Research on semi-presidentialism has made great strides, with comparisons between regime types followed by comparisons between various types of semi-presidential countries. Semi-presidentialism is where the constitution includes both a popularly elected president and a prime minister and cabinet accountable to the parliament (Elgie Reference Elgie1999: 13). Most of the comparative research on semi-presidentialism has focused on regime stability, with authors interested in how variables such as presidential powers or divided government impact on the level of conflict between the two executives (Elgie Reference Elgie2016; Schleiter and Morgan-Jones Reference Schleiter and Morgan-Jones2009). This body of work indicates, rather unsurprisingly, that cohabitation is on average more likely to produce conflict (Sedelius and Mashtaler Reference Sedelius and Mashtaler2013). Country studies, most of which are rather descriptive, have also detailed the relations between the president and the prime minister (PM) (Gherghina and Miscoiu Reference Gherghina and Miscoiu2013; Munkh-Erdene Reference Munkh-Erdene2010; Shen Reference Shen2011).
This case study of Lithuania departs from conventional approaches in three ways. Firstly, we underscore the importance of institutions in facilitating successful leadership and policy coordination. We ask, ‘do institutions matter’ at the level of normal intra-executive decision-making (Weaver and Rockman Reference Weaver and Rockman1993)? The basic premises are that institutional design is related to the level of conflict between the cabinet and the president, and that conflicts over policy, legislation or appointments are manifestations of coordination problems. Secondly, despite more than two decades of research on semi-presidentialism, we still know very little about the actual functioning of day-to-day routines and coordination mechanisms between the president and her administration on the one hand, and the PM and her cabinet on the other. With some notable exceptions (Elgie Reference Elgie2001; Raunio Reference Raunio2012), even country studies have not probed the regular interaction between the executives. Our third contribution is methodological: utilizing interviews with key civil servants and politicians and governmental documents enables us to reach behind the scenes and to understand the role of coordination mechanisms vis-à-vis other factors such as the personalities or party-political affiliations of the two executives.
We focus on Lithuania because it is in many ways representative of the Central and East European semi-presidential countries that became democratic in the 1990s. The powers of the president are mainly found in the area of external relations and the political culture is rather personality centred. Considering the lack of previous research, our study offers a tentative template for similar case studies or comparative analyses of other semi-presidential regimes – or indeed of countries where the president is not directly elected. Our goal is to pave the way for a line of inquiry so far neglected in the literature on semi-presidential regimes. Scholarly understanding of Lithuanian politics remains thin, and hence our article increases our knowledge of political leadership in Lithuania.
The goal of this article is thus to examine the effect institutional design has on semi-presidentialism and particularly on the relations between the president and the PM. By institutional design we mean those rules, organizational arrangements and conventions that structure routine coordination between the two executives. Hence this article, drawing on in-depth interviews with top-level Lithuanian civil servants and politicians, official documents and secondary material such as biographies, digs deeper – beyond constitutional rules and party system factors – to explore the inside structures of semi-presidential decision-making. Our research is driven by two interrelated questions: how does coordination between the president and PM actually work and how does institutional design influence the balance of power and level of conflict between the two executives? Challenging previous accounts of the Lithuanian case, we argue that the existing modes of coordination facilitate presidential dominance. Given the political challenges facing many semi-presidential countries, the article also seeks to identify institutional solutions that facilitate successful policymaking.
Theoretical framework: institutions and (dis)incentives for cooperation
Institutions and Cooperation
Coordination or collective action problems are a key concern of institutional theory, which studies how institutional design structures social behaviour and influences political outcomes. Institutions are known for their longevity, with institutional changes normally brought about by critical junctures, such as major policy failures or significantly altered external circumstances (Thelen Reference Thelen1999). The concept of path dependency is commonly utilized to explain why certain institutional models are adopted, and it emphasizes that initially adopted policies or organizational solutions become the appropriate course of action and, as ‘rules of the game’, structure political behaviour with the consequence that ‘particular courses of action, once introduced, can be virtually impossible to reverse’ (Pierson Reference Pierson2000: 251). As a result, institutional arrangements tend to reproduce the distribution of power in political systems (e.g. North Reference North1990; Goodin Reference Goodin1996; Hall and Taylor Reference Hall and Taylor1996; Pierson Reference Pierson2000; Rhodes et al. Reference Rhodes, Binder and Rockman2006; Scott Reference Scott2014).
