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THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN'S FOREIGN POLICY AND CONSTRUCTION JIHAD'S DEVELOPMENTAL ACTIVITIES IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Abstract
Abstract

This article adopts the theoretical framework of complex realism to trace the evolution of the Islamic Republic of Iran's foreign policy and developmental activities in Africa between the 1980s and the 2000s. Contrary to common assumptions, the deradicalization of the Islamic Republic's foreign policy in Africa began not under the moderates in the early 1990s, but under the conservatives in the mid-1980s. This period marked the first time that the Islamic Republic instrumentalized development to advance its strategic interests in Africa—a policy that has continued despite the factionalization of Iran's political elite. Based on one year of archival research and interviews in Iran, this article is the first to investigate the history and activities of the Islamic Republic's rural development organization, Construction Jihad, in Africa. It posits that development, instead of arms or ideology, has enabled Iran to make the farthest inroads into the continent due to Africa's sizeable agrarian economies, widespread rural poverty, and formidable developmental challenges.

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Eric Lob is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Politics and International Relations, Florida International University, Miami, Fl.; e-mail: elob@fiu.edu
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NOTES

Author's note: I thank Cyrus Schayegh, the IJMES editors, and the three anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments and feedback on this article. I presented drafts of this article at the following conferences: The Swiss Society for African Studies conference entitled “Islam in Africa” in Berne, Switzerland on 23–25 April 2015, the Association for the Study of the Middle East and Africa seventh annual conference entitled “Searching for Balance in the Middle East and Africa” in Washington, D.C. on 30 October–1 November 2014, and the Afro-Middle East Centre conference entitled “In Whose Interests? Exploring Middle East Involvement in Africa” in Pretoria, South Africa on 5–6 November 2013.

1 See Sick Gary, All Fall Down: America's Tragic Encounter with Iran (New York: Random House, 1985); Bill James, The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1988); Pollack Kenneth M., The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict between Iran and America (New York: Random House, 2004); Slavin Barbara, Bitter Friends, Bosom Enemies: Iran, the U.S., and the Twisted Path to Confrontation (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2007); Limbert John W., Negotiating with Iran: Wrestling the Ghosts of History (Washington, D.C.: US Institute of Peace, 2009); and Leverett Flynt and Mann Leverett Hillary, Going to Tehran: Why America Must Accept the Islamic Republic of Iran (New York: Picador, 2013).

2 See Milani Mohsen M., “Iran's Active Neutrality during the Kuwaiti Crisis: Reasons and Ramifications,” New Political Science 11 (1992): 4160; Milani , “Iran's Gulf Policy: From Idealism and Confrontation to Pragmatism and Moderation,” in Iran and the Gulf: A Search for Stability, ed. Suweidi Jamal S. (Abu Dhabi: Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 1996), 92; Marschall Christin, Iran's Persian Gulf Policy: From Khomeini to Khatami (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 107; Milani , “Iran's Persian Gulf Policy in the Post-Saddam Era,” in Contemporary Iran: Economy, Society, Politics, ed. Gheissari Ali (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 354; and Arjomand Said Amir, After Khomeini: Iran Under His Successors (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 133–43.

3 Led by the Association of Combatant Clergy (Majmaʿ-i Ruhaniyun-i Mubariz), the radicals espoused a revolutionary and populist state, a command economy and income redistribution, liberal social values, and a foreign policy that exported the revolution and promoted anti-imperialism. By contrast, the conservatives—who were predominantly members of the Society of Combatant Clergy (Jamiʿih-i Ruhaniyat-i Mubariz)—believed in an Islamic state, a laissez faire economy and private property protections, puritanical social mores, and a nonrevolutionary foreign policy that created open borders and free trade. Moslem Mehdi, Factional Politics in Post-Khomeini Iran (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 2002), 99127.

