No CrossRef data available.
We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 19 June 2025
This article analyzes whether the development of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle can serve to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing, given the abuse of veto power by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Although several proposals have been made to restrain the use of the veto, the absence of an intent to eliminate it in its entirety has obstructed UN institutions in their efforts to build an inclusive and peaceful society.
In this context, the authors discuss the debate on the utility of R2P as a norm; its historical background; the relevance of the Responsibility Not to Veto (RN2V) through the example of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict; and the role of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) and other UN organs in aiding the UNSC to implement R2P and maintain international peace and security.
The article focuses on preventing mass atrocities through R2P to safeguard vulnerable populations’ access to basic rights and economic opportunities. Further, RN2V, by limiting UNSC paralysis during a crisis, would help avert protracted conflicts that exacerbate poverty, displacement, and environmental degradation. The R2P and RN2V principles collectively have the potential to strengthen UN institutions and reinforce the emphasis on equity, resilience, and peace by ensuring that violence, conflicts, and political inaction do not undo developmental gains.
1 Glanville, L. 1996. “Does R2P matter? Interpreting the impact of a norm.” Cooperation and Conflict 51 (2): 184–9910.1177/0010836715612850CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 191.
2 Gallagher, A. 2014. “What constitutes a ‘Manifest Failing’? Ambiguous and inconsistent terminology and the Responsibility to Protect.” International Relations 28 (2): 428–4410.1177/0047117814552144CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 435.
3 Pison Hindawi, C. 2021. “Decolonizing the Responsibility to Protect: On pervasive Eurocentrism, Southern agency and struggles over universals.” Security Dialogue 53 (1): 38–56, https://doi.org/10.1177/09670106211027801.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
4 Chimni, B.S. 2012. “Capitalism, Imperialism, and International Law in the Twenty-First Century.” Oregon Review of International Law 14: 17–45, 31.Google Scholar
5 Blätter, A., and Williams, P.D.. 2011. “The Responsibility Not to Veto.” Global Responsibility to Protect 3 (3): 301–2210.1163/187598411X586052CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 304.
6 P5 refers to the five permanent members of the UNSC: Russia, China, France, the United Kingdom (UK), and the United States (US).
7 Adelman, H. 2010. “Blaming the United Nations.” Journal of International Political Theory 4 (1): 9–33 10.3366/E1755088208000062CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 10.
8 Harland, D. 2010. “Kosovo and the UN.” Survival 52 (5): 75–98 10.1080/00396338.2010.522097CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 76.
9 Mende, Janne, Heller, Regina, and Reichwein, Alexander. 2022. “Transcending a Western Bias: Towards a Decolonised and Entangled Perspective in Norms Research.” European Review of International Studies 9 (3): 339–6210.1163/21967415-09030001CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 350.
10 Murthy, C.S.R., and Kurtz, G.. 2015. “International Responsibility as Solidarity: The Impact of the World Summit Negotiations on the R2P Trajectory.” Global Society 30 (1): 38–53 10.1080/13600826.2015.1094451CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 39.
11 Thakur, R., and Weiss, T.. 2009. “R2P: From Idea to Norm—and Action?.” Global Responsibility to Protect 1 (1): 22–53 10.1163/187598409X405460CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 24.
12 UN General Assembly, “Implementing the responsibility to protect: report of the Secretary-General.” A/63/677 (2009).
13 Whittle, Devon. 2015. “The Limits of Legality and the United Nations Security Council: Applying the Extra-Legal Measures Model to Chapter VII Action.” European Journal of International Law 26 (3): 671–9810.1093/ejil/chv042CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 684.
14 Nahlawi, Yasmine. 2019. “Overcoming Russian and Chinese Vetoes on Syria through Uniting for Peace.” Journal of Conflict and Security Law 24 (1): 111–43, https://doi.org/10.1093/jcsl/kry032.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
15 Vilmer, J.J. “The Responsibility Not to Veto: A Genealogy.” Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations 24 (3): 331–4910.1163/19426720-02403003CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 334.
16 Blätter and Williams, “The Responsibility Not to Veto,” 304 (n 5).
17 Thym, D. 2004. “Reforming Europe’s Common Foreign and Security Policy.” European Law Journal 10 (1): 5–22, 1210.1111/j.1468-0386.2004.00200.xCrossRefGoogle Scholar.
18 Vilmer, “The Responsibility Not to Veto: A Genealogy,” 334 (n 15).
19 Nao Seoka, Nao. 2017. “The Gradual Normative Shift from ‘Veto as a Right’ to ‘Veto as a Responsibility’: The Suez Crisis, the Syrian Conflict, and UN Reform.” In Ekaterina Yahyaoui Krivenko, Human Rights and Power in Times of Globalisation. Brill, 196–224, 203.
20 Liang, Yuen-Li. 1949. “General Assembly Resolutions on the Problem of Voting in the Security Council and on Pacific Settlement of Disputes.” American Journal of International Law 43 (4): 705–3110.2307/2193260CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 706.
21 Golden, Merrow. 2017. “Could a Code of Conduct Work? The Prospects of the French Proposal Limiting the Veto on the United Nations Security Council.” Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 56 (1): 101–38Google Scholar, 102.
22 Vilmer, “The Responsibility Not to Veto: A Genealogy,” 331–49 (n 15).
23 Papalia, Giorgia. 2017. “A Critique of the Unqualified Veto Power.” Perth International Law Journal 2: 55–63 Google Scholar, 56.
24 Ibid.
25 Peters., A. 2023. “The war in Ukraine and legal limitations on Russian vetoes.” Journal on the Use of Force and International Law 10 (2): 162–72CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 167.
26 Glanville, “Does R2P matter? Interpreting the impact of a norm,” 191 (n 1).
27 UN General Assembly. Uniting for peace, A/RES/377, UN General Assembly, 3 Nov. 1950; see also “What is the Uniting for Peace Resolution?” Dag Hammarskjöld Library, United Nations, accessed May 1, 2025, https://ask.un.org/faq/177134.
28 Green, James A., Henderson, Christian, and Ruys, Tom, “Russia’s attack on Ukraine and the jus ad bellum.” Journal on the Use of Force and International Law, 9(1): 4–30 10.1080/20531702.2022.2056803CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 6.
29 UN General Assembly, Uniting for peace (n 27).
30 Seoka, “The Gradual Normative Shift from ‘Veto as a Right,’” 203 (n 19).
31 International Court of Justice (ICJ). “Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo (Request for Advisory Opinion).” General List No. 141, 22 July 2010.
32 Webber, Mark. 2000. “A tale of a decade: European security governance and Russia.” European Security 9, (2): 31–60 10.1080/09662830008407451CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 32.
33 See Green, Henderson, and Ruys. “Russia’s attack on Ukraine and the jus ad bellum,” 6 (n 28).