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TOWARDS UNILATERALISM? HOUSE OF COMMONS OVERSIGHT OF THE USE OF FORCE

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 April 2016

Colin RG Murray
Affiliation:
Senior Lecturer, Newcastle Law School, colin.murray@ncl.ac.uk

Abstract

Engaging democratically elected assemblies in national decision-making over the extraterritorial use of force seemingly provides a secure check on executive abuses of power. Many liberal democracies therefore maintain constitutional requirements that their elected national assembly must authorize decisions to use military force. By comparison, the UK Parliament has historically played a limited and often indirect role in authorizing the use of force. From the vote on the Iraq War in 2003 onwards, however, the UK Parliament's role has increased to the point where, in August 2013, the defeat of a Government motion seeking approval for the use of force undermined efforts to build an international coalition to intervene in the ongoing Syrian conflict. Whilst debate regarding this shift has hitherto concentrated on the degree to which parliamentary oversight of the war prerogative is desirable, in this article we consider what Parliament's evolving role heralds for the general relationship between domestic and UN mechanisms. We challenge the underlying assumption that Parliament's interventions mark an indisputably positive development in constraining the use of force. When coupled with the focus upon the doctrine of humanitarian intervention which has accompanied many controversial exercises of UK military force since the end of the Cold War, the involvement of Parliament in the decision-making process risks hollowing out UN Charter safeguards. Successive UK Governments have acquiesced to the extension of Parliament's role, with the effect of shifting the locus for legitimating uses of force away from UN institutions, where the UK cannot control the actions of other States, and into a domestic sphere which is susceptible to executive influence.

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © British Institute of International and Comparative Law 2016 

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References

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31 Charter of the United Nations (24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI, art 51.

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33 UNSC Res 2249 (20 November 2015) UN Doc S/RES/2249.

34 J Wright, HC Deb, vol 602, col 1468 (26 November 2015).

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44 Charter of the United Nations (24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI, art 51.

45 See R Higgins, ‘Intervention and International Law’ in H Bull (ed), Intervention in World Politics (OUP 1988) 31. See also Roberts, A, ‘The So-Called “Right” of Humanitarian Intervention’ (2000) 3 YIHL 3CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 5.

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48 Charter of the United Nations (24 Oct 1945) 1 UNTS XVI, art 2.4.

49 See S Krasner, Sovereignty: Organised Hypocrisy (Princeton University Press 1999) 14–20.

50 UNGA Res 2625 (XXV), ‘Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States’ (24 October 1970) UN Doc A/8028.

51 UNGA Res 377 (V), ‘Uniting for Peace’ (30 November 1950) UN Doc A/1775. See Carswell, A, ‘Unblocking the UN Security Council: The Uniting for Peace Resolution’ (2013) 18 JC&SL 453Google Scholar, 456–9.

52 See, in the context of the Suez Crisis, Marston, G, ‘Armed Intervention in the 1956 Suez Canal Crisis: Legal Advice Tendered to the British Government’ (1988) 37 ICLQ 773CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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54 H Gaitskell, Letter to the Editor, The Times (15 September 1956).

55 UK National Archives, PREM 11/1129, Letter from R Manningham-Buller (Attorney General) to RA Butler (Home Secretary) (28 November 1956).

56 Suez might not be quite as clear-cut a turning point as Peevers suggests. Archive materials show that, into the 1960s legal advisors were still working to persuade Ministry of Defence officials that, outside of art 51's self-defence provisions, a conflict which is not authorized by a UNSC resolution would breach international law. UK National Archives, DEFE 7/2001, Letter from BB Hall (Treasury Solicitor's Department) to PD Martyn (Ministry of Defence) (15 Aug 1962) 1–2.

57 ‘[U]nless the great Powers in the modern world are going to agree and play their part in the world organisation, that organisation cannot function properly’; A Eden, HC Deb, vol 413 col 677 (22 August 1945).

58 C Peevers, The Politics of Justifying Force: The Suez Crisis, the Iraq War and International Law (OUP 2013) 90.

59 ibid 214–15.