Apart from facilitating mutually beneficial outcomes, effective institutions reduce transaction costs and uncertainty in exchange, so that the individuals can anticipate each other’s preferences and behaviour. Institutions can thus induce actors otherwise driven by self-interest towards a ‘problem-solving’ mode characterized by cooperation and search for mutually beneficial solutions (Scharpf Reference Scharpf1989). Moreover, institutions can lengthen the time horizons of politicians through creating conditions for credible commitments, particularly when the game is repeated and interaction is regular among a small number of participants (North Reference North1990, Reference North1993). Long-term, stable interaction should also strengthen the sociological or cultural explanations of institutions. The logic of appropriateness, initially developed by James March and Johan Olsen (Reference March and Olsen1989, Reference March and Olsen2006), perceives political activity as the product of matching behavioural norms to situations and highlights the rule-driven and socially embedded nature of human interactions, with individual action based on mutual understanding of what is the appropriate way to proceed. Hence it is connected to the socialization effects of institutions, with individuals becoming accustomed to the organizational norms and practices. In contrast with the identity-based logic of appropriateness, in the logic of consequences action is more guided by outcomes. Distinguishing between two such behavioural logics can be difficult (Goldmann Reference Goldmann2005), but again the main point is that rules are likely to be sustained as long as they are perceived by the relevant actors to be both legitimate and efficient.
(Dis)incentives for Coordination in Semi-Presidential Regimes
But why would the president and the PM adhere to common institutions? Why would they seek cooperation and institutional constraints to begin with? In line with path dependency, coordination may be a well-established practice regulated by laws, in which case unilateral rejection of cooperation by new office-holders is difficult. Cooperation can also benefit both sides, as institutional theory informs us. Regular coordination of the two executives enables them to learn each other’s preferences and bargaining styles and facilitates the identification and solving of problems, with both sides able to address potential grievances ex ante before the more formal or public decision-making stage. Moreover, willingness to cooperate can be regarded as a sign of ‘statesmanship’, a quality that should enhance the re-election prospects of the president and the PM. Time constraints are also likely to favour coordination. While domestic political calendars can be altered – for example, in terms of when to introduce new legislation – similar rights do not extend to European or global negotiations. If the president and the PM are both involved in European Union (EU) or foreign affairs, then regular coordination makes it possible to react quickly to changing external circumstances.
Research nonetheless informs us that semi-presidentialism is prone to intra-executive conflict, regardless of the specific constitutional form or level of democracy. For example, Oleh Protsyk (Reference Protsyk2006) and Matthew Shugart and John Carey (Reference Shugart and Carey1992) have identified intra-executive conflict in premier-presidential systems (where the cabinet can only be dismissed by the parliament), as well as in president-parliamentary systems (where both the president and the parliament have the formal power to dismiss the cabinet). Other studies have observed intra-executive conflict in consolidated democracies (e.g. Lazardeux Reference Lazardeux2015; Raunio Reference Raunio2012) as well as in new democracies and transitional states (e.g. Beuman Reference Beuman2016; Sedelius and Ekman Reference Sedelius and Ekman2010).
Conflicts between the president and PM can include a range of issues such as specific policies, appointments or government performance. Indeed, there may be good reasons for politicians motivated by re-election or policy influence not to enter into cooperation or, despite coordination mechanisms, to ‘go public’ with their differences of opinion. Under cohabitation the president and the PM are ideologically often quite far apart, and even when there is intra-executive coordination, presidents can in the end choose to exercise their right of veto over legislation or appointments or publicly criticize the government’s policies while prime ministers may try to push through legislation they know will not please the president. For example, Sébastien Lazardeux (Reference Lazardeux2015) shows how electoral motives, particularly winning presidential elections, the main prize in French politics, have shaped the strategies of both executives. However, the impact of such confrontational behaviour on overall intra-executive relations is surely mitigated by regular coordination. Indeed, according to Robert Elgie (Reference Elgie2001) intra-executive relations in the French Fifth Republic during cohabitation have been characterized by both conflict and compromise. Conflict has surfaced in political gridlock, the use of extraordinary constitutional and political procedures, and in battles for public opinion. With the exception of certain defence and foreign policy meetings, presidential advisers have not attended government meetings during these periods. Instead the president and the PM have met on a regular basis and the existence of regular channels for communication ensures that even during public confrontations common tasks can still be carried out and mistakes avoided.