4 See Cole Juan R. I. and Keddie Nikki R., eds., Shiʿism and Social Protest (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1986); Shaery-Eisenlohr Roschanack, Shi'ite Lebanon: Transnational Religion and the Making of National Identities (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008); Louër Laurence, Transnational Shia Politics: Religious and Political Networks in the Gulf (London: Hurst, 2008); and Louër , Shiism and Politics in the Middle East (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012).

5 Hunter Shireen, Iran's Foreign Policy in the Post-Soviet Era (Santa Barbara, Calif.: Praeger, 2010); Amelot Laurent and Icho Ourtane, “L'Afrique au centre de la ‘stratégie Sud’ de l'Iran,” in L'Iran et les grands acteurs régionaux et globaux, ed. Makinsky Michel (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2012); Uwizeyimana Emeline, “L'Afrique: Nouvel enjeu de la politique extérieure de l'Iran,” in L'Iran dans le monde, ed. Nahavandi Firouzeh (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2013).

6 In their analysis of Turkish foreign policy in Africa, Gökhan Bacik and Isa Afacanb argue that Turkey has depoliticized and de-Islamized its foreign policy strategy and discourse due to the continent's lack of major Islamic political groups and its substantial Christian population. According to Bacik and Afacan, Ankara has downplayed religion and politics and focused instead on economic development, an issue that resonates with Africans. Bacika Gökhan and Afacanb Isa, “Turkey Discovers Sub-Saharan Africa: The Critical Role of Agents in the Construction of Turkish Foreign-Policy Discourse,” Turkish Studies 14 (2013): 8.

7 Ehteshami Anoushiravan and Hinnebusch Raymond, “Foreign Policymaking in the Middle East: Complex Realism,” in International Relations of the Middle East, 3rd ed., ed. Fawcett Louise (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 225–31.

8 Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, “Foreign Policymaking,” 231.

9 Ibid.

10 In the mid-1950s, the shah adopted a similar strategy of entering Africa to gain international visibility and share Iran's experience and expertise. Uwizeyimana, “L'Afrique,” 189.

11 During the 1989 and 1993 presidential elections, which received voter turnouts of 54.59 percent and 50.66 percent, respectively, Rafsanjani won 94 percent and then 63 percent of the vote. “1989 Presidential Election,” Iran Data Portal, accessed 29 November 2015, http://www.princeton.edu/irandataportal/elections/pres/1989/; “1993 Presidential Election,” Iran Data Portal, accessed 29 November 2015, http://www.princeton.edu/irandataportal/elections/pres/1993/. During the 1997 and 2001 presidential elections, which received voter turnouts of 79.92 percent and 66.77 percent, respectively, Khatami won 69.1 percent and then 77 percent of the vote. “1997 Presidential Election,” Iran Data Portal, accessed 29 November 2015, http://www.princeton.edu/irandataportal/elections/pres/1997/; and “2001 Presidential Election,” Iran Data Portal, accessed 29 November 2015, http://www.princeton.edu/irandataportal/elections/pres/2001/. During the 2000 parliamentary election, the reformists won 80 percent of the vote and secured 195 out of 290 seats. Abrahamian Ervand, A History of Modern Iran (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 188. During subsequent parliamentary elections, the Guardian Council disqualified reformist candidates, leading to victories and majorities for the conservatives and the principlists.

12 Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, “Foreign Policymaking,” 231.

13 See Buchta Wilfried, Who Rules Iran?: The Structure of Power in the Islamic Republic (Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000).

14 Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, “Foreign Policymaking,” 231.

15 Ibid.

16 Ministry of Construction Jihad, ʿAmalkard-i Dih Salih-yi Jahad-i Sazandigi az 1358 ta 1368, 1991, 187.

17 Kojo Opoku Aidoo, Senior Research Fellow, University of Ghana, discussion with the author, Pretoria, South Africa, 5 November 2013. See also Hunter, Iran's Foreign Policy, 228; and Uwizeyimana, “L'Afrique,” 189, 197–98.

