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Imperfect relief: Challenges to the impartiality and identity of humanitarian action

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 March 2024

Marc DuBois*
Affiliation:
Independent Humanitarian Consultant and Senior Fellow, SOAS University of London, London, United Kingdom
Sean Healy
Affiliation:
Head of Reflection and Analysis, Médecins Sans Frontières, Melbourne, Australia
*
*Corresponding author email: 4marcdubois@gmail.com

Abstract

One of the four core humanitarian principles, impartiality's substantive ethical and deeply operational nature directs aid agencies to seek and deliver aid on the basis of non-discrimination and in proportion to the needs of crisis-affected people. Designed to operationalize the principle of humanity, impartiality is challenged by a plethora of external factors, such as the instrumentalization of aid, bureaucratic restriction, obstruction by States or non-State armed groups, and insecurity. Less visible and less examined are factors internal to aid agencies or the sector as a whole. Based on a desk review of the literature and the authors’ experience working with Médecins Sans Frontières, this article explores shortcomings in how the humanitarian sector understands and operationalizes impartiality, placing the focus on these internal factors.

Beginning with the definition of impartiality, the article focuses on inadequacies in the practice of impartiality's twin pillars: non-discrimination and proportionality in the delivery of aid. Key conclusions include the necessity of an active rather than passive approach to non-discrimination, and the need for greater commitment to proportionality. In extending this analysis, the article looks more deeply at how aid organizations approach the humanitarian principles, identifying shortcomings in the way that the sector operationalizes, engages with and evaluates those principles. Given the sector's limited inclusion of or accountability towards people in crisis, its exercise of impartiality seems particularly problematic in relation to its power to decide the who and what of aid delivery, and to define the needs which it will consider humanitarian.

The objective of this article is to reset humanitarians’ conceptual and operational understanding of impartiality in order to better reflect and protect humanity in humanitarian praxis, and to help humanitarians navigate the emergent challenges and critical discussions on humanitarian action's position in respect to climate change, triple-nexus programming, or simply a future where staggering levels of urgent needs vastly outstrip humanitarian resources.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2024. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of ICRC

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Footnotes

Sadly, Sean Healy passed away on 26 November 2023. See Appendix for a tribute to Sean, penned by his co-author, Marc DuBois.

The advice, opinions and statements contained in this article are those of the author/s and do not necessarily reflect the views of the ICRC. The ICRC does not necessarily represent or endorse the accuracy or reliability of any advice, opinion, statement or other information provided in this article.

References

1 Global figures on those reached by at least one item of aid remain unreliable. The numbers do show that in 2022, humanitarian aid targeted a reported 222.4 million out of an estimated 404.6 million people in need. Development Initiatives, Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2023, Bristol, 2023, pp. 41, 44, 11.

2 Jean Pictet, The Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross: Commentary, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), 1979, p. 24.

3 Kyazze, Amelia, “Walking the Walk: Evidence of the Principles in Action from Red Cross and Red Crescent National Societies”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 97, No. 897–898, 2015, p. 212CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Sean Healy and Sandrine Tiller, Where Is Everyone? Responding to Emergencies in the Most Difficult Places, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), July 2014.

4 In its most basic form – that is, the response to the suffering of others – the authors recognize the historical and geographic omnipresence of humanitarianism. In this article, references to “humanitarian” refer to the formal sector, largely comprising institutions of the global North that hold a disproportionate influence over the sector, which predominantly operates in the global South.

5 Fast, Larissa, “Unpacking the Principle of Humanity: Tensions and Implications”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 97, No. 897–898, 2015, p. 116CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

6 While these four principles track the first four (of seven) Fundamental Principles of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (the Movement), the Movement's Code of Conduct notably also contains principles related to integrating with local capacities and involving beneficiaries in the management of aid. See International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and IFRC, The Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non-Governmental Organisations in Disaster Relief, Publication Ref. 1067, 31 December 1994.

7 ICRC, The Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, Publication Ref. 0513, Geneva, 1996, p. 4.

8 See e.g. UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), “OCHA On Message: Humanitarian Principles”, June 2012.

