¹ Kriminalpolitik can also be translated as criminal justice politics, which would make for a still starker contrast with Strafrechtswissenschaft.Google Scholar

² See generally Schünemann, Bernd, Strafrechtsdogmatik als Wissenschaft, in Festschrift für Claus Roxin 1 (Bernd Schünemann et al. eds. 2001).Google Scholar

³ For an excellent English-language exposition of the Straftatsystem by a leading German criminal law scholar, who retains some useful critical distance to it, see Wolfgang Naucke, An Insider's Perspective on the Significance of the German Criminal Law Theory's General System for Analyzing Criminal Acts, 1984 BYU L. Rev. 305; see also George P. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law 575-78 (1978).Google Scholar

⁴ See, e.g., 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 177-78, 182 (1769); see generally Markus D. Dubber, Criminal Law: Model Penal Code § 3.2 (2002); Markus D. Dubber & Mark Kelman, American Criminal Law: Cases, Statutes, and Comments 499-509 (2005).Google Scholar

⁵ The Model Penal Code, for instance, only drew “a rough analytic distinction” between justifications and excuses. Model Penal Code Commentaries art. 3, introduction, at 2 (American Law Institute ed. 1985).Google Scholar

⁶ See, e.g., Greenawalt, Kent, The Perplexing Borders of Justification and Excuse, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1897 (1984).Google Scholar

⁷ Ordeig, Enrique Gimbernat, Sind die bisherigen dogmatischen Grunderfordernisse eines Allgemeinen Teils geeignet, dem heutigen Stand der Kriminalität, der Strafzumessung und des Sanktionensystems zu genügen, in Krise des Strafrechts und der Kriminalwissenschaften?, at 152, 165 (Hans-Joachim Hirsch ed. 2001). On the history and scope of the influence of German criminal law in Spain, see José Cerezo Mir, Die deutsche Strafrechtswissenschaft aus spanischer Sicht, in Die deutsche Strafrechtswissenschaft vor der Jahrtausendwende 255 (Albin Eser et al. eds. 2000).Google Scholar

⁸ See Hans-Heinrich Jescheck & Thomas Weigend, Lehrbuch des Strafrechts: Allgemeiner Teil 199 (5th ed. 1996) (continuing effort “to improve and to supercede” German criminal law through “renovations of the doctrinal edifice”).Google Scholar

⁹ See, e.g., Fletcher, George P., The Fall and Rise of Criminal Theory, 1 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 275 (1998).Google Scholar

¹⁰ See, e.g., Schünemann, Bernd, Die deutsche Strafrechtswissenschaft nach der Jahrtausendwende, 148 GA 205 (2001) (reviewing Die deutsche Strafrechtswissenschaft vor der Jahrtausendwende: Rückbesinnung und Ausblick (Albin Eser et al. eds. 2000)).Google Scholar

¹¹ (1884) 14 QBD 273 (CCR). In this classic case, Dudley and Stephens were convicted of murder for killing (and then cannibalizing) a fellow occupant of their lifeboat. The English court rejected the argument that the defendants acted under circumstances that forced them to choose the lesser of two evils (causing the death of a single weakened person vs. permitting the deaths of several persons, including the defendants, the victim, and a fourth occupant of the boat). Note, however, that the Queen then commuted their death sentences to six months’ imprisonment. For a detailed analysis of this case from a comparative perspective, see Dubber & Kelman, supra note 4, at 191-97; see generally A.W.B. Simpson, Cannibalism and the Common Law: The Story of the Tragic Last Voyage of the Mignonette and the Strange Legal Proceedings to Which It Gave Rise (1984).Google Scholar

¹² Jescheck & Weigend, supra note 8, at 195.Google Scholar

¹³ Id. Note, however, that the authors also warn of the “danger of a criminal law doctrine that excessively relies on abstract formulas” and “disregards the particularities of the individual case.” Id. at 195-96 (emphasis in original).Google Scholar