60 See R Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It (OUP 1994) 262 and Reisman, WM, ‘Unilateral Actions and the Transformations of the World Constitutive Process: The Special Problem of Humanitarian Intervention’ (2000) 11 EJIL 3CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 12.

61 UK National Archives, FCO 28/920, Letter from CLG Mallaby (FCO Eastern European and Soviet Department) to R Braithwaite (FCO Western Organisations Department) (2 June 1970) para 2.

62 See Roberts (n 21) 186.

63 See Kumm (n 38) 911.

64 The test from the Caroline Case (1837) allows self-defence when the attack is ‘instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation’, (1906) 2 Moore Digest of International Law, vol II, 412.

65 See Justice Select Committee, ‘Oral Evidence: The Work of the Attorney General’ (15 September 2015) HC 409, Q34.

66 Lord Goldsmith, ‘Iraq: Resolution 1441’ (7 March 2003) <http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2005/apr/28/election2005.uk>.

67 See Ahmed, DI, ‘Defending Weak States against the “Unwilling or Unable” Doctrine of Self-Defense’ (2013) 9 JILIR 1Google Scholar, 5–13; and Deeks, A. ‘“Unwilling or Unable”: Toward a Normative Framework for Extraterritorial Self-Defense’ (2012) 52 VaJIntlL 483Google Scholar.

68 Letter from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General UN (23 September 2014) Doc S/2014/695. Letter from the Chargé d'Affaires of the Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (31 March 2015) UN Doc S/2015/221. Letter dated 9 September 2015 from the Permanent Representative of Australia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (9 September 2015) UN Doc S/2015/693. See Ahmed (n 67) 5–13, Deeks (n 67) 483.

69 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Uganda), Judgment [2005] ICJ Rep 168; and Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory [2004] ICJ Rep 136.

70 See K Anderson, ‘Legality of Intervention in Syria in Response to Chemical Weapon Attacks’ ASIL Insight (30 August 2013) <http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/17/issue/21/legality-intervention-syria-response-chemical-weapon-attacks>.

71 Changes to the Charter through though customary international law include UNSC abstentions not being understood as rejecting a proposal under art 27.3 and expansions to the UN Secretary-General's role under art 99. In the latter regard, see O'Donoghue, A, ‘Good Offices: Grasping the Place of Law in Conflict’ (2014) 34 LS 469Google Scholar, 477.

72 See Congo (n 69) para 148. The R2P doctrine affirms this position but places additional emphasis on the responsibilities of a State towards its own population; see UNGA Res 60/1, ‘Responsibility to Protect, World Summit Outcome’ (24 October 2005) UN Doc A/RES/60/1; and UNSC Res 1973, ‘On Libya’ (17 March 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1973.

73 Nicaragua (n 1) para 94.

74 ibid, para 124–125. Of particular importance is the ICJ's recognition, at para 268, that ‘[t]he protection of human rights, a strictly humanitarian objective, cannot be compatible with the mining of ports … or … with the training, arming and equipping of the Contras’.

75 FCO Paper, ‘Is Intervention Ever Justified?’ Foreign Policy Document No 148 1984 (1986) 57 BYBIL 614, 618.

76 ibid 619.

77 See 1971 UNYB 144–6. See also Franck, TM and Rodley, NS, ‘After Bangladesh: The Law of Humanitarian Intervention by Military Force’ (1973) 67AJIL 275Google Scholar.

78 See 1979 UNYB 271–9.

79 See 1979 UNYB 262–3. In 1984, the UK FCO stated that the Uganda and Bangladeshi examples constituted self-defence claims, even though they have subsequently been described as examples of humanitarian intervention; FCO Paper (n 75) 619.

80 Intervention in Cambodia attracted General Assembly condemnation UNGA Res 34/22, ‘The Situation in Kampuchea’ (14 November 1979) UN Doc A/RES/34/22.