18 Arjomand , The Turban for the Crown (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 164; Farhi Farideh, States and Urban-Based Revolutions (Champagne, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1990), 217.

19 During the Iran–Iraq War, the Islamic Republic sustained an estimated US $450 billion in infrastructural damage and destruction, dedicated one third of its national budget to the war effort, and suffered precipitous declines in oil production and revenues—not to mention between 150,000 and 300,000 casualties. After such major expenditures and losses, the government reduced military spending from 17 to 2 percent of GNP. Foran John and Goodwin Jeff, “Revolutionary Outcomes in Iran and Nicaragua: Coalition Fragmentation, War, and the Limits of Social Transformation,” Theory and Society 22 (1993): 219; Abrahamian, A History of Modern Iran, 184; Luciani Giacomo, “Oil and Political Economy in the International Relations of the Middle East,” in International Relations of the Middle East, ed. Fawcett Louise (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 106; Fareed Mohamedi, “Oil and Gas Industry,” USIP Iran Primer, updated August 2015, accessed 26 October 2015, http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/oil-and-gas-industry.

20 See “Fact Sheet: The World Bank and Agriculture in Africa,” World Bank, accessed 1 November 2013, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/0,,contentMDK:21935583~pagePK:146736~piPK:146830~theSitePK:258644,00.html; and “Rural Poverty in Africa,” International Fund for Agricultural Development, accessed 3 September 2014, http://www.ruralpovertyportal.org/in/region/home/tags/africa.

21 Emadi Hafizullah, “Exporting Iran's Revolution: The Radicalization of the Shiite Movement in Afghanistan,” Middle Eastern Studies 31 (1995): 2.

22 Moslem, Factional Politics, 110–11.

23 Leichtman Mara A., “(Still) Exporting the Islamic Revolution: Senegal's Relationship with Iran,” Shi'a Affairs Journal 1 (2008): 96. See also Hunter, Iran's Foreign Policy, 227.

24 Mohammad J. Iravani, Nihadgirayi va Jahad-i Sazandigi (Ministry of Construction Jihad, 1998–99), 263. Although I assume it is Tehran, I was unable to find the city where this monograph was published.

25 Leichtman, “(Still) Exporting,” 97.

26 For more on the rift between the conservatives and the moderates, see Abrahamian, A History of Modern Iran, 184–85.

27 Amelot and Icho, “L'Afrique au centre,” 157n9.

28 Kojo Opoku Aidoo, Senior Research Fellow, University of Ghana, discussion with the author, Pretoria, South Africa, 5 November 2013. For more on the limitations and setbacks of Africa's “third wave” of democratization in the 1990s, see Lynch Gabrielle and Crawford Gordon, “Democratization in Africa 1990–2010: An Assessment,” Democratization 18 (2011): 275310.

29 Ministry of Construction Jihad, ʿAmalkard-i, 187–88. During Khamenei's tour of Africa in 1986, a diplomatic incident occurred in Zimbabwe when he refused to shake hands with the women in Mugabe's government, highlighting his conservatism. “Iranian, in Zimbabwe, Affronts Women,” The New York Times, 22 January 1986.