9 UNGA Res. 46/182, 19 December 1991. A later resolution added independence to this threesome: UNGA Res. 58/114, 5 February 2004.

10 Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 31 (entered into force 21 October 1950), Art. 3; Geneva Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea of 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 85 (entered into force 21 October 1950), Art. 3; Geneva Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 135 (entered into force 21 October 1950), Art. 3; Geneva Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 287 (entered into force 21 October 1950), Art. 3.

11 Labbé, Jeremie and Daudin, Pascal, “Applying the Humanitarian Principles: Reflecting on the Experience of the International Committee of the Red Cross”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 97, No. 897–898, 2015CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

12 Dapo Akande and Emanuela-Chiara Gillard, Oxford Guidance on the Law Relating to Humanitarian Relief Operations in Situations of Armed Conflict, University of Oxford and OCHA, 2016, p. 21.

13 ICRC, above note 7, p. 5.

14 J. Labbé and P. Daudin, above note 11.

15 J. Pictet, above note 2, p. 27.

16 Ibid., pp. 31–32.

17 Though this is often overlooked in much thinking on the principle, impartiality is also the primary determinant of the relationship between the aid giver and the people and communities in crisis who do not receive aid.

18 Ibid.; Martin Quack, “Impartiality in Discussion”, in Martin Quack (ed.), Based on Need Alone? Impartiality in Humanitarian Action, Caritas Germany, Diakonie Katastrophenhilfe and Ärzte ohne Grenzen, 2018, p. 11.

19 In deliberating non-discrimination in relation to policies and plans, it is helpful to distinguish between different categories of discrimination, and the ethics surrounding them: (1) discrimination may be entirely justifiable where it is designed to produce positive distinction, identifying groups or individuals for whom it is morally required or justified (e.g., targeting the elderly, immunosuppressed, etc. during the first round of COVID vaccinations); (2) intentional discrimination that produces an adverse distinction; (3) policies and programmes that are non-discriminatory in their design but produce discriminatory consequences that could not have been reasonably foreseen; and (4), a subset of the previous category, policies and programmes established with no actual discriminatory intent, but where the discriminatory impact should reasonably have been foreseen (e.g., health education messages that appeared only in written form, thereby excluding key groups in society).

20 J. Pictet, above note 2, p. 13.

21 Ibid., p. 25.

22 International Court of Justice, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1986, p. 115.

23 On the surface, the concept of global impartiality is a simple extension of impartiality to the organization's or sector's global operations. In reality, it is technically complex to measure, financially viable for less than a handful of organizations, and politically impossible. Two recent examples are the recent disproportionate responses to the situations in Ukraine and Gaza versus, respectively, the Horn of Africa and Sudan. Interviews revealed that some international NGOs have constructed monitoring tools and response capacities to use global impartiality as a useful metric, while for others it is more aspirational – for example, a useful concept in planning next year's opening and closure of programmes. As for humanitarian actors working at a national or local level, globality seems inapposite.

24 See e.g. Neve Gordon, “The Moral Norm, the Law, and the Limits of Protection for Wartime Medical Units”, in Jehan Bseiso, Michiel Hofman and Jonathan Whittall (eds), Everybody's War: The Politics of Aid in the Syria Crisis, Oxford University Press, New York, 2021. Gordon documents the efforts of the Syrian government to discriminate in the provision of health care against wounded civilians that it considered “enemies of the State”.

25 Becky Carter, Impact of Social Inequalities and Discrimination on Vulnerability to Crises, K4D Helpdesk Report No. 994, Institute of Development Studies, Brighton, April 2021.

26 Ibid., p. 2.

27 Verity McGivern and Ken Bluestone, If Not Now, When? Keeping Promises to Older People Affected by Humanitarian Crises, HelpAge International, London, 2020. See also Veronique Barbelet, Older People in Displacement: Falling Through the Cracks of Emergency Responses, Humanitarian Practice Group (HPG) Commissioned Report, Overseas Development Institute (ODI), London, July 2018, p. vi: “actual interventions still lack a sufficiently nuanced understanding of how displacement affects the status and role of older people …, and resources continue to be skewed towards younger generations”.