81 UNGA Res 2625 (XXV), ‘Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States’ (24 October 1970) UN Doc A/8028; and UNGA Res 3314 (XXIX), ‘Definition of Aggression’ (14 December 1974) UN Doc A/9631. Group of 77 South Summit, Havana, Cuba (10–14 April 2000) para 54, < http://www.g77.org/summit/Declaration_G77Summit.htm>. See also Movement of the Non-Aligned Countries, XVI Ministerial Conference, Tehran (26–31 August 2012) para 598, <http://www.pmiran.at/NAM/Final%20Document%20%28NAM%202012%29.pdf>.

82 UNSC Res 794, ‘On Somalia’ (3 December 1992) UN Doc S/RES/794.

83 UNSC Res 688, ‘On Iraq’ (5 April 1991) UN Doc S/RES/688. China, Russia and the Arab League, all opposed the action, while the UN Secretary-General reiterated the Security Council's pre-eminence. See Schachter, O, ‘United Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict’ (1991) 85 AJIL 452CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also Blokker, N, ‘Is the Authorization Authorized? Powers and Practice of the UN Security Council to Authorize the Use of Force by “Coalitions of the Able and Willing”’ (2000) 11 EJIL 541CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

84 Earl of Caithness, HL Deb, vol 534, col 1380 (29 January 1992).

85 Foreign Affairs Committee, Third Report: The Expanding Role of the United Nations and its implications for United Kingdom Policy (23 June 1993) HC 235-III, Q109.

86 ibid, Q142.

87 ibid, Q143. An example of the protection of nationals abroad would be the Entebbe Incident of 1976 involving Israel and Uganda; Gordon, ‘D, ‘Use of Force for the Protection of Nationals Abroad: The Entebbe Incident’ (1977) 9 CaseWResJIntlL 117Google Scholar.

88 UNSC Res 1199, ‘On Kosovo (FRY)’ (23 September 1998) UN Doc S/RES/1199 and UNSC Res 1203, ‘On Kosovo’ (24 October 1998) UN Doc S/RES/1203. See also UNSC Res 1160, ‘On the letters from the United Kingdom (S/1998/223) and the United States (S/1998/272)’ (31 March 1998) UN Doc S/RES/1160.

89 See Blair (n 16).

90 R Cook, Speech at the London School of Economics, 13 January 2000 (2000) 71 BYBIL 641, 642.

91 R Cook, Speech at Chatham House, 28 January 2000 (2000) 71 BYBIL 643, 643–4.

92 See Robin Cook's discussion of a ‘comprehensive approach’ when humanitarian crises arise; R Cook, Speech to the American Bar Association, 19 July 2000 (2000) 71 BYBIL 646, 647–8.

93 Foreign Affairs Committee, Fourth Report: Kosovo (7 June 2000) HC 28-I, para 128.

94 ibid, para 132. The Committee did go on to note, at para 134, that ‘faced with the threat of veto in the Security Council by Russia and China, the NATO allies did all that they could to make the international intervention on Kosovo as compliant with the tenets of international law as possible’. The Committee, at para 144, suggested the creation of new instruments to enable such actions ought to be considered.

95 R Cook, Press Statement, 7 June 2000 (2000) 71 BYBIL 645, 645.

96 NATO Press Release (99)12 (30 January 1999) paras 4–5.

97 See Gray (n 7) 47.

98 As can be seen from the US position, Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v United States of America) 1999 ICJ Pleadings (Verbatim Record: CR 1999/24) (11 May 1999) 10 <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/114/4577.pdf>.

99 Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v Belgium) 1999 ICJ Pleadings (Verbatim Record: CR 1999/15) (10 May 1999) 7 <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/114/4491.pdf>.

100 Belgium also invoked the UK's intervention in Sierra Leone in 1999, on which see Samuels, K, ‘Jus Ad Bellum and Civil Conflicts: A Case Study of the International Community's Approach to Violence in the Conflict in Sierra Leone’ (2003) 8 JC&SL 315Google Scholar.

101 Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v United States of America) 1999 ICJ Application (29 April 1999) 5 <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/114/7173.pdf>.

