Among the figures in the scholarly imagining of the post-colonial world, “the peasant” is a strange kind of presence. With this abstraction, a category of human being has become a field of expertise, the subject of his own scholarly journals, and the object of a distinct body of theory and description. “What are villagers in India, in Egypt, in Mexico really like?” the anthropologist George Foster asks, as he begins a brief history of the field. “For nearly fifty years anthropologists (by no means to the exclusion of others) have searched for answers [to this question] …. living with villagers in order to question them and to observe their behavior, describing their findings in books and articles.” At first they called their research the study of “folk” societies, Foster says, but after World War II scholars “came to realize that ‘peasant’ is a more appropriate term, and thus was born the new subfield of ‘peasant studies’.”

As the new editor of the International Journal of Middle East Studies, my goal is to maintain the excellent reputation and standards of the Journal set by its departing editor. To achieve that task constitutes a tall order for just about anyone in the field, as Peter von Sivers has done such an admirable job over the past five years of promoting the Journal's international reputation. Under his editorship, the quality, number, and scope of submitted manuscripts and reviews, as well as the Journal's readership, have increased. Scholars from the Middle East have taken a more active part than ever before, as evaluators, reviewers, and authors.

Among the results of recent scholarly interest in the “World-Systems” perspective has been a revival of the debate concerning the origins of capitalism and the modern world economy. Despite the fact that the World-Systems approach at times seems as Eurocentric as some of the theories it purports to oppose, since the origins and “core” developments of both mercantilism and capitalism are considered to have been uniquely rooted in the socioeconomic experience of early modern Europe, it nonetheless offers historians the promise of studying social structural and economic changes in non-Western societies without recourse to the value judgments and prejudices implicit in models of development that employ such terms as “traditional society,” “underdevelopment,” or “modernization.” By demonstrating that market and productive forces external to a particular regional economy and social system can intrude upon that system, dominate it, and eventually stimulate its transformation, thus creating wider changes in intrasocietal social relations, the World-Systems model has the potential of offering a conceptual point of departure of great value to students of social change in regions other than Europe during the early modern era.

Mahmud Nedim Paşa was appointed grand vizier of the Ottoman Empire for the first time in September 1871 following the death of his predecessor in that office, Mehmed Amin Ali Paşa. His first tenure lasted until the end of July 1872. His rise to power represented the rise of a current in Ottoman politics that had been suppressed in the 1860s, when Ali and Fuad dominated the Porte.

The contrast between Muslim Istanbul and Anatolia in the late Ottoman years was based on the large-scale socioeconomic dichotomies that often set great traditional cities apart from their hinterlands. These differences were also felt in the rhythms of ordinary domestic life in the city. Istanbul was marked by a unique system of marriage and household formation, one that had cultural connections with the Anatolian hinterland, but that also resembled those found in other major centers in the Mediterranean basin. This pattern is not at all what it seems to have been to many Turks or to most European observers of Turkey in the 19th century.

The events of Aleppo have caused amongst all classes of all nationalities a sensation such as I have never witnessed here before. The population of Aleppo is the wealthiest, best conducted community in Syria. That such a body of people in a time of profound peace, living under the protection of an organized government of two pashas and a garrison of regular troops of all arms should find themselves, without the slightest provocation on their part, or a moment's warning, the victims of atrocities which are rarely practiced on a town taken by storm, is a consideration which has, I regret to say, produced a feeling most unfavorable to the responsible government.

The production of silk on Mount Lebanon dates back to the time of the Byzantine Emperor Justinian. From his reign in the 7th century until the 19th century, despite fluctuations in the production of silk, Mount Lebanon and parts of the Bekaa valley continued to produce “Syrian silk.” In the latter part of the 19th century, silk production on Mount Lebanon and elsewhere even expanded, as new areas for growing mulberry trees were added along the coast from Antioch to Sidon.

Studies on silk production in Syria, such as those of Gaston Ducousso, Dominique Chevallier, Roger Owen, and Boutros Labaki, focus on the silk industry and trade, treating silk as a cash crop and analyzing its impact on the 19th-century Syrian economy, and deal only indirectly with subjects such as the land-tenure system, the peasants' dependence on the silk merchants, the decline of the landlords, and changes in the mushāc system, or collective use of land.

The conquest of the Mamluk sultanate by the Ottoman Empire brought into confrontation two centers in the history of Islamic civilization. One, Asia Minor and southeast Europe, was the center of the Ottoman Empire. The other, Egypt, had been the core of the Mamluk sultanate for 2½ centuries (1250–1517). Both states were dominated by Turkish-speaking elites based on the institution of military slavery. In both cases this slave-recruited manpower was the backbone of the army, and, to a lesser extent, of the administration.

One of the most resilient ideas introduced to the analysis of economic and political change under colonialism and imperialism is the “comprador” and, by extension, the “comprador bourgeoisie.” The comprador in essence embodies or internalizes the basic theoretical problem of the peripheral political economy: economic activity oriented primarily for the benefit of the other.1 By strict definition, compradors are native agents or partners of foreign investors who operate in some form in the local economy. However, in the theoretical context of assessing the possibilities for local industrial development, compradors represent forces that hinder change. As “agents of foreign imperialism,” they act “against the interest of the national economy.”2

The Ilkhan Tegüder (r. 1282–84), who took the name Ahmad when he converted to Islam, is widely credited with having interrupted—for the duration of his brief reign—the Mamluk-Ilkhanid conflict which had continued unabated since the battle of 'Ayn Jalut (1260). He is also credited with sending two embassies to Qalawun (r. 1280–90), his Mamluk counterpart: the first in 1282 and the second at the end of 1284.