30 Ministry of Construction Jihad, ʿAmalkard-i, 187–88.

31 Former CJ official, interview with the author, Tehran, Iran, 9 March 2011.

32 Ministry of Construction Jihad, ʿAmalkard-i, 187–88; Iravani, Nihadgirayi, 261–62.

33 Former CJ employee, interview with the author, Tehran, Iran, 3 May 2011.

34 Ibid.

35 Ibid.

36 Ministry of Construction Jihad, ʿAmalkard-i, 187–88.

37 See Hunter, Iran's Foreign Policy, 229.

38 Former CJ member and current MAJ employee, interview with the author, Tehran, Iran, 11 May 2011.

39 Iranian cultural attaché, discussion with the author, Pretoria, South Africa, 7 November 2013.

40 Leichtman, “(Still) Exporting,” 88. See Buchta Wilfried, Die Iranische Schia und die islamische Einheit (1979–1996) (Hamburg: Deutsches Orient-Institut, 1997), 245–75; and Buchta Wilfried, “Tehran's Ecumenical Society (Majmaʿ al-Taqrib): A Veritable Ecumenical Revival or a Trojan Horse of Iran,” in The Twelver Shia in Modern Times: Religious Culture and Political History, ed. Brunner Rainer and Ende Werner (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 333–54. See also the Ecumenical Society's website: http://www.taqrib.info/english/.

41 Hunter, Iran's Foreign Policy, 227.

42 Buchta, Die Iranische Schia, 275–73. See also the Ahl ul-Bayt Institute's website: http://www.ahl-ul-bayt.org/ar.php.

43 Sani Yakubu Adam, Researcher, Bayero University, discussion with the author, Berne, Switzerland, 24 April 2015. In Nairobi, Kenya—which contains half a million Shiʿa—an association affiliated with the Ahl ul-Bayt Institute published the English-language monthly bulletin Mojtaba and distributed it to Shiʿi youth in Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. Uwizeyimana, “L'Afrique,” 195–96.

44 See Danawi Dima, Hizbullah's Pulse: Into the Dilemma of Al-Shahid and Jihad Al-Bina (Bonn: Friedrich Ebert Foundation, 2002); Harik Judith, Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2004); and Harik , “Hezbollah's Public and Social Services and Iran,” in Distant Relations: Iran and Lebanon in the Last 500 Years, ed. Chehabi Houchang E. (London: I. B. Tauris, 2006), 259–86.

45 Former CJ employees, interviews with the author, Tehran, 3, 8, 11 May 2011.

46 Ibid.

47 “About Sudan,” United Nations Development Program, accessed 4 April 2013, http://www.sd.undp.org/content/sudan/en/home/countryinfo/; US Department of State, “2010 Report on International Religious Freedom—Sierra Leone,” 17 November 2010, accessed 4 April 2013, http://www.refworld.org/docid/4cf2d06b43.html.

48 Ministry of Construction Jihad, ʿAmalkard-i, 188.

49 In Ghana, 16 percent of the population is made up of Muslims, a majority of whom is Maliki Sunni. Next to the Sunnis, Ghana has the largest percentage of Ahmadis in the world. Many of them live in the Northern Provinces, where CJ operated. A number of Shiʿa reside in Ghana's southern cities. A precise statistical breakdown of Tanzania's religious populations does not exist because the government has not conducted a census since 1967. Tanzania's Sunnis are mainly affiliated with the Shafiʿi School of jurisprudence. Tanzania's Shiʿa are largely Ismaʿilis who reside under the spiritual leadership of the Aga Khan. Tanzania also contains Khoja Shiʿa, who migrated from South Asia and converted Tanzania's black natives to Shiʿism. Compared to the Ismaʿilis, the Khoja make up a smaller percentage of the population. However, they wield considerable influence through their control of key sectors of the economy. Daftary Farhad, A Short History of the Ismailis: Traditions of a Muslim Community (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1998), 179; US Department of State, “2009 Report on International Religious Freedom—Ghana,” 26 October 2009, accessed 4 April 2013, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2009/127235.htm; Iqbal Akhtar, Professor, Florida International University, discussion with the author, 9 October 2013.