102 Report of the Secretary General on the work of the Organization, UN Doc A/54/1 (1999) para 66.

103 See T Paterson, ‘Merkel fury after Gerhard Schroeder backs Putin on Ukraine’ Telegraph (14 March 2014).

104 See 1999 UNYB 342–3.

105 See Security Council 7019th Meeting (19 August 2013) UN Doc S/PV.7019, 27.

106 ‘Responsibility to Protect, World Summit Outcome’ (24 October 2005) UN Doc A/RES/60/1; and ICISS Report, Responsibility to Protect (December 2001) <http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf>.

107 ibid, para 139. See also UN Secretary-General Report, Implementation of the Right to Protect (12 January 2009) A/63/677.

108 UN Secretary-General Report, In Larger Freedom, Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All (21 March 2005) A/59/2005. See also JL Cohen, Globalisation and Sovereignty: Rethinking Legality, Legitimacy, and Constitutionalism (CUP 2012) 172–80.

109 Ban Ki-moon has stated that R2P is only triggered by specific crimes, such as genocide or crimes against humanity, inflicted by a State against its population; UN Secretary-General Report, Responsible Sovereignty: International Cooperation for a Changed World (15 July 2008) SG/SM/11701.

110 Gray (n 7) 166.

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112 AV Dicey, An Introduction to the Study of the Constitution (8th edn, first published 1915, Liberty Fund 1982) 310.

113 W Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765) vol I, 250. For the influence of this view, see F Flournoy, Parliament and War (PS King 1927) 263.

114 See Dicey (n 112) 312. Francis Flournoy agreed that the executive's independence in the field of foreign relations, ‘so complete in theory, was under a considerable degree of indirect control by Parliament’; Flournoy (n 113) 8.

115 J Moulton, HC Deb, vol 78, col 625 (5 February 1900).

116 J Bryce, The American Commonwealth (1st edn, first published 1888, Macmillan 1918) 221–2. These view had been first articulated in Bryce's time as a Foreign Office minister; HC Deb, vol 303, col 1420 (19 March 1886).

117 KG Robbins, ‘The Foreign Secretary, the Cabinet, Parliament and the Parties’ in FH Hinsley (ed), British Foreign Policy under Sir Edward Grey (CUP 1977) 3, 7.

118 S Low, ‘The Foreign Office Autocracy’ (January 1912) 41/541 Fortnightly Review 1, 5.

119 HC Deb, vol 32, col 60 (27 November 1911).

120 Flournoy (n 113) 15.

121 KG Robbins, ‘Public Opinion, The Press and Pressure Groups’ in FH Hinsley (ed), British Foreign Policy under Sir Edward Grey (CUP 1977) 70, 70. See also E Grey, Twenty-Five Years, 1892–1916 (Frederick A Stokes 1925) vol I, 287–9.

122 GH Perris, Our Foreign Policy and Sir Edward Grey's Failure (Andrew Melrose 1912) 207.

123 Bryce (n 116) 22. On the influence of Bryce's writings, see M Swartz, The Union of Democratic Control in British Politics during the First World War (OUP 1971) 6.

124 See S Low, ‘The Foreign Office Autocracy’ (January 1912) 41/541 Fortnightly Review 1, 8; and Perris (n 122) 209–10.

125 A departmental select committee covering the work of the FCO was ultimately introduced as part of the wider reform of parliamentary committees in 1979. See C Poyser, ‘Proceedings on the Record: The Floor of the House, the Foreign Affairs Committee and Other Committees’ in C Carstairs and R Ware (eds), Parliament and International Relations (Open University Press 1992) 8, 28–32.

126 See J Bryce, HC Deb, vol 303, col 1420 (19 March 1886).

127 Flournoy (n 113) 8. This traditional lever over executive action was recently emphasized in a Constitution Committee report on the deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan; Constitution Committee, Waging War: Parliament's Role and Responsibility (2006) HL Paper 236-I, para 14.

128 See C Ku and HK Jacobson, ‘Broaching the Issue’ in C Ku and HK Jacobson (eds), Democratic Accountability and the Use of Force in International Law (CUP 2003) 3, 15–18; and ND White, Democracy Goes to War: British Military Deployments under International Law (OUP 2009) 269–95.

