Once upon a time, a Professor of European Institutions, at least if a lawyer by training, could simply assert that the European Communities are based on the rule of law, that they create institutions with autonomous powers, which are able to issue legislation binding as law throughout every member State of the Community, and that they create courts which have power to exercise judicial control over a complex network of relationships between the Community institutions, the member States and private citizens. While these statements are still true, however, they must now be laced in a rather more complex context. Furthermore, there is a contrast between on the one hand the intensification (to borrow a word from the Common Agricultural Policy) of certain fundamenta s of the EC legal order in the recent case law of the European Court, and on the other hand attempts by member States to escape this through non-EC forms of cooperation in the framework of the European Union, the development of the idea that not all the rules of the EC Treaty apply to all the member States, and the entry by the majority of the member States into a separate Treaty, the Schengen Agreement, dealing with matters which might be thought to fall under the EC Treaty or the Home Affairs and Justice pillar of the Treaty on European Union—all of which might generically be referred to as variable geometry. In the other direction, it may be observed that large amounts of substantive

Increased policy harmonization on refugee matters in the European Union (EU), namely the creation of a Common European Asylum System (CEAS), has created the imperative for a transnational judicial comparative dialogue between national courts. This article is based on a structured, focused comparison approach to examining a key element of a transnational European legal dialogue, namely, the use of foreign law by national judges when making their own decisions on asylum. It does so by examining two countries, France and Britain, as representative of the difference in legal tradition and culture within the EU in terms of the civil–common law divide. Both case studies are structured around a common set of empirical and jurisprudential research questions. The empirical findings reveal a surprising lack of transnational use of national jurisprudence on asylum between judges. Nonetheless, a slight but noticeable increase in the use of transnational asylum jurisprudence in the British and French courts must be noted. Two broad accounts—one rational, the other cultural—are applied in each of the case studies to explain this empirical finding. This article concludes on the broader implications of these findings for the establishment of a CEAS by 2012.

The European Union is soon to be composed of twenty-seven Member States. The first wave of enlargement is to take place in 2004 and may see the accession of Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, and the three Baltic states. A few years later, Bulgaria and Romania are also expected to join the EU. Although previous enlargements have taken place,2 the imminent accession of ten countries, mainly from Central and Eastern Europe, is unprecedented not only in terms of scale, but also for its political symbolism: for these states, EU membership confirms the success of their democratic and economic transition efforts and represents their (re-)integration to the European family after decades of isolation under the Soviet domination.

English conflict of laws is the creation of the common law. Prior to Britain's entry into the European Union, legislation played only a limited role. The few legislative measures concerning choice of law were narrowly targeted to remedy specific problems—for example the formal validity of wills, or torts. The rules for service outside the jurisdiction were a more important exception, but their practical operation largely depended on judge-made concepts and remedies, such as forum non conveniens and antisuit injunctions. The common law also provided a complete system for the recognition of foreign judgments that operated untrammelled with regard to judgments from many countries, including some of the most important, while the relevant legislation, where applicable, did little more than provide a simpler procedure.

Even if an external observer who takes an interest in the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Communities and of the Court of First Instance of the European Communities may not have such an impression at first sight, comparative law plays a central role in the activities of these courts. It means much more than simply looking at solutions given to certain problems in the legal orders of the Member States. As a former president of the Court of Justice rightly observed, recourse to comparative law is for the Court of Justice essentially a method of interpretation of Community law itself.1 For the Court of Justice and the CFI (below often referred to as ‘Community judge’ or ‘Community courts’), it is one method amongst other methods of interpretation of the law (such as literal, exegetic, historical, systematic interpretation) and it constitutes a tool for establishing the law.2