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Dying of corruption

  • Sören Holmberg (a1) and Bo Rothstein (a1)

In many poor countries, over 80% of the population have experienced corrupt practices in the health sector. In rich countries, corruption takes other forms such as overbilling. The causal link between low levels of the quality of government (QoG) and population health can be either direct or indirect. Using cross-sectional data from more than 120 countries, our findings are that more of a QoG variable is positively associated with higher levels of life expectancy, lower levels of mortality rates for children and mothers, higher levels of healthy life expectancies and higher levels of subjective health feelings. In contrast to the strong relationships between the QoG variables and the health indicators, the relationship between the health-spending measures and population health are rather weak most of the time and occasionally non-existent. Moreover, for private health spending as well as for private share of total health spending, the relation to good health is close to zero or slightly negative. The policy recommendation coming out of our study to improve health levels around the world, in rich countries as well as in poor countries, is to improve the QoG and to finance health care with public, not private, money.

Corresponding author
*Correspondence to: Sören Holmberg, The Quality of Government Institute, Department of Political Science, University of Gothenburg, Box 711, Gothenburg SE 405 30, Sweden. Email:
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Health Economics, Policy and Law
  • ISSN: 1744-1331
  • EISSN: 1744-134X
  • URL: /core/journals/health-economics-policy-and-law
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