28 Jennifer Rumbach and Kyle Knight, “Sexual and Gender Minorities in Humanitarian Emergencies”, in Larry W. Roeder (ed.), Issues of Gender and Sexual Orientation in Humanitarian Emergencies: Risks and Risk Reduction, Humanitarian Solutions in the 21st Century, Springer, Cham, 2014, p. 3.

29 Handicap International, Disability in Humanitarian Context: Views from Affected People and Field Organisations, July 2015.

30 Jeremy Allouche, Harriet Hoffler and Jeremy Lind, Humanitarianism and Religious Inequalities: Addressing a Blind Spot, CREID Working Paper No. 04, Brighton, 2020.

31 Veronique Barbelet, Oliver Lough and Sarah Njeri, Towards More Inclusive, Effective and Impartial Humanitarian Action, ODI, London, 2022, p. 1.

32 Veronique Barbelet and Oliver Lough, “In Search of Inclusive Humanitarian Responses”, ODI Blog, 6 January 2021, available at: https://odi.org/en/insights/in-search-of-inclusive-humanitarian-responses/ (all internet references were accessed in February 2024); see also HERE-Geneva, Principled Humanitarian Programming in Yemen: A “Prisoner's Dilemma”?, Geneva, 2021.

33 ALNAP, The State of the Humanitarian System: 2018, ALNAP and ODI, London, 2018, p. 142, further finding that “[a]ssessments to identify the actual vulnerabilities of different groups of people within a specific context are still uncommon”.

34 The authors note that some agencies are officially mandated to respond to certain identity-based groups, such as UNICEF or the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees.

35 James Darcy and Charles-Antoine Hofman, According to Need? Needs Assessment and Decision-Making in the Humanitarian Sector, ODI, London, 2003, p. 31.

36 Hugo Slim, “Impartiality and Intersectionality”, Humanitarian Law and Policy Blog, 16 January 2018, available at: https://blogs.icrc.org/law-and-policy/2018/01/16/impartiality-and-intersectionality/.

37 See Monika Krause, The Good Project: Humanitarian Relief NGOs and the Fragmentation of Reason, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, 2014.

38 V. Barbelet, O. Lough and S. Njeri, above note 31, p. 15.

39 Ibid., p. 5.

40 Jeremy Konyndyk, Rethinking the Humanitarian Business Model, CGD Brief, Center for Global Development, May 2018, p. 5.

41 See Joel Glasman, Humanitarianism and the Quantification of Human Needs, Routledge, New York, 2020.

42 Veronique Barbelet, and Caitlin Wake, Inclusion and Exclusion in Humanitarian Action: The State of Play, ODI, London, November 2020, p. 25.

43 For example, ACAPS has developed a global severity index, available at: www.acaps.org/en/thematics/all-topics/inform-severity-index. Interestingly, some interviewees expressed hopefulness while others were critical of a similar effort by the UN, the development of a Joint Intersectoral Analysis Framework (JIAF), which aims inter alia to permit the comparison of disparate needs across contexts and sectors. For commentary on the JIAF, see Victoria Metcalfe-Hough, Wendy Fenton and Farah Manji, The Grand Bargain in 2022: An Independent Review, HPG Commissioned Report, ODI, London, June 2023, pp. 87–90.

44 International Rescue Committee, IRC's Equitable Scale: Connecting Our Ambition, Our Mission and Our Values, 2021 (internal document on file with author).

45 See e.g. Antonio Donini and Stuart Gordon, “Romancing Principles and Human Rights: Are Humanitarian Principles Salvageable?”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 97, No. 897–898, 2015; Ban Ki-moon, One Humanity; Shared Responsibility: Report of the Secretary-General for the World Humanitarian Summit, United Nations, New York, 2016; J. Labbe and P. Daudin, above note 12.

