¹ In some sense, this can be understood as a variant of the question whether a market economy is helpful (if not a precondition) for a democratic order; for a recent example of such an argument see Carl Christian von Weizsäcker, Die normative Ko-Evolution von Marktwirtschaft und Demokratie, 65 Ordo 13 (2014).Google Scholar

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