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How international law works: introduction

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 July 2009

Andrew T. Guzman
Andrew T. Guzman
Affiliation:
Berkeley Law School, University of California, Berkeley, CA 94720, USA
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Abstract

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Type
Symposium on Andrew Guzman's How International Law Works
Information
International Theory , Volume 1 , Issue 2 , July 2009 , pp. 285 - 293
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2009

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