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The Role of External Actors in Incentivizing Post-Conflict Power-Sharing

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 July 2013

Abstract

External actors engaged in peace building often induce domestic elites to share power. This article explores the effectiveness of external incentives in establishing, maintaining or reforming power-sharing. Adopting a rationalist approach to socialization, the research investigates the strategic interaction between external and internal actors in two cases of contemporary power-sharing: Northern Ireland and Bosnia-Herzegovina. External incentives will probably be more effective when they uphold a peace agreement that satisfies groups’ structural preferences on constitutional issues. External incentives can, under certain conditions, lead to internalization and the potential ‘habitualization’ of power-sharing as norm-conforming behaviour. The strategy of external actors will be less effective when their socialization efforts are inconsistent and coercive, viewed as threatening to one or more of the contending groups.

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Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Government and Opposition Ltd 2013 

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Footnotes

*

Joanne McEvoy is a Lecturer in Politics in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Aberdeen. Contact email: j.mcevoy@abdn.ac.uk.

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