50 Between 2005 and 2013, Ahmadinejad and the principlists expanded the Islamic Republic's nuclear program from 3,000 to 19,000 centrifuges, its low-enriched uranium stockpile to 10,000 kilograms or 22,000 pounds, and its high-enriched uranium stockpile to 180 kilograms or 400 pounds. Dafna Linzer, “Iran Asserts Expansion of Nuclear Operation,” The Washington Post, 10 April 2007, accessed 8 December 2015, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/04/09/AR2007040900290.html; Saeed Kamali Dehghan and Julian Borger, “Iran Needs Greater Uranium Enrichment Capacity, Says Ayatollah Ali Khamenei,” The Guardian, 8 July 2014, accessed 8 December 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/08/iran-increase-uranium-enrichment-capacity-supreme-leader-ali-khamenei; Kenneth Katzman, “Iran, Gulf Security, and U.S. Policy,” Congressional Research Service, 28 May 2015, 19, accessed 8 December 2015, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL32048.pdf.

51 During the first round of the 2005 presidential election, which received a voter turnout of 62.84 percent, Ahmadinejad won 19.4 percent of the vote while Rafsanjani won 21 percent. During the second round, voter turnout dropped to 59.76 percent and Ahmadinejad won 61.7 percent of the vote while Rafsanjani won 38.3 percent. “2005 Presidential Election,” Iran Data Portal, accessed 29 November 2015, http://www.princeton.edu/irandataportal/elections/pres/2005/.

52 During the 2009 presidential election, which received a voter turnout of 85.21 percent, Ahmadinejad won 63.1 percent of the vote while his reformist competitor, Mir-Hossein Mousavi, won 34.2 percent. After the results were announced, mass demonstrations broke out around the country due to suspicions of electoral fraud. “2009 Presidential Election,” Iran Data Portal, accessed 29 November 2015, http://www.princeton.edu/irandataportal/elections/pres/2009/.

53 After touring seven African countries in 2005, Khatami “noted that in recent meetings of the International Atomic Energy Agency board of governors, the Africans managed to stand against the US greed.” “Iranian President Terms His 7-Nation African Tour as Fruitful,” Payvand Iran News, 22 January 2005, accessed 15 September 2014, http://www.payvand.com/news/05/jan/1198.html.

54 During Ahmadinejad's presidency, annual average domestic crude oil prices rose from US $50.04 (nominal)/US $60.44 (inflation-adjusted) per barrel in 2005 to US $91.17 (nominal)/US $92.40 (inflation-adjusted) per barrel in 2013—peaking at US $91.48 (nominal)/US $100 (inflation-adjusted) per barrel near the end of his first term in 2008. Tim McMahon, “Historical Crude Oil Prices (Table),” 1 May 2015, accessed 29 November 2015, http://inflationdata.com/Inflation/Inflation_Rate/Historical_Oil_Prices_Table.asp.

55 Ministry of Agricultural Jihad, Guzarish-i Ijmali az Faʿaliyatha-yi Daftar-i Umur-i bayn al-Milal va Sazamanha-yi bayn al-Milali va Mantiqih-i dar Sal-i 1386, Ministry of Agricultural Jihad, 2007–8, 2.

56 Ministry of Agricultural Jihad, Guzarish-i ʿAmalkard-i Daftar-i Umur-i bayn al-Milal va Sazamanha-yi bayn al-Milali vā Mantiqih-i dar Sal-i 1387, Ministry of Agricultural Jihad, 2008–9, 40.

57 Ibid., 10.

58 Ibid.

59 Ministry of Agricultural Jihad, Guzarish-i 1386, 14, 32, 35; Ministry of Agricultural Jihad, Guzarish-i 1387, 4–5.

60 Ministry of Agricultural Jihad, Guzarish-i 1386, 13, 32; Ministry of Agricultural Jihad, Guzarish-i 1387, 4, 32.

61 Ministry of Agricultural Jihad, Guzarish-i 1386, 14, 32, 35; Ministry of Agricultural Jihad, Guzarish-i 1387, 4–5, 10.