¹⁴ On the notion of a solution of a legal case, as opposed to a resolution of a legal dispute, in German law generally speaking, see James E. Herget, Contemporary German Legal Philosophy 118 (1996). Herget also notes the absence of dissenting opinions (except in opinions of the German Constitutional Court), which would be incompatible with the view that the court had arrived at the correct solution of the case before it. Id. at 146-47. For an interesting exploration of similar issues in a broader context, see Vivian Grosswald Curran, Romantic Common Law, Enlightened Civil Law: Legal Uniformity and the Homogenization of the European Union, 7 Colum. J. Eur. L. 63 (2001).Google Scholar

¹⁵ On the origins of the German idea of legal science, and its influence on nineteenth century American jurisprudence, see generally Mathias Reimann, Nineteenth Century German Legal Science, 31 B.C. L. Rev. 837 (1990).Google Scholar

¹⁶ Hoeflich, Michael H., Law & Geometry: Legal Science from Leibniz to Langdell, 30 Am. J. Legal Hist. 121 (1986); Marcia Speziale, Langdell's Concept of Law as Science: The Beginning of Anti-formalism in American Legal Theory, 5 Vt. L. Rev. 1 (1980); Howard Schweber, The Science of Legal Science: The Model of the Natural Sciences in Nineteenth-Century American Legal Education, 17 L. & Hist. Rev. (1999).Google Scholar

¹⁷ The German analogue, and precursor, of American Legal Realism, the Free Law School (Freirechtsschule) of the early twentieth century, had no lasting effect on German jurisprudence, in stark contrast to Realism's transformative effect in the United States, which continues to this day, through Realism's contemporary heirs, “Law and Economics,” “Law and Society,” and “Critical Legal Studies.” In fact, German criminal law bears a certain stylistic resemblance to classical formalism in American law prior to Realism's arrival. See James E. Herget & Stephen Wallace, The German Free Law Movement as the Source of American Legal Realism, 73 Va. L. Rev. 399 (1987).Google Scholar

¹⁸ Criminal law as a science (Strafrechtswissenschaft) must be distinguished from the attempt to integrate it into a more comprehensive scientific program, which includes other (social) sciences as well. In Germany, this program is generally associated with its early champion, Franz v. Liszt, who in the late nineteenth century gave it the somewhat awkward, but still popular, name “general criminal legal sciences” (gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaften), encompassing both criminal legal science and “criminal sciences,” including most importantly criminology.Google Scholar

¹⁹ See Dubber, supra note 4, § 4.2.Google Scholar

²⁰ Alternativ-Entwurf eines Strafgesetzbuches: Allgemeiner Teil 56-57 (2d ed. 1969).Google Scholar

²¹ Recently law lectures at German universities have become somewhat more interactive and court opinions are beginning to receive more attention in teaching materials as a result of several factors, including the general lowering of professors’ status vis-à-vis the student body in the wake of the 1960s student movement, attempts to reform German legal education loosely based on an American model (including the introduction of teaching evaluations), and the growing sense (particularly among the professors themselves) that the professoriate's influence on the judiciary, and the legislature, has diminished. Even some “casebooks” have begun to appear, starting with constitutional law, though they remain very much the exception.Google Scholar

²² There are two sets of state examinations, one following the completion of coursework, the other after a subsequent mandatory period of apprenticeship (Referendariat). Professors help administer the first set, which consists of written and oral examinations.Google Scholar

²³ 1775-1833. Feuerbach was the father of the important philosopher Ludwig Feuerbach (1804-72), and a colorful figure in his own right. After falling victim to an intrigue at the Bavarian Court, Feuerbach was appointed to a rural judgeship. There he found himself in the unusual position of applying the very code he had drafted. Finding the deterrence-oriented code overly strict and incapable of taking into account the culpability of individual defendants, Feuerbach grew frustrated and recorded his experiences in a series of popular case histories. He also wrote a highly scandalous book about a young man who one day walked into town after claiming to have been raised by wolves. Feuerbach suspected that he was the illegitimate offspring of a local aristocrat. See generally Gustav Radbruch, Paul Johann Anselm Feuerbach: Ein Juristenleben (3d ed. 1969) (1934) (a biography of Feuerbach written by Radbruch, Gustav, himself an important German criminal law scholar and justice minister in the Weimar Republic).Google Scholar

