1996), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/; Dalia v. France, App. No. 154/1996/773/974, para. 38 (Feb. 19, 1998), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/.

123 See Akdivar, App. No. 21893/93 at para. 66.

124 Turkey Sacks 107 Judges, Prosecutors Over Links to Failed Coup, Reuters (May 5, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-security-court/turkey-sacks-107-judges-prosecutors-over-links-to-failed-coup-media-idUSKBN1811P4.

125 SCF, Turkish Court Releases UN Judge Arrested Over Alleged Gülen Links, Stockholm Center for Freedom, (June 14, 2017), http://stockholmcf.org/turkish-court-releases-un-judge-arrested-over-alleged-gulen-links/.

126 See, inter alia, Akdivar, App. No. 21893/93; Aksoy, App. No. 21987/93.

127 Akdivar, App. No. 21893/93. at para. 67.

128 The last extension of the derogation was submitted by Ukrainian authorities on February 3, 2017; see Eur. Consult. Ass., Notification of Declaration, JJ8218C Tr./005-205 (Feb. 3, 2017).

129 Eur. Consult. Ass., supra note 6.

130 See Eur. Consult. Ass., supra note 4.

131 See Marie-Laure Basilien-Gainche, Etat d’urgence et lutte contre le terrorisme. La mécanique de l’entropie, Journal du Droit Administratif (2016) http://www.journal-du-droit-administratif.fr/?p=447.

132 Joan Fitzpatrick, Human Rights in Crisis: The International System for Protecting Rights During States of Emergency 19–31 (1994).

133 Turkey has reduced the length of preventive detention without judicial control to seven days; see Eur. Consult. Ass., Notification of Declaration, JJ8338 Tr./005-206 (Mar. 6, 2017) (introducing Decree Law No. 684 on Specific Regulations under the State of Emergency).

134 Gumrukcu, supra note 100.

135 Eur. Consult. Ass., supra note 2, at 3.

136 Loi No. 55–385 du 3 avril 1955 relative à l’état d’urgence [Law No. 55–385 of 3 April 1955 on the State of Emergency], art. 11, https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000695350.

137 Loi No. 2015-1556 du 30 novembre 2015 relative aux mesures de surveillance des communications électroniques internationals [Law No. 2015–1556 of November 30th, 2015 Relating to the Measures of Surveillance of the International Electronic Communications], http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do;jsessionid=998EACDA05B79BB46ECB1B480CC1846E.tpdila07v_2?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000031549747&dateTexte=&oldAction=rechJO&categorieLien=id&idJO=JORFCONT000031549744.

138 See inter alia, El Masri v. Macedonia, App. No. 39630/09 paras. 230–33 (Dec. 13, 2012), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/; Guzzardi v. Italy, App. No. 7367/76, para. 92 (Nov. 6, 1980), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/; Amuur v. France, App. No. 19776/92, para. 42 (June 25, 1996), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/.

139 Kurt v. Turkey, App. No. 24276/94, para. 123 (May 25, 1998), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/.

140 Eur. Consult. Ass., supra note 4.

141 Eur. Consult. Ass., supra note 6.

142 See Decree on Measures to be Taken Under State Emergency, Law No. 667, (July 22, 2016) (Turk.), https://rm.coe.int/168069661d.

143 See Alpay, App. No. 16538/17 at para. 72; Altan, App. No. 13237/17 at para. 88.

144 Ronald St. John McDonald, The Margin of Appreciation in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, in International Law at the Time of its Codification: Essays in Honour of Robert Ago 187, 207 (A. Giuffré ed. 1987).

145 Gross & Nì Aolain, supra note 24, at 636.

146 Eva Brems, The Margin of Appreciation in the Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights, 56 Zeitschrift Fur Auslandisches Offentliches Recht Und Volkerrecht 230, 240 (1996).

147 Evan Criddle, Protecting Human Rights During Emergencies: Delegation, Derogation and Deference, 45 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 197, 206 (2014).

148 Gross & Nì Aolain, supra note 24, at 285–86. See also Loof, supra note 14, at 708–09.

149 See European Court of Human Rights, supra note 97, at 8.

150 See Brannigan and McBride, App. No. 14553/89, 14554/89 at para. 43; Aksoy, App. No. 21987/93 at para. 68; Demir and others, App. No. 71/1997/855/1062–1064 at para. 43; Ireland, App. No. 5310/71 at para. 207.