62 Ministry of Agricultural Jihad, Guzarish-i 1386, 16; Ministry of Agricultural Jihad, Guzarish-i 1387, 14.

63 Ministry of Agricultural Jihad, Guzarish-i 1386, 14, 32, 35; Ministry of Agricultural Jihad, Guzarish-i 1387, 4–5.

64 Although Uganda is landlocked, it produces up to 15,000 tons of fish from aquaculture, including production from small-scale fish farmers, emerging commercial fish farmers, and stocked community water reservoirs and minor lakes. There are an estimated 20,000 ponds throughout the country with an average surface area of 500 square meters per pond. “Uganda: National Aquaculture Sector Overview,” United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, accessed 21 April 2015, http://www.fao.org/fishery/countrysector/naso_uganda/en.

65 Ministry of Agricultural Jihad, Guzarish-i 1387, 10.

66 Ibid., 4–5, 11, 14.

67 Ibid., 3, 31–33. Iran is a key market for Kenyan tea. Hunter, Iran's Foreign Policy, 230; Uwizeyimana, “L'Afrique,” 194.

68 Ministry of Agricultural Jihad, Guzarish-i 1387, 16, 31–32.

69 Ibid., 4, 8.

70 Ibid., 4.

71 Monavar Khalaj, “Iran's Car Industry Output Falls Sharply,” Financial Times, 23 January 2013.

72 Ministry of Agricultural Jihad, Guzarish-i 1387, 4.

73 “Iran to Export Vehicles to Gambia,” PressTV, 26 April 2007, accessed 10 October 2013, http://edition.presstv.ir/detail/7552.html; “Iran and Israel in Africa: A Search for Allies in a Hostile World,” The Economist, 4 February 2010; “Iranian Tractors To Be Exported to South Africa,” Islamic Republic News Agency, 8 October 2013, accessed 10 October 2013, http://www.payvand.com/news/13/oct/1058.html; Amelot and Icho, “L'Afrique au centre,” 162; Uwizeyimana, “L'Afrique,” 193.

74 Ministry of Agricultural Jihad, Guzarish-i 1387, 8.

75 Ibid., 8, 14.

76 Ibid., 11, 14.

77 Amelot and Icho, “L'Afrique au centre,” 160.

78 Ministry of Agricultural Jihad, Guzarish-i 1387, 5, 10, 40.

79 In 2010, the Islamic Republic became a member with observer status in the African Union and organized its Iran–Africa forum in Tehran. In August 2012, the Non-Aligned Movement held a summit in Tehran. Amelot and Icho, “L'Afrique au centre,” 157, 159–60; Uwizeyimana, “L'Afrique,” 191.

80 In 2009, Ahmadinejad condemned the International Criminal Court's arrest warrant for Sudan's al-Bashir, who defended Iran's right to have a nuclear program. Amelot and Icho, “L'Afrique au centre,” 168; Uwizeyimana, “L'Afrique,” 198.

81 For more on the agency of African leaders and governments in manipulating foreign powers to maximize aid and use it for political ends, see Bayart Jean-François, “Africa in the World: A History of Extraversion,” African Affairs 99 (2002): 217–67; and Clapham Christopher, Africa and the International System (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

82 See Hunter, Iran's Foreign Policy, 229; Amelot and Icho, “L'Afrique au centre,” 164; and Uwizeyimana, “L'Afrique,” 187, 190–91.

83 Uwizeyimana, “L'Afrique,” 194.

84 Ministry of Agricultural Jihad, Guzarish-i 1387, 40.

85 Between 2006 and 2014, all of the MAJ's African clients and partners with nonpermanent membership to the UNSC voted to maintain or increase economic sanctions against Iran's nuclear program. United Nations Bibliographic Information System, accessed 10 September 2014, http://unbisnet.un.org. Voting records of the IAEA Board of Governors are not public record. IAEA Library's Nuclear Information Section, email to author, 10 September 2014. See also Hunter, Iran's Foreign Policy, 231; and Amelot and Icho, “L'Afrique au centre,” 172.

