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Hegel on the Productivity of Action: Metaphysical Questions, Non-Metaphysical Answers, and Metaphysical Answers

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 July 2019

Edgar Maraguat
Edgar Maraguat*
Affiliation:
University of Valencia, Spainedgar.maraguat@uv.es
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Abstract

Charles Taylor claims that not only Kant, but also successors of Kant such as Fichte and Hegel, advocate a primitive concept of action, namely, a basic, irreducible, indispensable concept allegedly essential to our self-understanding. This paper shows how philosophers like Robert Brandom agree with Taylor explicitly with regard to Hegel, and attribute to him transcendental non-metaphysical arguments in support of such a concept. It then proceeds to challenge this attribution (both of the concept and the type of argument), offering a brief presentation of an alternative non-transcendental metaphysical approach to the Hegelian idea of giving actuality to a concept (or end) through a productive activity.

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Articles
Information
Hegel Bulletin , Volume 40 , Special Issue 3: Hegel and the Philosophy of Action , December 2019 , pp. 425 - 443
Copyright
Copyright © The Hegel Society of Great Britain, 2019 

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