151 See Alpay, App. No. 16538/17 at para. 75; Altan, App. No. 13237/17 at para. 91.

152 A. and others, App. No. 3455/05 at para. 177.

153 Id. at para. 177.

154 Aksoy, App. No. 21987/93 at paras. 69–70.

155 Ireland, App. No. 5310/71 at para. 207.

156 Convention art. 15(3).

157 See Lawless, App. No. 332/57 at para. 47.

158 Id.

159 Id. at para. 44-47.

160 See Alpay, App. No. 16538/17 at para. 73 (emphasis added); Altan, App. No. 13237/17 at para. 89 (emphasis added).

161 See Brannigan and McBride, App. No. 14553/89, 14554/89 at para. 43.

162 See Ireland, App. No. 5310/71 at para. 11.

163 Id.

164 Id. at para. 243.

165 A. and others, App. No. 3455/05 at para. 178.

166 Marshall v. UK, App. No. 41571/98 (July 10, 2001), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/.

167 See, inter alia, Decree on Measures to be Taken Under State Emergency, Law No. 667, art. 5 (July 22, 2016) (Turk.), https://rm.coe.int/168069661d.

168 Constanze Letsch, Turkey Shuts 15 Media Outlets and Arrests Opposition Editor, The Guardian (Oct 31, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/30/turkey-shuts-media-outlets-terrorist-links-civil-servants-press-freedom.

169 Turkey Sacks 107 Judges, Prosecutors Over Links to Failed Coup, supra note 124.

170 Constanze Letsch, Turkey’s President Orders Closure of 1,000 Private Schools Linked to Gülen, The Guardian (July 23, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/23/turkey-erdogan-closure-of-1000-private-schools-gulen.

171 See Turkey: Events of 2016, supra note 68.

172 Id.

173 Amnesty International USA Board Writes to Secretary of State, Amnesty International (June 21, 2017), https://humanrightsturkey.org/2017/06/21/amnesty-international-usa-board-writes-to-secretary-of-state/.

174 Turkey: Events of 2016, supra note 68.

175 Id.

176 Asylum Research Consultancy, Turkey Country Report–Update 177 (Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/1325304/1226_1486117831_5890c8d84.pdf.

177 See Loi No. 55-385 du 3 avril 1955 relative à l’état d’urgence [Law No. 55-385 of 3 April 1955 on the State of Emergency], https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000695350.

178 Giorgio Agamben, De l’Etat de droit a l’Etat de securitè, Le Monde (Dec. 27, 2015), http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2015/12/23/de-l-etat-de-droit-a-l-etat-de-securite_4836816_3232.html.

179 Arthur Neslen, Paris Climate Activists Put Under House Arrest Using Emergency Laws, The Guardian (Nov. 27, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/nov/27/paris-climate-activists-put-under-house-arrest-using-emergency-laws.

180 Tony Cross, France’s State of Emergency Used to Ban Activists from Labour Law Protests, RFI (May 16, 2016), http://en.rfi.fr/france/20160516-frances-state-emergency-used-ban-activists-labour-law-protests; see also MariePierre Cauchard, Manifestations et maintien de l’ordre (public), Journal du Droit Administratif (2016), http://www.journal-du-droit-administratif.fr/?p=225; Basilien-Gainche, supra note 131.

181 This is What Happened During France’s State of Emergency, The Local (Oct. 31, 2017), https://www.thelocal.fr/20171031/what-exactly-happened-during-frances-state-of-emergency.

182 France: Prolongation de l’état d’urgence, menace pour les droits humains, Human Rights Watch (July 22, 2016), https://www.hrw.org/fr/news/2016/07/22/france-prolongation-de-letat-durgence-menace-pour-les-droits-humains.

183 Thus far, the four countries that the ECHR has called on to justify special legislation approved under the state of emergency have all adopted measures of preventive detention.

184 See Ireland, App. No. 5310/71 at para. 145.

185 See Aksoy, App. No. 21987/93; Demir and others, App. No. 71/1997/855/1062–1064; Nuray Şen, App. No. 41478/98 at para; Bilen, App. No. 34482/97 .

186 1955–1957 Y.B. Eur. Conv. On H.R. (Eur. Comm’n of H.R.) 50; 1969 Y.B. Eur. Conv. On H.R (Eur. Comm’n of H.R.) 72–74; 1971 Y.B. Eur. Conv. On H.R. (Eur. Comm’n of H.R.) 32; 1973 Y.B. Eur. Conv. On H.R. (Eur. Comm’n of H.R.) 24-28; 1975 Y.B. Eur. Conv. On H.R. (Eur. Comm’n of H.R.) 18; 1978 Y.B. Eur. Conv. On H.R. (Eur. Comm’n of H.R.) 22.

187 As discussed above, Turkey has reduced detention without judicial control to up to seven days. See Decree Law No. 684 Dated 23 January 2017 on Specific Regulations Under the State of Emergency (Turk.), https://rm.coe.int/16806fab6b.

188 By putting an end to the state of emergency, France has abrogated this special measure from November 1, 2017; see Eur. Consult. Ass., supra note 56.

189 Fiona de Londras, Counter-Terrorist Detention and International Human Rights Law, in Research Handbook on International Law and Terrorism 401 (Ben Saul ed., 2014).