²⁴ 1762-1824.Google Scholar

²⁵ Jürgen Baumann et al., Alternative Draft of a Penal Code for the Federal Republic of Germany (Joseph J. Darby trans. 1977).Google Scholar

²⁶ On the significance of the American Law Institute's prestige for the Model Penal Code project, see Markus Dirk Dubber, Penal Panopticon: The Idea of a Modern Model Penal Code, 4 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 53 (2000).Google Scholar

²⁷ The title of the 1999 biannual meeting of German criminal law professors (Halle, May 1999) (“Gesetzgebung ohne Strafrechtswissenschaft?”).Google Scholar

²⁸ It has also become a popular conference topic. See, e.g., Krise des Strafrechts und der Kriminalwissenschaften? (Hans Joachim Hirsch ed. 2001).Google Scholar

²⁹ See, e.g., Prittwitz, Cornelius, Nachgeholte Prolegomena zu einem künftigen Corpus Juris Criminalis für Europa, 113 ZStW 774 (2002).Google Scholar

³⁰ Any law professor is so entitled, provided he or she has successfully completed the second state examination. See DRiG (German Judiciary Law) § 7 (“Every law professor at a university within the jurisdiction of this law is authorized to hold judicial office.”). As a rule, law professors are appointed to positions on the appellate bench. Details of judicial appointments vary from state to state.Google Scholar

³¹ Occasionally these expert opinions are transformed into separately published articles and monographs and thus contribute to German criminal law science. See, e.g., Harro Otto, Keine strafbare Untreue im Fall Kohl, in 36 Recht und Politik 109 (2000); see also Ex-Kanzler _ ex culpa? Interview mit dem Bayreuther Professor für Strafrecht Harro Otto zu seinem Rechtsgutachten zur „Parteispendeaffäre“ um Dr. Helmut Kohl, <http://www.alt.tip-bt.de/SS_00/Ausgabe_164/kanzler.html>. I am indebted to Sascha Ziemann for this reference..+I+am+indebted+to+Sascha+Ziemann+for+this+reference.>Google Scholar

³² For a recent example, consider the celebrated Daschner case, which involved the prosecution of police officers for the (threatened) use of torture against a suspected kidnapper. The court's decision in the case quoted extensively from a defense Gutachten prepared by a criminal law professor (Cornelius Prittwitz, Frankfurt) and devoted considerable effort to refuting the Gutachten's doctrinal analysis. Schriftliche Urteilsgründe in der Strafsache gegen Wolfgang Daschner, LG Frankfurt a.M., Feb. 15, 2005, <http://www.lgfrankfurt.justiz.hessen.de/C1256E4B004692BD/vwContentByKey/W269PMLU645JUSZDE/$File/Pressemitteilung%20Urteilsgr%C3%BCnde%20Daschner%20u.a.%2017.02.05.pdf>. I am indebted to Lutz Eidam for this reference..+I+am+indebted+to+Lutz+Eidam+for+this+reference.>Google Scholar

³³ For instance, the massive Leipziger Kommentar on the German criminal code in its most recent complete edition—the 10th—takes up eight volumes and ca. 8,000 pages, published over the course of eleven years. Leipziger Kommentar: Strafgesetzbuch (Hans-Heinrich Jescheck et al. eds. 10th ed. 1978-1989); see also Adolf Schönke & Horst Schröder, Strafgesetzbuch (Theodor Lenckner et al. eds. 25th ed. 1997) (ca. 2,390 pp.).Google Scholar

³⁴ See Jutta Limbach, Im Namen des Volkes: Macht und Verantwortung der Richter 30-31 (1999). Judges, it should be noted, ordinarily are appointed following their successful completion of the second state examination. At that time they have no practical legal experience apart from the required general two-year apprenticeship (Referendariat) sandwiched between the first and second state examinations. Upon appointment, judges are promoted through the ranks from trial to appellate courts based on their performance, as evaluated by their superiors in the judicial hierarchy. (Law professors, by contrast, can be appointed directly to an appellate court. See supra note 30.)Google Scholar

³⁵ And so whatever constraints upon the accessibility of German criminal law doctrine are recognized, even in theory, tend to reflect concerns about its efficient implementation in routinized procedures by expert officials—“police, prosecutors, and courts.” Jescheck & Weigend, supra note 8, at 198 (goals of clarity and simplicity).Google Scholar