46 According to Development Initiatives, in 2022, contexts of protracted crisis accounted for 83% (339.3 million) of the total people in need of humanitarian relief. Development Initiatives, above note 1, p. 25.

47 Marzia Montemurro and Karin Wendt, “The Limits of Labels: Mali Report”, in HERE-Geneva, The Role of Mandates, Geneva, 2018.

48 Hugo Slim, How Should We Define and Prioritise Humanitarian Need? An Ethics-Based Perspective for IMPACT Initiatives, NCHS Paper No. 15, Norwegian Centre for Humanitarian Studies, Bergen, November, 2023.

49 Ibid., pp. 10–11.

50 Cara Kielwein, “Can We Make Better Use of Humanitarian Data for an Impartial and Humane Response to Crisis?”, Humanitarian Practice Network, 24 November 2023, available at: https://odihpn.org/publication/can-we-make-better-use-of-humanitarian-data-for-an-impartial-and-humane-response-to-crisis/.

51 Abby Stoddard and Shoaib Jillani, The Effects of Insecurity on Humanitarian Coverage, Humanitarian Outcomes, Global Public Policy Institute and UKaid, November 2016; Katherine Haver and William Carter, What It Takes: Principled Pragmatism to Enable Access and Quality Humanitarian Aid in Insecure Environments, Humanitarian Outcomes, 2016; HERE-Geneva, above note 32. The issue is less about proportionality specifically than the more general insufficient understanding of the principles and the lack of policies and guidance related to them that is discussed in the next section.

52 K. Haver and W. Carter, above note 51, p. 67. The research further concluded that this “mindset can be found in a small range of national and international organisations”. See also Ed Schenkenberg van Mierop, “Local Humanitarian Actors and the Principle of Impartiality”, in M. Quack (ed.), above note 18; Standing Committee for Humanitarian Response (SCHR), SCHR Impartiality Review: Report of Findings, January, 2014, available at: http://tinyurl.com/btbae2xc. “Many agencies are concentrating only on the easiest-to-reach populations and ignoring the more difficult places”: S. Healy and S. Tiller, above note 3, p. 4.

53 A. Donini and S. Gordon, above note 45.

54 HERE-Geneva, Principled humanitarian Assistance of Echo Partners in Iraq, Geneva, May 2017.

55 “Leave no one behind” and “ending need” formed two of the five “Core Responsibilities” established in the UN Secretary-General's report: B. Ki-moon, above note 45, pp. 20 ff.

56 E. Schenkenberg van Mierop, above note 52.

57 Core Humanitarian Standard on Quality and Accountability, CHS Alliance, Groupe URD and Sphere Project, 2014, p. 10.

58 J. Pictet, above note 2, pp. 31 ff.

59 Zainab Moallin, Karen Hargrave and Patrick Saez, Navigating Narratives in Ukraine: Humanitarian Response Amid Solidarity and Resistance, ODI, London, 2023.

60 See Kraft, Kathryn, “Faith and Impartiality in Humanitarian Action: Lessons from Lebanese Evangelical Churches Providing Food Aid”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 97, No. 897–898, 2015CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

61 ICRC, above note 7.

62 J. Pictet, above note 2, p 33.

63 For example, one major UN review found that “some evaluations link the risk of local partner bias … with the risk of partiality in the delivery of aid”. Tony Beck, Margie Buchanon-Smith, Belen Diaz and Lara Ressler, Reflecting Humanitarian Principles in Evaluation, UN Evaluation Group Working Paper, 2016, p. 23.

64 See e.g. Sadaf Shallwani and Shama Dossa, “Evaluation and the White Gaze in International Development”, in Themrise Khan, Dickson Kanakulya and Maïka Sondarjee (eds), White Saviorism in International Development, Daraja Press, Wakefield, 2023, pp. 47 ff.

