The initial uncertainties as to the eventual capacity of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia to accomplish its mandate can definitively he relegated to the archives of history and the creation of this Tribunal be heralded as a major step in the quest to develop mechanisms to impkment inter-national humanitarian hw. But after ten years of enstence, it appears that the role of the Tribunal cannot be limited to the mere enforcement of international humanitarian hw: while exercising its repressive function, the Tribunal has been interpreting this complex area of hw and — in so doing — has greatly contributed to a more progressive vision of international humanitarian law. The aim of this article is to briefly set out the more important contributions of this judicial hermeneutic reading of international humanitarian fow.

It is argued that the Tribunal contributed to international humanitarhn Law in three ways, which interact with each other: first, by affirming the customary nature of a certain number of principles; second, by reducing the substantive gap separating the rules applicable to international versus non-international armed conflicts; and finally, by adapting international humanitarian law to modern realities through a liberal interpretation of certain rehtively old provisions of humanitarian treaties.

The object of this article is to identify several issues pertinent to impie-mentation of international humanitarian law in the Russian Federation. It first examines the relevant provisions of the Russian Constitution of 1993 and discusses the extent to which they provide for the incorporation of international norms. An overview of current Russian legislation is then given, focusing on some specific examples of legislative incorporation of international humanitarian law. That overview will not be confined to laws adopted solely by the Russian parliament. References to international law and more specifically to international humanitarian law can also be found in military field manuals that are binding on the Russian armed forces and other uniformed armed services. Finally, a notable case decided by the Russian Constitutional Court in 1995 with regard to the implementation of international humanitarian law is discussed. In its decision, the supreme body of judicial review in the Russian Federation made remarkable references to the Additional Protocol II of 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949.1

This article explores the process of the “study, development, acquisition or adoption of a new weapon, means or method of warfare” under Article 36 of 1977 Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949. It then considers the manner in which the legal review of weapons can take place in practice, including an examination of the evidence that will be available on which to base legal assessments.