The 1950s were years of profound change in the Middle East. In the realm of great power diplomacy, British hegemony gradually gave way to American ascendancy which, in turn, competed with the rapid spread of Soviet influence in the area. Within the region, the era witnessed the crystallization of a state system and, simultaneously, the growth of ideological movements dedicated to the unification of those states on national or religious bases. Internally, Middle Eastern governments sought new of opposition groups. These transformations, together with the dislocations of decolonization, the persistence of regional rivalries, and the introduction of new technologies, caused chronic instability throughout the Middle East, and in the winter of 1955–1956, combined to produce Britain's crisis in Jordan.

Contemporary feminists have stressed the importance of women's networks in empowering women. In the Western context, professional networks, support groups, and the availability of role models are seen to provide a collective basis for the development of confidence and self-esteem as well as a potential base for political action. Feminist attention to the Middle East has uncovered patterns of interaction suggesting that there, too, women have found in feminine networks both the basis for power and the personal attributes that undergird social competence. Aswad, for example, describes the kabul, an upper-class formal visitation network in Turkey with distinct political overtones. Women exchange information that might be dismissed as gossip were it not for the fact that participants are from powerful land-owning families, and the discussions have impact well beyond the immediate setting.1

In his essays on “Self-Expression” and “The Human Ideal” in the medieval Islamic world, the late Gustave E. von Grunebaum argued that both expressions and portrayals of individuality were a comparative rarity in the literature of pre-modern Islamic civilization.1 Von Grunebaum concluded from reviewing both autobiographical and biographical works written by Muslims that the social customs, religious values, and literary conventions of premodern Islamic society combined to discourage evocations or depictions of idiosyncratic personalities in favor of representations of impersonal stereotypes.

The Egyptian economy has deteriorated since the early 1980s. In response to periods of economic crisis, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and actors within the Egyptian government have been pushing President Hosni Mubarak to reform the economic system. Similar, but less obvious, efforts at reform are found throughout Egyptian society; private organizations are providing services–education, job training, health care, and day care–in the face of governmental unwillingness or inability to make these services available as promised

From Morocco to Iraq, Arab polities and economies appear to be liberalizing. The holding of comparatively free elections, easing of media censorship, and invigoration of associational activity have accompanied relaxation of political control by single parties. Economic liberalization has paralleled these political changes. Privatization, currency devaluations and partial flotations, rejuvenation of capital markets, reductions of subsidies on basic consumer goods, and other elements of economic liberalization packages have been adopted in varying degrees in the political economies of the Arab republics and, to a lesser extent, in the Arab monarchies.

Infanticide is known to have been a common means of birth control from early, apparently even prehistoric, times. In societies that lacked any precise knowledge of the fertilization process and consequently methods for its prevention, infanticide was used more frequently than other known methods of population limitation, such as abstention from intercourse and abortion. Infanticide was expected to serve several functions: “general reduction in population numbers (including twin removal), removal of defectives, elimination of social ‘illegitimates’ (i.e., offspring whose existence violated social group boundaries), response to loss of the nursing mother, control of dependency ratio, manipulation of sex ratio, and finally, use as a backstop to other methods when those fail”.

The historical formation, contemporary scope, and future dynamics of national identity remain important concerns in Egyptian scholarship. While many aspects of national identity and the forces that shape it in each generation have been analyzed, a more complete understanding of the results of these often antagonistic influences suffers from the lack of descriptive information.

The last three messianic claimants to appear in the Jewish diaspora appeared in Yemen in the 19th century. At this time and place the mutual influences of Jews and Muslims were notable both in messianic movements and in literary expression. Muslim society in Yemen was aware of the messianic tension among the Jews, and individual Muslims even took part in each of the known messianic movements. Conversely—and this is the subject of this article—Jewish society, at least on the popular level, was receptive to Muslim apocalyptic ideas and beliefs and integrated them into Jewish apocalyptic anticipations.

The belief in messianism and the sharing of ideas on redemption or of the golden age in the eschatological era (i.e., at the End of Time) have long been maintained by the Jews. Some of the concepts that served as paradigms for later messianic speculations were derived from the Bible. For instance, the concept of rescue—the rescue by God of the Israelites from slavery in Egypt—became the example of God's intervention to help his people and mirrored the rescue at the End of Days. Likewise, the Davidic kingdom was believed to be the fulfillment of an ancient covenant between God and the Israelites—and, therefore, the Davidic kingdom became in the history of Jewish messianism the paradigm for how the future kingdom would be, how the covenant would be fulfilled. Also, the term “messiah” (mashiah)—i.e., the anointed one—was originally the official title for the Davidic kings and the early root for the later messiah; hence, it would be a Davidic descendant who would lead the Jews into the messianic age.