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Selectorate theory, the democratic peace, and public goods provision

  • Philip Arena (a1) and Nicholas P. Nicoletti (a2)
Abstract

We show that without a few peculiar modeling choices that are not justified by the core assumptions of the theory, selectorate theory neither unambiguously predicts the democratic peace nor that leaders of more inclusive regimes will rely upon the provision of public goods to remain in office, though they may be more likely to provide club goods. We illustrate these claims using relatively simple models that incorporate the core assumptions of their theory, while avoiding modeling choices we believe to be less appropriate. We argue for a revised version of selectorate theory, one that continues to emphasize the importance of the size of the winning coalition, yet we believe it provides a more realistic picture of democratic politics.

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Corresponding author
E-mail: parena@buffalo.edu
References
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International Theory
  • ISSN: 1752-9719
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