³⁶ On lay participation in the German criminal process, see Markus Dirk Dubber, American Plea Bargains, German Lay Judges, and the Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 49 Stan. L. Rev. 547 (1997). For an excellent brief summary of German criminal procedure, see Thomas Weigend, Germany, in Criminal Procedure: A Worldwide Study 187 (Craig M. Bradley ed. 1999). For an interesting recent account by a German lay judge of his experiences, see Ernst Köhler, Mehr Selbstbewusstsein, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Jan. 11, 2005, at 34. I am indebted to Lutz Eidam for this reference.Google Scholar

³⁷ § 261 StPO (Grundsatz der freien Beweiswürdigung); see Claus Roxin, Strafverfahrensrecht 84 (23d ed. 1993) (“the court determines the facts on its own ('instructs’ itself) and in this regard is not bound by the motions and declarations of the process participants”). This is not to say, of course, that enterprising criminal defense attorneys—especially in the past few decades—may not make every effort to shape the nature and import of the evidence that the presiding judge decides to collect. See Dubber, supra note 36.Google Scholar

³⁸ Contrast Model Penal Code § 1.12 (burden of production) with N.Y. Penal Law § 25.00 (burden of persuasion); see also Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977) (preponderance of the evidence); Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952) (beyond a reasonable doubt); see generally Markus D. Dubber, Einführung in das US-amerikanische Strafrecht § 7 (2005).Google Scholar

³⁹ See generally Nora Demleitner et al., Sentencing Law and Policy: Cases, Statutes, and Guidelines ch. 6 (2003).Google Scholar

⁴⁰ For a critical discussion of this practice, see Winfried Hassemer, Einführung in die Grundlagen des Strafrechts 100 et seq. (2d ed. 1990).Google Scholar

⁴¹ Dubber, , supra note 38, § 7.Google Scholar

⁴² Jescheck & Weigend, supra note 8, at 194.Google Scholar

⁴³ See, e.g., Hirsch, Hans Joachim, Tatstrafrecht—ein hinreichend beachtetes Grundprinzip?, in Festschrift für Klaus Lüderssen 253, 260 (Cornelius Prittwitz et al. eds. 2002).Google Scholar

⁴⁴ See, e.g., Claus Roxin, Strafrecht: Allgemeiner Teil I, at 149-50 (3d ed. 1997) (charting “the discovery of the fundamental concepts” of criminal law and “their adoption by the legislature”). As one example, consider the “discovery” of “normative” and “subjective” offense elements like the animus furandi of theft, as recounted in the standard textbook literature. Jescheck & Weigend, supra note 8, at 185, 206; Roxin, supra, at 229; Johannes Wessels, Strafrecht: Allgemeiner Teil 34 (23d ed. 1993). The discovery here was not the animus furandi itself, of course, but its doctrinal classification as an offense element, rather than as an issue relating to guilt: without animus furandi, it was discovered, no theft had been committed in the first place, rather than, as previously thought, a theft had been committed, but guilt was lacking. The defendant would be acquitted either way.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ This commitment to scientific progress also translates into a surprisingly ahistorical attitude to criminal law; every scientific advance, after all, means the abandonment of a previously held hypothesis, which has turned out to be false. Earlier theories are of interest only to the extent they have withstood the test of time. For a rare study of the historical development of some of the basic concepts of German criminal law, see Bernd Schünemann, Einführung in das strafrechtliche Systemdenken, in Grundfragen des modernen Strafrechtssystems 1 (Bernd Schünemann ed. 1984).Google Scholar

