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Afghanistan: Imperatives of Stability Misperceived

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Shayeq Qassem*
Affiliation:
Centre for Arab and Islamic Studies Australian National University

Abstract

More than seven years have passed since the intervention of the international community in Afghanistan, yet the country has not only failed to achieve stability; it has actually experienced a downward trend on that account. The worsening situation in Afghanistan has occurred despite the fact that the Afghan government and its international partners have allocated unprecedented amounts of resources, increased their security forces and implemented socio-political and economic programs that they deemed were conducive to stability. Why and how this failure did come about? This article challenges some of the underlying assumptions for stability and the notion of political reconstruction that the international community and the Afghan government have implemented so far as being largely responsible for the gloomy state of affairs in that country.

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Articles
Copyright
Copyright © The International Society for Iranian Studies 2009

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References

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123 Summers, Deborah and Siddique, Haroon, “Brown Signals Iraq Pull-Out and Opens Door to Taliban in Afghanistan,” Guardian Unlimited, 25 September 2007;Google Scholar “Britania: Taliban Bayad Bakhshi Az Rawand-e Solh Bashand” [Britain: Taliban Should be Part of the Peace Process], BBC Persian, 25 September 2007.

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125 For a discussion of the concept of political stability see Hurwitz, Leon, “Contemporary Approaches to Political Stability,” Comparative Politics, 5, no. 3 (April 1973): 449463CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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