Turning to the distribution of power, constitutionally weak presidents can seek to compensate for their limited powers by more obtrusive behaviour, especially if they feel politically marginalized and need to signal their political views to the voters. If the government is clearly dominant, then the PM can also feel no need for coordination beyond perhaps the president’s office receiving information about governmental decisions. The president and the PM should thus have stronger incentives to cooperate when there is a more balanced distribution of power between the government and the president and/or if the two executives share powers in a particular policy area. The latter applies especially to security and defence policies, issue areas where it is often emphasized that disunity at home should not undermine success abroad.Footnote 1
Nor can one disregard other institutional and contextual variables. The dual legitimacy structure of semi-presidentialism is certainly relevant. Both the president and the PM derive legitimacy from popular elections, but the president leans on a direct electoral mandate while the latter is selected indirectly. Philipp Köker (Reference Köker2014) has found that directly elected presidents are more active in the legislative process. Similarly, David Samuels and Matthew Shugart (Reference Samuels and Shugart2010) and Gianluca Passarelli (Reference Passarelli2015) have shown how direct elections of the president shape the behaviour of political parties. Moreover, presidential activism tends to be higher when the country is experiencing political turbulence, with low levels of societal consensus or weak governments (Tavits Reference Tavits2009). These considerations are particularly relevant to Central and Eastern Europe, where surveys show high levels of public trust in presidents but outright distrust in the PM and the parties (New Europe Barometer 2004; Baltic Barometer 2014). Presidents can distance themselves from unpopular economic measures and day-to-day politics. Normally, they are constitutionally assigned to stand above party politics. The paradox, however, is that the presidents may experience that their popularity outweighs their formal powers and their de facto political influence. When seeking ways of converting their perceived prestige into ‘real’ power, they can publicly criticize the government by leaning on the popular mandate (Amorim Neto and Costa Lobo Reference Amorim Neto and Costa Lobo2009; Sedelius and Mashtaler Reference Sedelius and Mashtaler2013). As seen in the next section, these arguments certainly apply to Lithuania.
Semi-presidentialism in Lithuania
The Lithuanian constitution, adopted in 1992, provides for a directly elected president with limited but more than marginal formal powers. The same person can hold the presidency for ten years – that is, two consecutive terms. Existing measures of formal presidential powers among semi-presidential countries in Central and Eastern Europe place Lithuania in the middle range, on a par with Croatia, Poland and Romania (Doyle and Elgie Reference Doyle and Elgie2016; Krupavičius Reference Krupavičius2008). The president nominates the PM, who is confirmed by the Seimas (parliament) and only the parliament can dismiss the PM. The president’s appointment powers are quite extensive and she has the right to nominate the chair and a number of judges of the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court, the chairman of the National Bank, the commander of the Army, the head of the Security Service and the prosecutor general. The president’s policy powers are directed to foreign affairs. According to Article 84:1, she ‘shall decide the basic issues of foreign policy and, together with the Government, conduct foreign policy’. The implementation of foreign policy thus requires close cooperation between the president and the PM.
Previous analyses of semi-presidentialism in Eastern Europe suggest that Lithuania is among those countries with the lowest frequency of intra-executive conflict (Protsyk Reference Protsyk2006; Sedelius and Mashtaler Reference Sedelius and Mashtaler2013). Table 1 lists the Lithuanian presidents and the governments with which they have shared power. The picture of relative harmony is, however, somewhat blurred by the so-called ‘Paksasgate’, the short and turbulent presidency of Rolandas Paksas which ended with his impeachment from office in 2003.
Table 1 Lithuanian Presidents and Governments, 1993–2016
Source: World Statesmen (2016), www.worldstatesmen.org.
Notes: Following the impeachment of Paksas, Artūras Paulauskas, the leader of the Seimas, temporarily performed the duties of the president until the next election (April–July 2004).