⁴⁶ Jescheck & Weigend, supra note 8, at 210-11 (finalism).Google Scholar

⁴⁷ Roxin, , supra note 44, at 189 (discussing Welzel).Google Scholar

⁴⁸ Jescheck & Weigend, supra note 8, at 211 (finalism). Finalism takes its name from what its adherents call the “finalist” (or intentionalist) concept of act (finale Handlungsbegriff). In their view, the finality of an act derives from the fact that “man can due to his causal knowledge foresee the possible results of his actions and, for that reason, set himself various aims and direct his actions toward their accomplishment.” Roxin, supra note 44, at 188-89. Only quite recently was it pointed out that this view of a criminal act cannot account for crimes of omission or of negligence. Id. at 190-91.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ Roxin, supra note 44, at 180-81. Invocations of “the sense of justice” in support of a claim are perhaps less forbiddingly obscure, but no less unhelpful, and no less uncommon. Jescheck & Weigend, supra note 8, at 463 (mistake regarding justification), 604 (omission vs. commission) (5th ed. 1996) (Rechtsgefühl (sense of right)); Roxin, supra note 44, at 60 (Gerechtigkeitsgefühl (sense of justice) demands punishment according to desert).Google Scholar

⁵⁰ Günther Jakobs, Strafrecht: Allgemeiner Teil vii (2d ed. 1991).Google Scholar

⁵¹ Id. (quoting Hans Welzel, Das Deutsche Strafrecht: Eine systematische Darstellung 2 (11th ed. 1969))Google Scholar

⁵² Roxin, , supra note 44, at 155.Google Scholar

⁵³ Claus Roxin, Kriminalpolitik und Strafrechtssystem (1970).Google Scholar

⁵⁴ See, e.g., Michael Köhler, Strafrecht: Allgemeiner Teil (1997); Michael Köhler, Freiheitliches Rechtsprinzip und Betäubungsmittelstrafrecht, 104 ZStW 3 (1992); Ernst Amadeus Wolff, Das neuere Verständnis von Generalprävention und seine Tauglichkeit für eine Antwort auf Kriminalität, 97 ZStW 786 (1985); Diethelm Klesczewski, Die Rolle der Strafe in Hegels Theorie der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft (1991); Rainer Zaczyk: Das Strafrecht in der Rechtslehre J.G. Fichtes (1981). Jakobs too recently has taken to invoking Hegel's legacy. See Günther Jakobs, Das Strafrecht zwischen Funktionalismus und “alteuropäischem” Prinzipiendenken, 107 ZStW 843 (1995); Günther Jakobs, Norm, Person, Gesellschaft: Vorüberlegungen zu einer Rechtsphilosophie (1997).Google Scholar

⁵⁵ The much-cited essay by Klug, Ulrich, entitled “Farewell to Kant and Hegel,” is not to the contrary. Ulrich Klug, Abschied von Kant und Hegel, in Programm für ein neues Strafgesetzbuch: Der Alternativ-Entwurf der Strafrechtslehrer 36 (Jürgen Baumann ed. 1968). This five-page essay provides a critical, and rather superficial, discussion of Kant's and Hegel's writings on crime and punishment. It does not even pretend to expose, never mind to dismantle, the Kantian or Hegelian underpinnings of current German criminal law. Instead, published in 1968 in a collection of essays dedicated to the alternative draft of a German criminal code prepared by a group of progressive law professors, it provides some historical background to the common call for recodification along rehabilitative, rather than retributivist or “metaphysical,” lines. To the extent it is attacking current Kantian and Hegelian criminal law doctrine, it is attacking a straw man.Google Scholar

⁵⁶ On Feuerbach's limited Kantianism, see Wolfgang Naucke, Kant und die psychologische Zwangstheorie Feuerbachs (1962). This unwavering commitment to general deterrence led Feuerbach, for instance, to increase—rather than mitigate—punishment in cases of duress, so as to counterbalance the increased incentive for criminal conduct represented by the source of the duress (be it economic, circumstantial, or personal). And it was also the reason that Feuerbach in his judicial capacity found the application of his Bavarian criminal code in actual cases so distasteful. See supra note 23.Google Scholar

⁵⁷ Prominent Hegelians among German criminal law scholars include Julius Abegg (1796-1868), Reinhold Köstlin (1813-1856), Hugo Hälschner (1817-1889), and Albert Friedrich Berner (1818-1907).Google Scholar