129 See HC Deb, vol 41, col 1498 (25 July 1912); and HC Deb, vol 50, col 2056 (28 March 1913).

130 P Richards, Parliament and Foreign Affairs (Allen & Unwin 1966) 40.

131 HC Deb, vol 65, col 955 (27 July 1914).

132 Beginning in Hansard at HC Deb, vol 65, col 1809 (3 August 1914).

133 See W Churchill, The World Crisis (Charles Scribner's Sons 1923) vol I, 235.

134 Flournoy (n 113) 225.

135 R Joseph, The War Prerogative: History, Reform and Constitutional Design (OUP 2013) 107.

136 See Flournoy (n 113) 247–8.

137 ibid 257.

138 Examples of such debates begin in Hansard at HC Deb, vol 351, col 291 (3 September 1939) (Second World War); HC Deb, vol 477, col 485 (5 July 1950) (Korean War); HC Deb, vol 21, col 633 (3 April 1982) (Falklands War); HC Deb, vol 184, col 23 (21 January 1991) (Gulf War); HC Deb, vol 328, col 536 (25 March 1999) (Kosovo War).

139 Joseph (n 135) 107–8.

140 Low (n 118) 6.

141 Joseph (n 135) 71–2.

142 Z Steiner, The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, 18981914 (Ashfield 1986) 170–1.

143 When questions were recently raised over the effectiveness of combat drones in Afghanistan, the Minister of State for Defence refused to answer, on the basis that doing so ‘would be likely to prejudice the capability, effectiveness or security of the armed forces’ and that an evaluation of the strategic lessons from the campaign would not occur until ‘combat operations are complete and all relevant information is available’. M Francois, vol 584, col 688W (16 July 2014).

144 UK National Archives, DEFE 7/2001, Chiefs of Staff Committee, ‘Authority to Alert and Move Forces’ (25 June 1962) para 4.

145 Richards (n 130) 38–9.

146 HL Deb vol 664, col 1138 (19 February 2003).

147 J Straw, HC Deb, vol 460, col 492 (15 May 2007).

148 Even in the 1930s some commentators had pointed to the development of international institutional arrangements for authorizing uses of force displacing domestic processes; see Brierly, JL, ‘International Law and Resort to Armed Force’ (1932) 4 CLJ 308CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 318.

149 ‘[I]t is necessary that the Government should have behind them an informed House of Commons, whose members can bring home to their constituents throughout the country the true state of international relations’; D Lipson, HC Deb, vol 413 col 727 (22 August 1945).

150 HC Deb, vol 21, col 571 (2 April 1982). See also UK National Archives, FCO 7/4501, I Sinclair (FCO Legal Adviser), ‘Formal Consequences of a State of War between the UK and Argentina’ (9 April 1982).

151 C Attlee, HC Deb, vol 477, col 485 (5 July 1950). See White (n 128) 90–104.

152 Beginning in Hansard at HC Deb, vol 558, col 2 (12 September 1956).

153 ibid, vol 401, col 760 (18 March 2003).

154 ibid.

155 Foreign Affairs Committee, Fourth Report: Kosovo (7 June 2000) HC 28-I, para 166.

156 For example, having opposed the use of force in Suez fear of such a backlash dissuaded Labour, when it entered Government in 1964; see Peevers (n 58) 124–5.

157 HC Deb, vol 401, col 774 (18 March 2003).

158 See Peevers (n 58) 231–3.

159 HC Deb, vol 401, col 773 (18 March 2003).

160 See R (Gentle) v Prime Minister [2006] EWCA Civ 1689; [2007] QB 689, [46] (Clarke MR).

161 ‘Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Assessment of the British Government’ (2003) <https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/272079/5972.pdf>.

162 The Chilcot Inquiry is yet to publish its report on the lessons from the 2003 Iraq War. The Iraq Inquiry, (HC Deb, vol 494, col 23 (15 June 2009)), now looks unlikely to be published until mid-2016; see BBC News, ‘Chilcot Inquiry: Doubts over report's release in 2015’ (21 April 2015) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-32390844>.