LDDP=Lietuvos Demokratinė Darbo Partija (Democratic Labour Party of Lithuania); LLS=Lietuvos Liberalų Sąjung (Liberal Union of Lithuania); LSDP=Lietuvos Socialdemokratų Partija (Social Democratic Party of Lithuania); LVZS=Lietuvos Valstiečių ir Žaliųjų Sąjunga (Lithuanian Peasant and Greens Union, agrarian, centrist, Green conservative); TS-LK=Tėvynės Sąjunga-Lietuvos Konservatoriai (Homeland Union-Conservatives of Lithuania); TS-LKD=Tėvynės Sąjunga-Lietuvos Krikščionys Demokratai (Homeland Union-Christian Democrats of Lithuania).
Scholars have characterized the Lithuanian political system as centred around personalities (Talat-Kelpsa Reference Talat-Kelpsa1999; Urbanavicius Reference Urbanavicius1999). A relatively high percentage of Lithuanians appear to favour a stronger presidency at the expense of other institutions (Baltic Barometer 2014). Arguably, the presidency is the big prize for ambitious political leaders, which certainly strengthens the importance of personalities in Lithuanian politics. Political parties in Lithuania are affected by the personalized political culture, as many parties have been organized around individuals with political ambitions related to personal interests and with small groups of political activists – hence the large number of splinters and factions over the post-Soviet period. The personalization factor is reinforced by the mixed electoral system where 71 of the 141 deputies are elected in single-member constituencies and the remaining 70 from party lists. Somewhat simplified, two parties with a relatively high level of organization and programmatic structure have dominated Lithuanian politics since independence. On the left side, the reformed communist party, the Democratic Labour Party (LDDP), which later became the Social Democratic Party (LSDP), has formed about half of the governments since 1992. On the centre right, the Homeland Union-Conservatives (TS-LK), an offspring of the Popular Movement (Sajudis), has controlled the playing field and led governments in almost all of the remaining cases.
Empirical analysis
The period of analysis runs from the early 1990s until 2016. We focus on the presidencies of Algirdas Brazauskas, Valdas Adamkus and Dalia Grybauskaitė, with the short presidency of Rolandas Paksas referred to in so far as it impacted on subsequent intra-executive relations. Our data consist of official documents, semi-structured in-depth interviews with senior civil servants and politicians, and other supplementary material such as news items and politicians’ memoirs.Footnote 2 The analysis was carried out in two stages: using government documents we first identified the coordination mechanisms, with the interviews in the second stage providing behind-the-scenes information from both sides – the president and the PM – about the actual role of such instruments and overall intra-executive relations. Given the highly sensitive nature of the topic, the interviewees were willing to speak only on the condition of strict anonymity. A total of nine interviews were carried out. The interviewed persons were selected on the basis of their hands-on expertise in coordination between the president and the PM during each presidency, and many of them had experience of coordination under at least two presidents. The interviewees were current or former high-level civil servants or advisers in the offices of the PM and the president, two speakers of the Seimas, one former prime minister and one former foreign minister.Footnote 3
Coordination Mechanisms
Institutional theory underlines the importance of initial decisions over policy or organizations that ‘lock in’ subsequent choices. It also emphasizes the role of critical junctures that can bring about fundamental change, rendering past practices illegitimate and ineffective. In Lithuania, the transition to democratic rule in the early 1990s was certainly a case of both: not only did it introduce a major overhaul of the whole political system, but it also necessitated decisions about how the country was to be governed.
When Lithuania achieved independence, the institution of presidency was reintroduced. It is evident that considerations about the exact powers of the president and particularly inter-institutional relations were overridden by more pressing concerns. At that time the young democracy had more urgent issues that needed attention: kick-starting the economy, foreign and defence policy, and in general just ensuring a smooth transition to democratic rule and market economy. The period was also characterized by tensions between different camps, and these also influenced discussions about the presidency, with the popular mood appearing to favour a strong leader (Krupavičius Reference Krupavičius2008, Reference Krupavičius2013; Matsuzato and Gudžinskas Reference Matsuzato and Gudžinskas2006; Norkus Reference Norkus2013). There were initial plans to issue a decree about coordination between the president and the other state institutions, but this idea was rejected. The reasons for rejection included time pressure and political opposition, and also it was not seen as appropriate to regulate such matters by laws. However, it was nonetheless recognized that cooperation between the central state institutions was a prerequisite for successful policymaking (Brazauskas Reference Brazauskas2007: 63).
