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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 March 2014
AFTER MORE THAN A DECADE IN WHICH DOMESTIC POLICY PROVIDED the major issues for party debate in West Germany, the determination of the Brandt government on taking office to engage itself in activities designed to ‘normalize’ relations with the Eastern Bloc has had notable effects on the West German parties. The political climate has altered; partisanship has been intensified; the Basic Law has been tested in novel circumstances; and the governing coalition and the apprentice opposition have both faced trials and tensions in terms of their party base.
The new Ostpolitik has had its effects on the political climate in terms of the first use of the constructive vote of no confidence, the erosion of the coalition majority, the pressures for a premature general election; but the short-term and longer-term effects on the West German parties are likely to be of greater significance. This article seeks to assess the significance of the Ostpolitik for the government and opposition parties. For, whatever the benefits or disadvantages which the Ostpolitik may bring to the Federal Republic in intrinsic terms, it is already clear that it has modified considerably the pre-1969 pattern of party politics.
1 These benefits and disadvantages are discussed in Whetton, L., ‘Appraising the Ostpolitik’, Orbis, Vol. xv, No. 3, 1971, pp. 856–78Google Scholar.
2 Besson, W., Die Aussenpolitik der Bunderepublik, Piper Verlag, Munich, 1970, P. 27 Google Scholar.
3 On 12 February 1969 in the Bundestag.
4 21 April 1969.
5 ‘Sicber in die 70er Jabre’: Wablprogramm der Christlich Demokratiscben Union Deutscblands; Regierungsprogramm der Sozialdemokratiscben Partei Deutscblands 1969; ‘Praktische Politik für Deutschland—Das Konzept der FDP’.
6 Hanreider, W., The Stable Crisis, Harper and Row, New York, 1970, p. 193 Google Scholar.
7 ‘The tremendous political advantage of a highly abstract goal lies in its non‐operational character, which permits it to be perceived in as many different ways as are convenient for various purposes, and which saves the considerable costs (in terms of support, good will, possibilities for coalition, etc.) that explicitly rejecting such possible interpretations often leads to.… Since operational goals often meet resistance, policymakers tend to be reluctant to define their goals operationally.…’ Y. Dror, Public Policymaking Reexamined, Chandler, San Francisco, 1968, p. 135.
8 For example, speeches by Schiller (Karlsruhe, 5 September 1969), Apel (Hamburg, 17 September 1969) and Brandt (Cologne, 25 September 1969).
9 Relative to the 1969 federal election results, the SPD lost votes in North Rhine‐Westphalia, Hesse, Bavaria and Schleswig‐Holstein; the FDP lost votes in Lower Saxony, the Saarland, Rhineland‐Pfalz, Schleswig‐Holstein and Bremen; the coalition parties in aggregate lost votes in North Rhine‐Westphalia, the Saarland and Schleswig‐Holstein.
10 For example, in the North Rhine‐Westphalia Land election, a speech by Barzel (Cologne, 2 June 1970) concentrated on foreign policy as one of three major themes.
11 This concern arose because of the possibility that the Bundesrat would signify that the Treaties were an issue requiring an absolute majority of members in the Bundestag (249 votes) to overrule its rejection of ratification.
12 When a member of one Fruktion (parliamentary party) joins another Fraktion, this not only affects relative party strengths, but also the proportional distribution of seats on parliamentary committees.
13 Speech to German newspaper publishers, 24 April 1969, in B. Meissner (ed.), Die deutsche Ostpolitik 1961–70, Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, Cologne, 1970, P. 342.
14 Despite a comment by George Ball (Newsweek, 24 April 1972) that Brandt's Ostpolitik is ‘plainly a policy from the past’.
15 At Weilburg, 14 September 1969.
16 On the importance of the balance of advantage in the Ostpolitik see von Weizsäcker, R., ‘Keine Entspannung ohne Gleichgewicht’ in Die Zeit, 6 11 1970 Google Scholar.
17 Speech of Barzel in Die Welt, 24 February 1972.
18 Speech of Kiesinger in Die Welt, 24 February 1972.
19 Der Spiegel, 22 May 1972, pp. 21–8.
20 Such as Freiherr von Guttenburg, who made a major speech attacking the Ostpolitik in the Bundestag on 27 May 1970.
21 Die Zeit, 13 November 1970.
22 On the financial crisis in the CDU in opposition see Der Spiegel, 29 March 1971, P. 44.
23 The phrase is that of Kirchheimer, ‘Germany: The Vanishing Opposition’ in R. Dahl (ed.), Political Opposition in Western Democracies, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1966, p. 237.
24 Dahrendorf, R., ‘Bonn after Twenty Years’ in The World Today, 04 1969, P. 170 Google Scholar.
25 One member of the CDU is reported as saying ‘For 1973 we must pray, for 1977 we must work, and for 1981 we must invest.’Der Spiegel, 22 May 1972, p. 28.
26 L. Whetton, op. Cit., p. 858.
27 Of course, it is not suggested that members of the Bundestug may not be permitted to vote against their Fraktion line; but by formally joining another Fruktion they rob their previous party of a vote and also affect its strength on all committees of the Bunahtug, since these are based on proportional representation.
28 Kaiser, K., German Foreign Policy in Transition, Oxford University Press, 1968, P. 139 Google Scholar.