⁵⁸ That is not to say that some German criminal law scholars have not made significant efforts to break out of what they perceived to be the isolation of their discipline by, for instance, opening up a dialogue with the social sciences. See, e.g., Vom Nutzen und Nachteil der Sozialwissenschaften für das Strafrecht (Klaus Lüderssen & Fritz Sack eds., 2 vols. 1980) (“On the Benefits and Detriments of the Social Science for Criminal Law”). For a recent critical assessment of work in this vein, see Ernst-Joachim Lampe, Strafrechtsdogmatik und Sozialwissenschaften, in Festschrift für Klaus Lüderssen 279 (Cornelius Prittwitz et al. eds. 2002).Google Scholar

⁵⁹ With the exception of a suggestive essay by Günther, Klaus. Günther, Klaus, Möglichkeiten einer diskursethischen Begründung des Strafrechts, in Recht und Moral: Beiträge zu einer Standortbestimmung 205 (Heike Jung, Heinz Müller-Dietz & Ulfrid Neumann eds. 1991).Google Scholar

⁶⁰ For an overview of Rawls's remarks on punishment in A Theory of Justice, see Petra Wittig, Die Aufrechterhaltung gesellschaftlicher Stabilität bei John Rawls, 107 ZStW 251 (1995); see also Sharon Dolovich, Legitimate Punishment in Liberal Democracy, 7 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 307 (2004) (outlining a Rawlsian theory of punishment).Google Scholar

⁶¹ See Roxin, supra note 44, at 15-17 (constitutional foundation of Rechtsgut). Even those who, like Roxin, stress the need to turn to constitutional law, however, generally stop well short of establishing, as opposed to asserting, a constitutional foundation for the well-established principles of German criminal law. See generally Ivo Appel, Verfassung und Strafe: Zu den verfassungsrechtlichen Grenzen staatlichen Strafen (1998); see also Markus Dirk Dubber, The Bedrock of German Criminal Law Examined: Positive General Prevention and the Protection of Legal Goods, Am. J. Comp. L. (forthcoming 2006).Google Scholar

⁶² Law against dangerous recidivists and regarding measures of protection and rehabilitation (Gesetz gegen gefährliche Gewohnheitsverbrecher und über Maßregeln der Sicherung und Besserung), Nov. 24, 1933.Google Scholar

⁶³ Welzel, Hans, Studien zum System des Strafrechts, 58 ZStW 491 (1939); Hans Welzel, Der Allgemeine Teil des deutschen Strafrechts in seinen Grundzügen (1st ed. 1940). But see Hans-Heinrich Jescheck, Lehrbuch des Strafrechts: Allgemeiner Teil 179 (4th ed. 1988) (“political attitude” had no influence on criminal law theory during Nazi period in general (with one possible exception), and on finalism in particular).Google Scholar

⁶⁴ Law to amend the Criminal Code (Gesetz zur Änderung des Strafgesetzbuchs), June 28, 1935.Google Scholar

⁶⁵ See, e.g., Friedrich Schaffstein's 1934 book, entitled provocatively Political [!] Criminal Legal Science (Politische Strafrechtswissenschaft); see generally Gerhard Wolf, Befreiung des Strafrechts vom nationalsozialistischen Denken?, 36 JuS 189 (1996); Markus Dirk Dubber, Judicial Positivism and Hitler's Injustice, 93 Colum. L. Rev. 1807 (1993) (reviewing Ingo Müller, Hitler's Justice: The Courts of the Third Reich (1991)); Joachim Vogel, Einflüsse des Nationalsozialismus auf das Strafrecht, 115 ZStW 638 (2003).Google Scholar

⁶⁶ The aforementioned discoveries of German criminal legal science thus would be analogous to the discovery of a new plant, or perhaps even of an entirely new species of plants. For an interesting discussion of the very explicit connection between “taxonomical sciences,” such as botany and zoology, and nineteenth century American legal science à la Langdell, see Howard Schweber, The “Science” of Legal Science: The Model of the Natural Sciences in Nineteenth-Century American Legal Education, 17 L. & Hist. Rev. 421 (1999).Google Scholar