These initial decisions are clearly reflected in subsequent intra-executive cooperation, which takes many forms, but almost none of it is based on written rules (Table 2).Footnote 4 The president meets both the PM and other ministers, with meetings with the prime minister especially taking place regularly. Nonetheless, a lot depends on the preferences of the president and her/his relationship with the ruling coalition and its parliamentary majority. Meetings with other cabinet members can also be interpreted as a way of attempting to influence the government and bypassing the PM. There are no other joint ‘councils’ between the government and the president or ministerial committees where the president is represented. The functions and competence of the State Defence Council are defined in the constitution and the Special Law on State Defence Council. Coordination between civil servants of the offices of the PM and the president is active and is not so dependent on the personalities holding the respective offices. ‘Business relations type’ refers simply to the practice of bureaucrats engaging in coordination regularly and when the need arises. The president receives ex ante governmental documents related to decision-making. And finally, the president meets leaders and Seimas deputies of political parties, with the role of such party ties again depending on the party political situation.
Table 2 Intra-Executive Coordination Mechanisms in Lithuania
Sources: Official documents and interviews (see notes 2 and 3).
Coordination is most established in foreign and security policy. This is not surprising considering the salience of security questions for Lithuania. These are also key areas of presidential powers. In addition to the Defence Council, there was a Foreign Policy Coordination Council chaired by the president from 1993 to 2004.Footnote 5 Key foreign policy choices, at least those concerning the EU and NATO, were coordinated between all three key state institutions – Seimas, president and government. Meetings with foreign leaders or visits abroad are closely coordinated, with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs performing a key role.
The Actual Practice of Intra-Executive Coordination
The analysis in this section highlights the importance of personalities, with presidents enjoying considerable discretion in shaping their relations with other state institutions. Most of the interviewed persons confirmed that each president brings her own communication and inter-institutional coordination style.
Previous research has described Brazauskas as a constructive leader. He upheld the position as head of state carefully without open conflicts with the PM or the Seimas. One of his former advisers noted that Brazauskas was careful not to antagonize the government or the Seimas, and hence had regular meetings with the other main political leaders. He was referred to as a ‘housekeeper’ who wanted to ensure that his country was functioning properly. Brazauskas also favoured an open style of leadership, including active contacts with ordinary people. Interestingly, his staff comprised mainly policy advisers in areas falling under the competence of the government (social policy, economic policy, education, science, culture and religion, sports, municipalities, information, health care). Their task was to analyse documents approved by the parliament and the government, to follow important developments and to formulate proposals for the president. In addition, Brazauskas used decrees to establish various commissions and councils on topics like state defence, foreign policy, citizenship, culture, fighting organized crime and judicial reform.Footnote 6 While much of this activity can be explained by the real need to address serious societal issues facing the young democracy, it also probably influenced the choices made by his successors.
Brazauskas (Reference Brazauskas2007: 70) himself noted that as the constitutional powers of the president are limited, he tried to influence the Seimas and the government with his ‘political authority’ and support of the people. This was easier during the first four years of his presidency, when the LDDP was in government. Upon entering office, he wanted ‘first of all’ to form a relationship with the Seimas. An important factor here was good relations with the Seimas’ leadership, with Brazauskas also meeting the main party groups and individual MPs, especially to discuss his legislative initiatives. However, following the 1996 Seimas elections, things got more difficult for Brazauskas under the centre-right coalition of Homeland Union and Christian Democrats. Brazauskas faced difficulties in establishing contacts with the ruling coalition and whilst he met PM Gediminas Vagnorius (Homeland Union) regularly, the latter emphasized the need to respect the jurisdictional limits set by the constitution. In his memoirs Brazauskas (Reference Brazauskas2007: 82) observed that during the period of more than a year of cohabitation, the PM ‘had never made a phone call’ to the president.