163 See, for example, the position of the Foreign Affairs Committee that the Kosovo intervention, ‘if of dubious legality in the current state of international law, was justified on moral grounds’; Foreign Affairs Committee, Fourth Report: Kosovo (7 June 2000) HC 28-I, para 138.

164 R (Gentle) v Prime Minister [2008] UKHL 20; [2008] 1 AC 1356.

165 ibid, [24] (Lord Hope). See also [62] (Lord Carswell).

166 HM Government, The Governance of Britain (HMSO 2007) Cm 7170, para 29. See also HM Government White Paper, The Governance of Britain: Constitutional Renewal Cm 7342-I, paras 215–216.

167 See J Straw, HC Deb, vol 460, col 492 (15 May 2007).

168 Straw, J, ‘BRISMES Lecture: The Future of British Foreign Policy in the Middle East’ (2015) 42 British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 375CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 376.

169 HC Deb, vol 524, col 1066 (10 March 2011).

170 See Strong (n 9) 613. See also HC Deb, vol 566, col 1428 (29 August 2013).

171 Joseph (n 135) 219.

172 Mayer, KR, ‘Executive Power in the Obama Administration and the Decision to Seek Congressional Authorization for a Military Attack against Syria: Implications for Theories of Unilateral Action’ (2014) UtahLRev 821Google Scholar, 821. For an analysis of President Obama's abortive effort to secure specific congressional authorization for intervention in Syria in 2013, see 826–32.

173 UNSC Res 1970, ‘Peace and Security in Africa’ (26 February 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1970.

174 UNSC Res 1973, ‘Libya’ (17 March 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1973, para 4.

175 Ulfstein, G and Christiansen, HF, ‘The Legality of the NATO Bombing in Libya’ (2013) 62 ICLQ 159CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 162.

176 HC Deb, vol 525, col 717 (21 March 2011).

177 See K Clark, HC Deb, vol 525, col 749 and D Winnick, HC Deb, vol 525, col 752 (21 March 2011).

178 The Libya action was supported by 557 MPs and opposed by 13; HC Deb, vol 525, col 802 (21 March 2011).

179 See R Drax, HC Deb, vol 525, col 752 (21 March 2011).

180 See White (n 11) 224.

181 UNSC Res 2118, ‘Middle East’ (27 September 2013) UN Doc S/RES/1118.

182 HC Deb, vol 585, col 1279 (26 September 2014).

183 See J Corbyn, HC Deb, vol 566, col 606 (11 July 2013).

184 HC Deb, vol 566, col 628 (11 July 2013).

185 See Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, Parliament's Role in Conflict Decisions: A Way Forward (27 March 2014) HC 892, para 6.

186 ibid, para 35.

187 Stahn, C, ‘Between Law-Breaking and Law-Making: Syria, Humanitarian Intervention and “What the Law Ought to Be”’ (2014) 19 JC&SL 25Google Scholar, 47.

188 R (Gentle) v Prime Minister [2006] EWCA Civ 1689; [2007] QB 689 [43].

189 Grieve (n 29) para 4.

190 ibid, para 4.

191 See D Bethlehem, ‘Stepping Back a Moment’ EJIL: Talk! (12 Sepember 2013). <http://www.ejiltalk.org/stepping-back-a-moment-the-legal-basis-in-favour-of-a-principle-of-humanitarian-intervention/>; and H Koh, ‘Syria and the Law of Humanitarian Intervention Part II: International Law and the Way Forward’ Just Security (2 October 2013), <https://www.justsecurity.org/1506/koh-syria-part2/>. Others consider the re-emergence of unilateralism in use-of-force decision-making to be dangerous; Stahn (n 187) 46.

192 See R Buchan, International Law and the Construction of the Liberal Peace (Hart 2014) 73–95.

193 Foreign Affairs Select Committee, Fourth Report: Kosovo (7 June 2000) HC 28-I, para 166.

194 D Cameron, HC Deb, vol 566, col 1425 (29 August 2013).

195 C Lucas, HC Deb, vol 566, col 1427 (29 August 2013).

196 M Gapes, HC Deb, vol 566, col 609 (11 July 2013).

197 For a further example of such confusion, see D Burrowes, HC Deb, vol 585, col 1263 (26 September 2014).

198 Grieve (n 29) para 4.

199 ibid, para 4. For the alternate approach of the US Government, see Draft Resolution of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, <http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/DAV13973.pdf>, 113th Congress, 1st Session, DAV13973. See also the White House Draft, <http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/AUMFresolutiontext.pdf>.

