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How international law works: a response to commentators

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 July 2009

Andrew T. Guzman
Andrew T. Guzman*
Affiliation:
Berkeley Law School, University of California, Berleley, CA 94720, USA
*
E-mail: aguzman@law.berkeley.edu
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Type
Symposium on Andrew Guzman's How International Law Works
Information
International Theory , Volume 1 , Issue 2 , July 2009 , pp. 335 - 343
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2009

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References

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