65 A. Kyazze, above note 3, p. 212.

66 ALNAP, The State of the Humanitarian System: 2022 Edition, ALNAP and ODI, London, 2022, pp. 267–268.

67 The IASC was created by the same UN General Assembly resolution that endorsed the humanitarian principles: see above note 10. Convening the heads of nineteen humanitarian agencies and consortia, the IASC formulates policy, sets strategic priorities and mobilizes resources in response to crisis. See IASC, “The Interagency Standing Committee”, available at: https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/iasc.

68 Rafael Gorgeu, Thinking About the Evolution of the Humanitarian Sector: An Exploration within the World of Ideas, HERE-Geneva, Geneva, January 2023, p. 75.

69 T. Beck et al., above note 63, p. 17.

70 Interview with Margie Buchanon-Smith, August 2023 (virtual, on file with author).

71 “Strengthening accountability through asking humanitarian actors not just how effective or efficient they are but also how well they live up to their principles would bolster consistency and build trust. If the usual evaluations and audits … give sufficient weight to principles, it would be a practical driver of changed behaviour.” World Humanitarian Summit Secretariat, Restoring Humanity: Synthesis of the Consultation Process for the World Humanitarian Summit, United Nations, New York, 2015, p. 92.

72 Margie Buchanan-Smith, John Cosgrave and Alexandra Warner, Evaluation of Humanitarian Action Guide, ALNAP and ODI, London, 2016.

73 HERE-Geneva, above note 54.

74 Ibid. More recently, two separate evaluations of the approaches of humanitarian actors to the principles of humanitarian action in Afghanistan made a similar finding: Ashley Jackson, Rahmatullah Amiri and Sarah Kilani, Principled Humanitarian Action in Afghanistan: Research Report, May 2023 (unpublished, on file with author); Humanitarian Outcomes, Navigating Ethical Dilemmas for Humanitarian Action in Afghanistan, June 2023.

75 HERE-Geneva, above note 54.

76 HERE-Geneva, above note 32.

77 Ibid. In HERE-Geneva's interpretation of the prisoner's dilemma in the context of Yemen, the impact of one “prisoner's” decision upon others gives rise to a responsibility to communicate. Furthermore, there is a crucial difference between this and the traditional prisoner's dilemma: in the latter, the cost falls upon the prisoners, while in the humanitarian context, the cost falls instead upon the people who do not receive assistance, and so indirectly upon the principle of impartiality.

79 A. Donini and S. Gordon, above note 45, p. 93.

80 Humanitarian Outcomes, above note 74.

82 Zeynep Sezgin and Dennis Dijkzeul, “Introduction: New Humanitarians Getting Old?”, in Zeynep Sezgin and Dennis Dijkzeul (eds), The New Humanitarians in International Practice: Emerging Actors and Contested Principles, Routledge, New York, 2016, p. 5.

83 ALNAP, above note 66, pp. 267–268.

84 For a summary of these issues, see ibid., pp. 265 ff.

85 Ed Schenkenberg van Mierop, “Coming Clean on Neutrality and Independence: The Need to Assess the Application of Humanitarian Principles”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 97, No. 897–898, 2015.

86 Martin Quack with Nina Zimmer, “Humanitarian Action and Impartiality: Where Do We Go from Here?”, in M. Quack (ed.), above note 18, p. 90.

87 Leader, Nicholas, “Proliferating Principles; or How to Sup with the Devil without Getting Eaten”, Disasters, Vol. 22, No. 4, 1998, p. 293CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed.

88 ALNAP, above note 66, p. 267.

89 Julia Steets and Katherine Haver, “Dealing with Challenges to Decisions Based on the Humanitarian Principles”, in M. Quack (ed.), above note 18. Various interviewees emphasized this point.

90 A. Jackson, R. Amiri and S. Kilani, above note 74, p. 18.

91 Ibid., p. 18 (emphasis added).

92 T. Beck et al., above note 63, p. 42 (see also p. 8). The primary challenge, of course, is not to the evaluation of the principles, but to principled humanitarian aid reaching those most in need.

93 Martin Barber, Mark Bowden, Armida van Rij and Rose Pinnington, Applying Humanitarian Principles in Armed Conflict: Challenges and Ways Forward, Chatham House, London, 2023, p. 4.

