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American Relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1979–1981

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Barry Rubin
Barry Rubin*
Affiliation:
Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University
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Extract

The triumph of the Khomeini forces and of the Iranian revolution in February 1979, sweeping away the old imperial regime and the transitional Bakhtiyar government, marked the beginning of a highly critical period in American-Iranian relations. The conflict culminated in the seizure of the American embassy in Tehran and in the holding of U.S. diplomats as hostages for well over a year. The hostage issue was the most controversial question for U.S. foreign policy in 1980 and marked a historic low point in relations between the two countries.

From the viewpoint of most Iranian leaders, this battle was an inevitable one. Based on their perceptions of bilateral relations over the previous three decades, Ayatollah Khomeini and his supporters expected a deterministically hostile United States. In their eyes, Washington had provided the main foreign support for the shah, a regime for which their passionate hatred can scarcely be overstated, and had tried to prevent the revolution's triumph.

Type
Research Article
Information
Iranian Studies , Volume 13 , Issue 1-4: Iranian Revolution in Perspective , 1980 , pp. 307 - 326
Copyright
Copyright © Association For Iranian Studies, Inc 1980

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References

Notes

1. This analysis and the events of this period are presented in greater detail in Rubin, Barry, Paved with Good Intentions: The American Experience and Iran (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980).Google Scholar

2. If a relatively moderate regime in Iran had emerged which had been willing to maintain good relations with the United States, the bilateral link would have probably reverted to the two nations’ pre-1971 ties. These were far looser and more oriented toward an anti-Soviet defensive alliance than they were during the following era of America's “two-pillar” strategy and of the shah's drive to become the primary regional power.

3. The meetings that various Iranians held with U.S. embassy officials on means of rebuilding relations later furnished the basis for accusations of treason against them when the records of those conversations were seized by the students who took over the embassy. Their purpose, however, was hardly to weaken the revolutionary government.

4. It should be noted that during this whole period, and at the time of the revolution as well, Soviet-controlled clandestine radio stations, most notably the National Voice of Iran, did everything possible to stir up anti- American feeling there. These broadcasts, however, were not all that different in tone from those produced in Iranian stations controlled by Khomeini's followers. They probably tell more about Soviet policy than they do about the ways in which Iranian public opinion was formed.

5. See Ayatollah Khomeini's speech to Islamic students in Qom, October 28, 1979, text in U.S. Department of Commerce, Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), November 6, 1979 and his speech of October 27, 1979, text in FBIS, October 29, 1979.

6. Bamdad (Tehran), January 27, 1980, text in FBIS, January 31, 1980.

7. At this point, many observers would add that the ruling out of military force weakened the American position in Iran's eyes and that the highlighting of the hostage issue within the United States handed the Iranians additional leverage. I am not convinced of the importance of these factors, however, since Iranian leaders apparently continued to believe in the likelihood of U.S. military action. Further, during those months, the problem was not merely a bargaining over terms but far more fundamental issues within Iran.

8. Khomeini's elimination of any demand for an American apology is often presented as a major step forward, but this had not seemed an insuperable obstacle in earlier negotiations. Again, evolution of the political situation within Iran, and not the terms themselves, seem to have been the main determinant of changes in the crisis.

9. Tehran radio, November 2, 1980, text in FBIS, November 3, 1980.

10. See, for example, Khomeini's speech to the militant students of November 3, 1980, text in FBIS, November 4, 1980.

11. See Hashemi Rafsanjani's interview in Le Monde, October 21, 1980.

12. The Washington Post, November 23, 1980.

13. See The New York Times/CBS poll on the issue, The New York Times, November 16, 1980.

14. For example, the respected Ayatollah Allameh Yahya Nuri criticized any bargaining over the hostages—even on the harshest terms—as “un-Islamic.” To place any meaning on an American promise not to intervene in the future was “like asking a scorpion not to bite.” Since the hostages were spies and criminals, he argued, they should be put on trial. All of these ideas, of course, were precisely based on what the Iranian leaders who were now negotiating had been saying for the last year. In seeking a settlement, Iranian leaders could only plead expediency and this was not an acceptable argument given the ideology and atmosphere of postshah Iran. The Washington Post, January 2, 1981.

15. Tehran radio, October 17, 1980, text in FBIS, October 20, 1980.

16. In analyses of Middle East politics, and particularly with reference to the hostage crisis, it is often argued that an emphasis on foreign quarrels is cynically manipulated by local governments to distract people's attention from problems at home and to foster internal unity. Sometimes this is true, but more often it is the result of domestic conflicts or rivalries with neighboring states which force a regime to prove its orthodoxy over basic issues concerning political culture and ideology—i.e., Islam, Arabism, etc. In short, national leaders are the slaves more often than they are the masters of such emotional regional or international questions. For a discussion of this phenomenon in a different context, see Rubin, Barry, The Arab States and the Palestine Conflict (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1981).Google Scholar