⁶⁷ The multitude of solutions proposed for virtually every problem of German criminal law makes it difficult, in fact, to get a handle on just what counts as “German criminal law,” rather than this or that approach to it. Not coincidentally, a classification system has been developed to address this problem. When discussing a particular rule, the author—professor or judge—ordinarily will categorize it according to (his perception of) the breadth of support it enjoys in the relevant community, or more precisely the relevant communities, of professors, of judges, or of both together. Beginning with professors, the designation of a rule as “dominant teaching” (herrschende Lehre, or simply h.L.) marks it as endorsed by a majority of scholars. What Anglo-American lawyers would call the majority rule, i.e., the rule endorsed by a majority of courts, is designated “dominant jurisprudence,” or “dominant practice” (herrschende Rechtsprechung (Praxis)). A rule supported by the combined community of scholars and judges is referred to as “dominant opinion” (herrschende Meinung, h. M.), or “general opinion” (allgemeine Meinung, allg. M.). Adding the adjective “absolut“ to any of these markers lends emphasis, and suggests supermajoritarian support, adding “einhellig“ implies consensus. By contrast, minority opinions are designated, literally, as “deviant” (abweichend). Alternatively minority positions might be labelled (particularly by their supporters, or perhaps by alarmed opponents) not as deviant, but as “on the rise” (“im Vordringen begriffen“).Google Scholar

⁶⁸ See generally Jescheck & Weigend, supra note 8, at 228 (“fines” (Ordnungsstrafen)); Roxin, supra note 44, at 209 (“measures”). See also Günther Jakobs, Strafbarkeit juristischer Personen, in Festschrift für Klaus Lüderssen 560, 574 (Cornelius Prittwitz et al. eds. 2002) (corporate “sanctions” are justifiable as long as they are “not christened with the name ‘punishment'”). Order violations (Ordnungswidrigkeiten) are governed by, and defined in, the Code of Order Violations (OWiG), not the Criminal Code (StGB). Note that the OWiG did not come into being until 1952. Until then, the bulk of offenses now classified as order violations were defined in the StGB as transgressions (Übertretungen), a category of crimes besides felonies and misdemeanors (Verbrechen, Vergehen). Transgressions remained in the StGB until 1968, when traffic offenses were reclassified as order violations. See Jescheck & Weigend, supra note 8, at 57-58.Google Scholar

⁶⁹ See generally Lisa Anderson, The Political Adventures of New Jersey's “Highly Partisan” Tomato, Chicago Tribune, Apr. 30, 2005, at C1.Google Scholar

⁷⁰ 149 U.S. 304 (1893).Google Scholar

⁷¹ Id. at 307.Google Scholar

⁷² A detailed critical assessment of these theories can be found in Dubber, supra note 61. For purposes of the present paper, a cursory discussion must suffice.Google Scholar

⁷³ See, e.g., Jescheck & Weigend, supra note 8, at 6 (“Criminal law has the objective of protecting legal goods.”) (emphasis in original); see generally.Google Scholar

⁷⁴ See, e.g., Roland Hefendehl, Kollektive Rechtsgüter im Strafrecht (2002).Google Scholar

⁷⁵ See, e.g., Schünemann, Bernd, Das Rechtsgüterschutzprinzip als Fluchtpunkt der verfassungsrechtlichen Grenzen der Straftatbestände und ihrer Interpretation, in Rechtsgutstheorie: Legitimationsbasis des Strafrechts oder dogmatisches Glasperlenspiel? 133 (Roland Hefendehl et al. eds. 2003).Google Scholar

⁷⁶ See, e.g., Roxin, supra note 44, at 15.Google Scholar

⁷⁷ Id. at 50 (quoting BVerfGE 45, 255 et seq.); see generally Positive Generalprävention: Kritische Analysen im deutsch-englischen Dialog (Bernd Schünemann et al. eds. 1998).Google Scholar

⁷⁸ For a recent exploration of the normative underpinnings of positive general prevention, and punishment theory in general, see Michael Pawlik, Person, Subjekt, Bürger: Zur Legitimation von Strafe (2004). See also Bernd Schünemann, Zum Stellenwert der positiven Generalprävention in einer dualistischen Straftheorie, in Positive Generalprävention: Kritische Analysen im deutschenglischen Dialog 109 (Bernd Schünemann et al. eds. 1998).Google Scholar

⁷⁹ But see Schünemann, , supra note 2, at 8.Google Scholar

⁸⁰ (1884) 14 QBD 273 (CCR); see supra note 11.Google Scholar