200 See UNSC Res 1540 (28 April 2004) UN Doc S/RES/1540, which established the Chemical Weapons Committee.

201 The possibility of an International Criminal Court indictment under the crime of aggression perhaps permits some limited international oversight; Art 5 and 8bis, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (17 July 1998) 2187 UNTS 90.

202 Evidence to the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, Parliament's Role in Conflict Decisions: A Way Forward (27 March 2014) HC 892, para 44.

203 See Buchan (n 192) 18.

204 ibid 42. Buchan does note that efforts towards such a consensus were damaged by the 2003 Iraq War, 44–8.

205 J Kerry, US Secretary of State, ‘Remarks with United Kingdom Foreign Secretary Hague’ (9 September 2013) <http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/09/213956.htm>.

206 See UNSC Res 2118 (27 September 2013) UN Doc S/RES/2118, which affirms that the use of chemical weapons anywhere is a threat to international peace and security. See also Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, ‘Syria Chemical Weapons Destruction Data, Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons’ (9 February 2015) <http://www.opcw.org/special-sections/syria/destruction-statistics/>.

207 Koh (n 191).

208 See Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, Judgment [1970] ICJ Rep 3, paras 60–63 (Separate Opinion of Judge Jessup); and J Crawford, Brownlie's Principles of Public International Law (OUP 2012) 24.

209 See Green, JA, ‘Questioning the Peremptory Status of the Prohibition of the Use of Force’ (2010) 32 MichJIntlL 215Google Scholar, 241–52.

210 Bethlehem (n 191).

211 HC Deb, vol 566, col 1551 (29 August 2013). The motion to intervene was defeated by 285 votes to 272.

212 ibid, vol 566, col 1555–1556 (29 August 2013).

213 See D Cameron, HC Deb, vol 585, col 1255 (26 September 2014).

214 See Bannelier, K and Christakis, T, ‘Under the UN Security Council's Watchful Eyes: Military Intervention by Invitation in the Malian Conflict’ (2013) 6 LJIL 855CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Henderson, C, ‘Editorial Comment: The Use of Force and Islamic State’ (2014) 1 Journal on the Use of Force and International Law 209Google Scholar, 210.

215 The motion to intervene was approved by 524 votes to 43.

216 UN Doc No S/RES/2178 (24 September 2014).

217 Letter from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General UN (23 September 2014) UN Doc S/2014/695.

218 See R Goodman, ‘Australia, France, Netherlands Express Legal Reservations about Airstrikes in Syria’ Just Security (25 September 2014) <http://justsecurity.org/15545/australia-france-netherlands-express-legal-reservations-airstrikes-syria/>.

219 Marc Weller has noted that each of these actions ‘stretches our understanding of self-defence a little bit’; Foreign Affairs Committee, ‘Oral Evidence: The extension of offensive British military operations to Syria’ (8 October 2015) Q63.

220 Letter dated 24 July 2015 from the Chargé d'Affaires of the Permanent Mission of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (24 July 2015) UN Doc S/2015/563.

221 Prime Minister's Office, ‘Summary of the Government Legal Position on Military Action in Iraq against ISIL’ (25 September 2014) para 4 <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/military-action-in-iraq-against-isil-government-legal-position/summary-of-the-government-legal-position-on-military-action-in-iraq-against-isil>.

222 HC Deb, vol 585, col 1259 (26 September 2014).

223 ibid, vol 585, col 1270 (26 September 2014).

224 ibid, vol 585, col 1265 (26 September 2014).