94 See also HERE-Geneva, above note 32, p. 10: “The overarching finding of this research is that a lack of trust and communication about how each agency/organisation operationalises the principles is hindering the effectiveness of the response”; A. Jackson, R. Amiri and S. Kilani, above note 74, p. 20: “No one will admit what they are doing”; J. Steets and K. Haver, above note 89, p. 30, finding that the perceived inviolability of the principles “makes staff and partners afraid to raise possible compromises”.

95 HERE-Geneva, above note 32; A. Jackson, R. Amiri and S. Kilani, above note 74.

96 See Jason Philips, Counterterrorism and Humanitarian Impartiality, International Rescue Committee, New York, 2021, p. 2.

97 See J. Labbe and P. Daudin, above note 11, p. 199, for an illustrated discussion of this point.

98 See also J. Steets and K. Haver, above note 89.

99 Nathan Ford and Richard Bedell (eds), Justice and MSF Operational Choices, MSF, Amsterdam, 2001. See also K. Haver and W. Carter, above note 51, p. 67, noting that fulfilling the principle of humanity “is all about the art of finding acceptable compromises”.

100 See e.g. HERE-Geneva, above note 54, including the recommendation to make the humanitarian principles more central to strategic coordination processes such as the Humanitarian Response Plan.

101 ALNAP, above note 66, p. 265; see also J. Labbe and P. Daudin, above note 11. These investments include the resources to build neutrality and independence.

102 M. Quack with N. Zimmer, above note 86, p. 90.

103 See J. Labbe and P. Daudin, above note 11, p. 199, pointing out that the “so-called humanitarian imperative”, not part of Pictet's commentaries, has been exploited as a justification for military intervention (under the Right to Protect).

104 In the eyes of one interviewee, this amounted to using the principles as a “cloak behind which people hide the essential motivation behind their aid, which is to spend donor money and have a job”.

105 A. Jackson, R. Amiri and S. Kilani, above note 74, p. 10.

106 Martin Barber and Mark Bowden, Rethinking the Role of Humanitarian Principles in Armed Conflict: A Challenge for Humanitarian Action, Chatham House, London, 2023.

107 Humanitarian Outcomes, above note 74, p. 3.

108 Eleanor Davey, Lioba Hirsch, Myfanwy James and Molly Naisanga, In Service of Emergency: Understanding Power and Inequality in MSF, MSF, London, 2024 (forthcoming). This “imaginary” matters because, as noted above, a great deal of the sector's work takes place in protracted crises that endure for years if not decades, available at: https://msfuk.unbounddocs.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/Understanding-Power-Inequality-in-MSF-UK-FINAL-Full-Research-1.pdf.

109 E. Davey et al., above note 108, p. 26.

110 Ibid., p. 44.

111 Aloudat, Tammam, “Can the Sick Speak? Global Health Governance and Health Subalternity”, Social Sciences, Vol. 11, No. 417, 2022CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

112 See V. Metcalfe-Hough, W. Fenton and F. Manji, above note 43, p. 73. The “participation revolution” formed a key commitment in the work stream on localization within the World Humanitarian Summit's Grand Bargain, an agreement between humanitarian donors and aid agencies to improve the effectiveness of aid by ensuring the participation in decisions of people in crisis.

113 Humanitarian Advisory Group, Accountability to Affected People: Stuck in the Weeds, Humanitarian Horizons Practice Paper Series, June 2021. ALNAP's 2022 State of the Humanitarian System report found that despite increased attention to accountability to affected people, the conclusion of its 2015 and 2018 editions still held true: such efforts “have not yet delivered greater accountability or participation”. ALNAP, above note 66, p. 303.

114 K. Haver and W. Carter, above note 51, p. 67.

115 Patrick Wintour, “Humanitarian System Not Listening to People in Crises, Says UN Aid Chief” The Guardian, 21 April 2021.