Adamkus came from a very different background, having served in the Environmental Protection Agency of the US for nearly two decades. Adamkus (Reference Adamkus2004: 38) says that he needed to ‘create traditions’ for the institution of the president. Adamkus’s team of advisers clearly wielded strong influence in presidential decision-making, particularly during his first term. Having observed the weak position of Brazauskas towards the end of his presidency, Adamkus wanted to act as a ‘counterweight’ to the government and ‘not let parties impose their own will on him’. In 1999, a serious conflict occurred between Adamkus and PM Vagnorius when the president openly criticized Vagnorius about economic reform. As the president had no friendly majority in the Seimas, he leaned on his popular support. Opinion polls at the time showed approval rates of over 80 per cent for the president, and less than 20 per cent for the PM (Sedelius Reference Sedelius2006: 149). Adamkus publicly voiced his distrust of the PM and stated that he could not perform his presidential duties as long as Vagnorius stayed in the post. The sharp decline of the economy following the Russian economic crisis gave the president the upper hand and he could effectively insist – although without formal dismissal powers – on the resignation of Vagnorius. The fact that Vagnorius chose to step down was an important moment in strengthening presidential leadership.
Adamkus would not limit his scope of activities to foreign and security policy. With his team he would try to influence ‘governmental issues’, particularly budgets but also agriculture, or the privatization of oil refinery Mazeikiu nafta. At the start of his first term Adamkus took steps to consolidate his foreign policy leadership and did not hesitate to disagree with the foreign minister even though public confrontations were largely avoided. He also abolished the Ministry for European Affairs and took an active role in coordinating EU affairs. Following Lithuania joining the EU, Adamkus participated in the European Council, mainly when foreign policy was on the agenda. Otherwise the PM represented Lithuania or both executives attended the summits. Adamkus had regular bilateral meetings with all prime ministers, with such meetings usually held on the initiative of the president. The agendas of the meetings covered all types of societal issues from economy to foreign affairs to problems inside the government. However, when Brazauskas was the PM from 2001 to 2006, his advisers saw that there was little interest from Adamkus and the president’s office to genuinely communicate and cooperate with the government. Adamkus also actively consulted the speaker of the Seimas, the leaders of parliamentary groups, individual ministers or key civil servants, not least when the governing coalition seemed not to be operating effectively. However, it appears that during his second term Adamkus adopted overall a less assertive stance, with the balance of power more in favour of the PM, even during the minority government of Gediminas Kirkilas (2006–8). In Adamkus’s second term, he faced PMs and cabinets from opposing political camps for most of the period. In addition, the political scandal surrounding Paksas’ impeachment called for a less confrontational approach in order to rebuild confidence in the political system in general and in the presidency in particular.
By all accounts, President Grybauskaitė became more powerful than her predecessors. Her team of advisers followed the governmental agenda closely according to their spheres of competence, and again the advisers covered issues outside presidential jurisdiction (economic and social policy, national security, education, science and culture, legal affairs, interior policy, foreign policy). Grybauskaitė met the PM weekly, and all of these meetings as well as meetings with other ministers were publicly announced.Footnote 7 Presidential advisers had regular contact with relevant ministries and the prime minister’s office. Advisers took part in the sittings of the government, expressing, if needed, the position of the president. Perhaps more important, the advisers kept track of the preparatory work carried out in the ministries, trying at least occasionally to influence decision-making before a draft proposal was discussed in the cabinet. Grybauskaitė and her team also approached other stakeholders such as civil society actors. In foreign and security policy the president obviously had more direct ways of influencing policymaking. Her influence also appeared strong in EU and economic affairs, partly because she had served previously as the finance minister and as the Commissioner for Financial Programming and the Budget. Here the political context favoured her assertiveness. The economic crisis preoccupied the already weak cabinet led by Andrius Kubilius, with Grybauskaité supporting the government whilst increasing her own authority. However, from late 2012 Grybauskaité shared power with the Social Democratic-led coalition of Algirdas Butkevičius, and this somewhat weakened the influence of the president.
Also during Grybauskaitė’s presidency it is acknowledged that coordination between the three main state institutions is necessary as no actor can achieve anything alone. Thus, working relations are maintained with the governing coalition, individual ministers, party leaders, and the sectoral committees of the Seimas. Discussions are held in order to avoid conflicts and even in the event of a (public) disagreement both sides try to build a compromise. Respective communication officers from the offices of the PM and the president coordinate their activities to ensure that potential disagreements do not surface, particularly in foreign and security policy. Again, this cooperation is not based on any written rules: the goal is simply to inform one another of developments and of forthcoming speeches or press releases.