190 Hum. Rts. Comm., General Comment No. 35: Article 9 (Liberty and Security of Person), para. 66, CCPR/C/GC/35 (Dec. 16, 2014) (“The fundamental guarantee against arbitrary detention is non-derogable…”); Id. at para. 67 (“In order to protect non-derogable rights … the right to take proceedings before a court to enable the court to decide without delay on the lawfulness of detention must not be diminished by measures of derogation.”).

191 Hum. Rts. Comm., General Comment No. 29: States of Emergency (Article 4), para. 16, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (Aug. 31, 2001). The non-derogability of the right to challenge the lawfulness of detention was affirmed by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and is expressly stipulated under Article 4(2) of the Arab Charter on Human Rights. Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations (Arts. 27(2), 25(1) and 7(6) American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-8/87, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., paras. 35–6 (Jan. 30, 1987).

192 Hum. Rts. Comm., supra note 191, at para. 66.

193 Convention art. 5(3) (emphasis added).

194 McKay v. UK, App. No. 543/03, paras. 33, 40 (Oct. 3, 2006), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/.

195 See, inter alia, Oral et Atabay c. Turquie, App. No. 39686/02, para. 43 (June 23, 2009), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/.

196 Id. at para. 62.

197 Brannigan and McBride, App. No. 14553/89, 14554/89, at para. 52–4.

198 See, inter alia, Nuray Şen, App. No. 41478/98 at para. 29; Bilen, App. No. 34482/97 at para. 54; Aksoy, App. No. 21987/93 at para. 37.

199 Demir and others, App. No. 71/1997/855/1062–1064 at para. 41.

200 Nuray Sen, App. No. 41478/98 at para. 24, 29.

201 Aksoy, App. No. 21987/93 at para. 84.

202 Id. at para. 78.

203 Wanda Marra, Gabriele Del Grande rischia di rimanere in carcere in Turchia per un anno, Il Fatto Quotidiano (Apr. 23, 2017), https://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/premium/articoli/altro-che-giorni-del-grande-rischia-di-stare-dentro-6-mesi.

204 Mancini v. Italy, App. No. 44955/98, para. 17 (Dec. 12, 2001).

205 See Agamben, supra note 178.

206 Id.

207 The Venice Commission has denounced cases of ill-treatment and even torture exercised by Turkish authorities against those arrested after the coup. See Eur. Consult. Ass., supra note 103, at para. 174.

208 Hum. Rts. Comm., Commc’n No. 560/1993, para. 9.4, UN Doc. CCPR/C/59/D/560/1993 (Apr. 30, 1997).

209 Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations (Arts. 27(2), 25(1) and 7(6) American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-8/87, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., para. 35 (Jan. 30, 1987). See also Hum. Rts. Comm., supra note 191, at paras. 56, 58.

210 See Hum. Rts. Comm., supra note 190, at para. 42.

211 See Greek Case, supra note 18.

212 Fionnuala Nì Aolain, The Emergence of Diversity Differences in Human Rights Jurisprudence, 19 Fordham Int’l. L.J. 101, 115 (1995).

213 Gross & Nì Aolain, supra note 24, at 628.

214 Brannigan and McBride, App. No. 14553/89, 14554/89 at para. 43.

215 See Marshall, App. No. 41571/98; Aksoy, App. No. 21987/93 at paras. 69–70.

216 Marshall, App. No. 41571/98.

217 Eur. Consult. Ass., supra note 103, at para. 155.

218 On the permanent state of emergency, see Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception (Univ. of Chi. Press 2005).

219 With regard to France, see in particular Vasiliki Saranti, L’état d’urgence en droit international : qu’est-ce qui a changé depuis « la guerre contre le terrorisme?, Journal du Droit Administratif (2016), http://www.journal-du-droit-administratif.fr/?p=118.

220 Emre Turkut, The Köksal Case Before the Strasbourg Court: A Pattern of Violations or a Mere Aberration?, Strasbourg Observers (Aug. 2, 2017) https://strasbourgobservers.com/2017/08/02/the-koksal-case-before-the-strasbourg-court-a-pattern-of-violations-or-a-mere-aberration/.

221 Akdivar and others, App. No. 21893/93 at para. 66; Dalia, App. No. 154/1996/773/974 at para. 38.

222 Akdivar, App. No. 21893/93 at para. 66.

* Triestino Mariniello is a Senior Lecturer in Law at Edge Hill University (UK), Email: .

The author is grateful to Marie-Laure Basilien-Gainche, Mariagiulia Giuffrè, Zeynep Kivilcim, Peter Langford, and Idil Isil Gul for their comments on earlier drafts. All errors remain the author’s own. This Article covers legal developments, to the best of the author’s knowledge, up to May 23, 2018.

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