116 See Humanitarian Outcomes, above note 74, p. 32.

117 See Marc DuBois, The Triple Nexus – Threat or Opportunity for the Humanitarian Principles?, discussion paper, Centre for Humanitarian Action, Berlin, May 2020, p. 19.

118 Interview with Paul Harvey, August 2023 (virtual, on file with author).

119 Elise Shea and Meg Sattler, An Unaccountable Response Perpetuates People's Vulnerabilities, GTS, June 2023, p. 5.

120 ALNAP, above note 66, p. 101.

121 Elise Shea and Meg Sattler, Listening Is Not Enough: People Demand Transformational Change in Humanitarian Assistance, GTS, November 2022, p. 2.

122 See A. Jackson, R. Amiri and S. Kilani, above note 74, pp. 16–17; interview with Ashley Jackson, Afghanistan expert, July 2023 (on file with author).

123 See Lisa Schwartz et al., “Western Clinical Health Ethics: How Well Do They Travel to Humanitarian Contexts?”, in Caroline Abu-Sadr (ed.), Dilemmas, Challenges and Ethics of Humanitarian Action: Refection on Médecins Sans Frontières’ Perception Project, McGill-Queen's University Press, London, 2012.

124 A. Jackson, R. Amiri and S. Kilani, above note 74.

125 Meg Sattler, “Five Ways the Aid System Can Improve Its Accountability to Affected People”, The New Humanitarian, 5 April 2023, available at: www.thenewhumanitarian.org/opinion/2023/04/05/ways-aid-system-can-improve-its-accountability.

126 Alex Humphrey, Vaidehi Krishnan and Roxani Krystalli, The Currency of Connections: Why Local Support Systems Are Integral to Helping People Recover in South Sudan, Mercy Corps, Washington, DC, January 2019.

127 World Health Organization, “WHO Statement on Menstrual Health and Rights”, Human Rights Council Panel Discussion on Menstrual Hygiene Management, Human Rights and Gender Equality, 50th Session, 22 July 2022, available at: www.who.int/news/item/22-06-2022-who-statement-on-menstrual-health-and-rights.

128 K. Kraft, above note 60.

129 H. Slim, above note 48.

130 Lynch, Cecilia and Schwartz, Tanya B., “Humanitarianism's Proselytism Problem”, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 60, No. 4, 2016CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

131 Development Initiatives, above note 1, p. 51.

132 Bywater, Matthew, “The Humanitarian Alibi: An Overview and a Redefinition”, Journal of International Humanitarian Action, Vol. 6, No. 22, 2021CrossRefGoogle Scholar. In short, the humanitarian alibi describes the way in which humanitarian action, and the funding of it, creates the impression of dealing with a crisis, allowing political actors to avoid the more difficult responsibility to engage politically or directly to resolve the underlying conflict.

133 Marc DuBois, The New Humanitarian Basics, HPG Working Paper, ODI, London, May 2018, p. 6.

134 E. Shea and M. Sattler, above note 121; Mary B. Anderson, Dayna Brown and Isabella Jean, Time to Listen: Hearing People on the Receiving End of International Aid, CDA Collaborative Learning Projects, Cambridge, MA, 2012.

135 ICRC, above note 7, p. 2.

136 C. Kielwein, above note 50.

137 Hugo Slim, “Painful Choices: How Humanitarians Can Prioritize in a World of Rising Need”, Global Public Policy Institute, 11 January 2024, available at: https://gppi.net/2024/01/11/how-humanitarians-can-prioritize.

138 Ibid.

139 Catherine-Lune Grayson and Amir Khouzam, “Responding to Climate Risks in Conflict Settings: In Search of Solutions”, Humanitarian Law and Policy Blog, 23 November 2023, available at: https://blogs.icrc.org/law-and-policy/2023/11/23/responding-to-climate-risks-in-conflict-settings-in-search-of-solutions/.

140 Andrea Steinke, Climate Change and Humanitarian Change: Challenging Norms, Mandates and Practices, Centre for Humanitarian Action, Berlin, November 2023.