All presidents have intervened in the life cycle of governments.Footnote 8 As previous literature has examined this question in careful detail (Krupavičius Reference Krupavičius2008, Reference Krupavičius2013; Matsuzato and Gudžinskas Reference Matsuzato and Gudžinskas2006; Norkus Reference Norkus2013), select examples only are provided here. There is an unwritten agreement that the president has a say on who will be appointed as ministers of foreign affairs and defence regardless of the ideological colour of the government. However, presidents have regularly also either hand-picked individual prime ministers or especially rejected candidates for other portfolios. Brazauskas without prior consultations nominated Adolfas Šleževičius as the PM in 1993, only to replace him with another ex-communist, Mindaugas Stankevičius, in 1996. Adamkus deliberately undermined the position of PM Vagnorius, including through a high-profile television speech in which he declared his lack of trust in Vagnorius, and managed to get Paksas appointed as his successor. In fact, in 2000 Adamkus chose the leader of the Liberal Union, Paksas, to form a ‘new politics’ government despite the fact that the Social-Democratic coalition led by Brazauskas had won the elections. And when the cabinet was suffering from internal turmoil in 2006, Adamkus again resorted to a statement on national television, questioning whether the government still enjoyed the confidence of the Seimas, with PM Brazauskas resigning afterwards. Interestingly, in 2004 Adamkus met the president of the Constitutional Court, Egidijus Kuris, to discuss how to proceed if the preferences of the PM and the president regarding ministerial candidates differed. According to Kuris, the constitution offered no direct solutions, thus paving the way for presidential activism. Grybauskaité in turn enforced in 2010 the resignation of Vygaudas Ušackas, the foreign minister. In 2012 she refused to appoint as ministers several well-known politicians, and even tried to exclude the Labour Party from government. Grybauskaité made it clear that she paid special attention to the competence of the minister of finance.
Where is it Written or Forbidden? The Power of Interpretation and Initiative
The preceding analysis confirms that, in the absence of written rules or otherwise strong norms guiding intra-executive coordination, presidents enjoy more discretion in designing their own modes of operation. The transition period from authoritarian to democratic rule presented the opportunity to set rules about coordination, but various motives worked against it. In line with institutional theory, the adopted approach has become the appropriate course of action, with each new president bringing her own staff, personality and leadership style to the equation. The presidents also have the power of initiative regarding cooperation, with forms and levels of intra-executive coordination essentially always determined by the president. For example, while joint councils or ministerial committees might facilitate better coordination, presidents do not need such bodies. As one interviewee put it: ‘Presidents that have enough powers do not create such councils, they do not need that kind of institution, they just arrange ad hoc meetings despite the fact that it is not foreseen in any law.’
The obvious challenge stemming from lack of rules is that power can be very much up for grabs, particularly given the political culture which favours strong leadership and presidential activism (Matsuzato and Gudžinskas Reference Matsuzato and Gudžinskas2006; Norkus Reference Norkus2013). As one of our informants succinctly put it: ‘one side might ask “where is it written?” and another can argue “where is it forbidden?”’ There is a rather broadly shared expectation, especially by citizens, that the president is the ‘political authority’. Even if the party-political ‘centre of power’ swings in favour of the PM, it is the job of the president to ensure the smooth functioning of the political system. This point came across repeatedly in the interviews and is strongly emphasized in various political and legal texts.
As in other semi-presidential regimes, much depends on party politics, with periods of cohabitation reducing the influence of the president and bringing about a more strict division of labour between the executives. At other times, such as when Grybauskaité entered office in 2009, the economic and political conditions can facilitate very assertive presidential behaviour. Regardless of such factors, the two decades of semi-presidentialism indicate that it is legitimate for Lithuanian presidents to step beyond their constitutional powers and intervene in questions falling under the competence of the government or the Seimas. The composition of presidential staff already suggests such ambitions, and successive presidents have actively formed ties with political parties, the speakers, party groups and individual deputies of Seimas, individual ministers and ministries, the broader civil society and the public. Cooperation with the Seimas in turn facilitates presidential influence, as in many instances the successful use of the president’s powers depends on the consent of the parliament (Matsuzato and Gudžinskas Reference Matsuzato and Gudžinskas2006: 156). Presidents have also benefited from their popularity, with Adamkus and Grybauskaité further reinforcing this through their anti-party or anti-establishment rhetoric (Krupavičius Reference Krupavičius2013).