86 Between 2006 and 2014, Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Malawi, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Sudan, Togo, and Zimbabwe, among other African countries, voted against UN General Assembly resolutions condemning Iran's human rights record. Between 2010 and 2013, Gambia, Malawi, Senegal, and Comoros changed their previous positions by voting for such resolutions. United Nations Bibliographic Information System, accessed 10 September 2014, http://unbisnet.un.org.

87 Amelot and Icho, “L'Afrique au centre,” 161–62, 168; Uwizeyimana, “L'Afrique,” 199.

88 Amelot and Icho, “L'Afrique au centre,” 157, 161–62, 165, 168–71, 173; Uwizeyimana, “L'Afrique,” 198–99, 208–48.

89 Uwizeyimana, “L'Afrique,” 195–97.

90 Amelot and Icho, “L'Afrique au centre,” 159–60.

91 Houchang E. Chehabi, “The Discreet Relationship: Iran and South Africa in the Apartheid Era” (paper presented at the Sixth Biennial Convention of the Association for the Study of Persianate Societies, Sarajevo, Bosnia, 2–6 September 2013), 54.

92 Issa Kalantari, former Iranian minister of agriculture, interview with the author, Tehran, Iran, 28 May 2011.

93 Ministry of Agricultural Jihad, Guzarish-i 1386, 31.

94 Ibid.

95 Ministry of Agricultural Jihad, Guzarish-i 1387, 38.

96 Ibid, 40.

97 Gasiorowski Mark, “Islamic Republic of Iran,” in The Government and Politics of the Middle East and North Africa, 7th ed., ed. Gasiorowski Mark (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 2014), 54.

98 “Security Council resolution 1929 (2010)” on measures against the Islamic Republic of Iran in connection with its enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, United Nations Bibliographic Information System, 9 June 2010, accessed 10 September 2014, http://unbisnet.un.org:8080/ipac20/ipac.jsp?session=1410W9T455609.826&profile=voting&uri=full=3100023~!926973~!8&ri=1&aspect=power&menu=search&source=~!horizon.

99 Hunter, Iran's Foreign Policy, 231; Uwizeyimana, “L'Afrique,” 194, 204–5.

100 Hunter, Iran's Foreign Policy, 231; Amelot and Icho, “L'Afrique au centre,” 172; Uwizeyimana, “L'Afrique,” 205.

101 Some of the MAJ's African clients and partners—such as Ethiopia, Kenya, and Nigeria—also accept agricultural and military assistance from one of Iran's regional rivals, Israel. Hunter, Iran's Foreign Policy, 231; Uwizeyimana, “L'Afrique,” 194, 204–5.

102 Amelot and Icho, “L'Afrique au centre,” 170–74; Uwizeyimana, “L'Afrique,” 204.

103 Iran's investment and trade in Africa pale in comparison to that of the United States, Western Europe, China, and India. “China in Africa: One Among Many,” The Economist, 17 January 2015.

104 Khalid Abdel Aziz, “Sudan Expels Iranian Diplomats and Closes Cultural Centres,” The Guardian, 2 September 2014. The closure of the centers and expulsion of officials coincided with Saudi pressure on Khartoum to sever ties with Tehran for allegedly backing the Houthi rebels in Yemen. Anonymous Sudanese scholar, discussion with the author, Berne, Switzerland, 25 April 2015.

105 By 2013, Iran's nuclear program had cost the country well over US $100 billion in lost foreign direct investment and oil export revenues. Ali Vaez and Karim Sadjadpour, “Iran's Nuclear Odyssey: Costs and Risks,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2 April 2013, vii, accessed 8 December 2015, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/iran_nuclear_odyssey.pdf.

106 During the 2013 presidential election, which received a voter turnout of 76.25 percent, Rouhani won 50.60 percent of the vote and avoided a second-round runoff. “2013 Presidential Election,” Iran Data Portal, accessed 29 November 2015, https://www.princeton.edu/irandataportal/elections/pres/2013-presidential-electio/.

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