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Constitution transformation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 September 2021

Cheryl Saunders Open the ORCID record for Cheryl Saunders [Opens in a new window]
Cheryl Saunders*
Affiliation:
Melbourne Law School, University of Melbourne
*
Email: c.saunders@unimelb.edu.au
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Abstract

This article explores the extent to which (if at all) the concept of a constitution is undergoing change in the conditions of globalization that characterize the early decades of the twenty-first century, to an extent that might be described as transformation. The question is prompted both by familiar manifestations of the interdependence of domestic constitutional and international law and practice, and by the interpretation placed on them by some of the literature on global constitutionalism. Some – although by no means all – of the literature and the experience on which it draws relate to the extent of transnational influence on the way in which constitutions now are made or changed: constitution transformation in the narrow, or more particular, sense. The article seeks to answer this question with reference to global constitutional experience, including – critically – experience in Asia, as one of the largest and most diverse regions of the world, too often omitted from studies of this kind. To this end, the article considers whether the concept of a constitution can be regarded as having been globally shared in any event; examines the phenomena associated with globalization that might suggest a paradigm change; and considers the arguments that mitigate against change, at least on a global scale. In exploring these factors, it necessarily considers the extent to which states in different regions of the world diverge in their experiences of the internationalization of constitutional law. The article concludes that, on balance, it is not plausible to argue that the generic concept of a constitution has changed, with global effect. It does, however, acknowledge that current conditions of globalization present a series of challenges for national constitutions. Responding to them might itself be regarded as an exercise in global constitutionalism.

Keywords

Asian constitutionalismconstitution transformationglobalizationnational constitutionalismtransnational influence

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Type
Research Article
Information
Global Constitutionalism , Volume 10 , Issue 2 , July 2021 , pp. 237 - 255
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press

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References

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