225 D Grieve, HC Deb, vol 585, col 1319 (26 September 2014).

226 See K Clarke, HC Deb, vol 585, col 1279 (26 September 2014) and M Campbell, col 1284.

227 M Fallon, HC Deb, vol 597, col 1671 (2 July 2015).

228 HC Deb, vol 599, col 26 (7 September 2015).

229 Letter from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (7 September 2015) UN Doc S/2015/688.

230 Justice Select Committee, ‘Oral Evidence: The Work of the Attorney General’ (15 September 2015) HC 409, Q39.

231 See Schaller, C, ‘Using Force Against Terrorists “Outside Areas of Active Hostilities” – The Obama Approach and the Bin Laden Raid Revisited’ (2015) 20 JC&SL 195Google Scholar, 201–4.

232 A Peters, ‘German Parliament decides to send troops to combat ISIS − based on collective self-defense “in conjunction with” SC Res. 2249’ EJIL: Talk! (8 December 2015) <http://www.ejiltalk.org/german-parlament-decides-to-send-troops-to-combat-isis-%E2%88%92-based-on-collective-self-defense-in-conjunction-with-sc-res-2249/>.

233 Foreign Affairs Committee, ‘Oral Evidence: Foreign Policy Developments’ (9 September 2015) HC 381, Q67.

234 Foreign Affairs Committee, ‘The Extension of Offensive British Military Operations to Syria’ (3 November 2015) HC 457, para 4.

235 M Fallon, HC Deb, vol 597, col 1671 (2 July 2015).

236 See M D'Ancona, ‘Cameron has the power to order air strikes. He should’ The Guardian (16 November 2015) <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/nov/16/isis-britain-david-cameron-air-strikes-armchair-generals>.

237 BBC News, ‘Michael Fallon: “Morally indefensible” not to bomb IS in Syria’ (6 November 2015) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-34742361>.

238 Foreign Affairs Committee, ‘The Extension of Offensive British Military Operations to Syria’ (3 November 2015) HC 457, para 19.

239 BBC News, ‘Could Islamic State have bombed Flight 9268?’ (5 November 2015) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-34730909>.

240 BBC News, ‘Paris Attacks: “Islamic State” claims Responsibility’ (14 November 2015) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-34819501>.

241 D Cameron, HC Deb, vol 602, col 669 (18 November 2015).

242 Treaty on European Union, art 42(7).

243 UN Doc No S/RES/2249 (20 November 2015).

244 See Congo (n 69) paras 146–147.

245 HC Deb, vol 602, col 1490 (26 November 2015).

246 ibid, vol 602, col 1491 (26 November 2015).

247 ibid, vol 602, col 1491 (26 November 2015).

248 The Commons ultimately supported action by 397 votes to 223.

249 H Benn, HC Deb, vol 603, col 484 (2 Dec 2015).

250 HC Deb, vol 603, col 367 (2 Dec 2015).

251 ibid, vol 603, col 343 (2 Dec 2015).

252 K Starmer, HC Deb, vol 603, col 467 (2 December 2015).

253 HC Deb, vol 603, col 326 (2 December 2015).

254 ibid, vol 603, col 324 (2 December 2015).

255 J Nicolson, HC Deb, vol 603, col 440 (2 Dec 2015). See also J Lewis, col 369.

256 HC Deb, vol 602, col 1496 (26 November 2015).

257 ibid, vol 603, col 330 (2 December 2015).

258 ibid, vol 603, col 328 (2 December 2015).

259 ibid, vol 602, col 1468 (26 November 2015).

260 S Doughty, HC Deb, vol 603, col 323 (2 December 2015).

261 A Lang, ‘Legal Basis for UK Military Action in Syria’ (1 December 2015) <http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-7404/CBP-7404.pdf>.

262 HC Deb, vol 603, col 465 (2 December 2015).

263 By contrast, see the briefing presented to German legislators by the Bundestag Scientific Service, ‘Staatliche Selbstverteidigung gegen Terroristen’ (30 November 2015) <http://thomas-hitschler.de/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/203_15_Staatliche-Selbstverteidigung-gegen-Terroristen-aktualisierte-Version.pdf>.

264 N Carmichael, HC Deb, vol 603, col 466 (2 December 2015).

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