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The Family Business in Iran since the Islamic Revolution as a Mode of Coordination

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 January 2022

Thierry Coville
Thierry Coville*
Affiliation:
French Research Center for International and Strategic Studies (IRIS), Novancia Business SchoolParis
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Abstract

There has been very little research on family businesses (FBs) in Iran. Taking an institutional point of view, this article, based on a survey conducted in Iran, demonstrates that since the 1979 revolution FBs in Iran have been key intermediaries between political pressure from the top and societal trends from below. FBs in Iran since the revolution can be considered as a perfect mode of coordination reflecting “capitalism from below.” Based on unconditional support among the family members, they are perfectly adapted to the low-trust environment in Iran since the revolution. As a mode of coordination, the family business was also essential in protecting the modernization of Iranian society in promoting the role of women and the value of competency. It was also a mode of coordination which enabled FBs to protect their property rights which were threatened by a predatory state.

Keywords

Family BusinessesMode of CoordinationInstitutionsTrustIran
Type
Articles
Information
Iranian Studies , Volume 53 , Issue 5-6 , December 2020 , pp. 925 - 946
Copyright
Copyright © Association For Iranian Studies, Inc 2020

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