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Elite Settlements and the Taming of Politics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 March 2014

John Higley  and
Michael Burton
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Extract

A BASIC QUESTION IS HOW POLITICS ARE TAMED AND CEASE BEING A deadly, warlike affair. The most dramatic way is through sudden, deliberate and lasting compromises of core disputes among political elites – what we think of as ‘elite settlements’. Prior to settlements elites disagree about government institutions, engage in unchecked fights for dominance, and view politics as winner-take-all. After settlements, elite persons and groups continue to be affiliated with conflicting parties, movements, and beliefs, but they share a consensus about government institutions and the codes and rules of political competition. Settlements tame politics by generating tacitly accommodative and overtly restrained practices among competing political elites.

Type
Articles
Information
Government and Opposition , Volume 33 , Issue 1 , January 1998 , pp. 98 - 115
Copyright
Copyright © Government and Opposition Ltd 1998

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References

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