There is thus a discrepancy between the wording of the constitution and the reality, another commonality with other semi-presidential systems. EU affairs are a good example. Constitutionally, European affairs are the domain of the government, with the PM leading Lithuanian integration policy. The cabinet is thus responsible for coordinating EU matters and for preparatory work ahead of the Council and the European Council. Yet very much depends on the personalities of the PM and the president. During the presidency of Adamkus and the premierships of Brazauskas and Gediminas Kirkilas, the president would participate in those European Councils (or cover those agenda points) which were related to foreign and security policy while the PM would cover other matters. Often both executives would attend the summits.
Grybauskaitė participated in the meetings of European Council alone, even though constitutional provisions about the division of labour clearly suggest otherwise. According to one interviewee, the prime ministers did not contest this arrangement: ‘The leader who enjoys public support can easily do such things ad hoc, therefore it was possible to establish certain practices without any legal documents – just like with attendance of the meetings of the European Council.’ The lack of contestation was aided by the weakness of the government as PM Kubilius needed presidential support for the austerity measures. Grybauskaité was also highly prominent during Lithuania’s EU presidency in the latter half of 2013 and intervened more than Adamkus in the formulation of national negotiating positions (Maniokas and Vilpišauskas Reference Maniokas and Vilpišauskas2010).Footnote 9 Again this power of interpretation shown by Grybauskaité and bending rules in her favour can be explained by the lack of rules. The constitution, secondary laws or the rules about domestic EU coordination do not detail who should represent Lithuania in the European Council.Footnote 10
Concluding remarks
Lithuanian presidents are not afraid to flex their muscles. Leaning on their popularity, consecutive presidents have actively intervened in government formation, even handpicking prime ministers and forcing them to resign. Presidents have also wielded influence in policy areas falling under the jurisdiction of the government, with Brazauskas, Adamkus and Grybauskaitė utilizing various channels for shaping domestic policymaking. In line with previous research on semi-presidentialism, intra-executive relations are less adversarial when Lithuanian presidents have friendly majorities in parliament. Presidents are also more powerful when the government is weak for some reason.
The Lithuanian case provides strong evidence of the role of institutions and of path dependency. Following the transition to democracy in the early 1990s there was insufficient political will to constrain the presidency through more precise legal rules or regular cooperation mechanisms. This initial solution has persevered and the lack of established coordination favours the president. Upon entering office, each president brings her own staff, ambitions and leadership style to the game. And the rules of the game are very much determined by the president: intra-executive coordination depends on the initiative of the president, and ad hoc practices further weaken the position of the PM. Representation in the European Council is a good example of how presidents can behave in ways that contradict at least the spirit if not the text of the constitution. EU policy falls in the competence of the government, but as the constitution or secondary legislation does not regulate who represents Lithuania in the summits, the president has in recent years attended the meetings.
At the same time we should not exaggerate the powers of the Lithuanian president. The balance of power between the Seimas, the government and the president ensures that the president can achieve very little alone – and this in fact explains the strategic behaviour of the president and her advisers. Despite the lack of rules, intra-executive coordination does exist and in most instances conflicts are avoided. This applies particularly to foreign and security policy – an issue area that is both highly salient and where the president and the government constitutionally share power. The perceived role of the president as a ‘constructive statesman’ also constrains the incumbents. But while Lithuanian semi-presidentialism has functioned by and large smoothly, the personality-centred politics commonly found in Central and East European countries do create favourable conditions for presidential activism. This can turn into a serious problem without adequate constitutional checks and balances or during long-term political or economic turmoil.
Future research should explore whether the patterns found in Lithuania apply to other semi-presidential countries. One obvious source of variation is presidential powers, with the president and the PM having stronger incentives to seek cooperation when there is a more balanced distribution of power between the two executives. Regardless of cohabitation or other institutional factors, coordination should be strongest in foreign and security policy and in EU affairs. Whether the EU with its frequent top-level meetings functions as an external factor inducing more active coordination could be examined through analysing non-EU countries. In general, more institutionalized and regular coordination should result in less conflict between the two executives.
Acknowledgements
We are grateful to Sigita Trainauskiene for her help with the data collection and the interviews. The research was supported by the Swedish Research Council (VR 2014-1260).
