¹ Kemp, Geoffrey, “Europe's Middle East Challenges,” Washington Quarterly 27, no. 1 (Winter 2003): 163CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

² See Mark Leonard, “Why the US needs the EU,” Time, 28 February 2005.

³ Nye, Joseph S. “The Changing Nature of World Power,” Political Science Quarterly 105, no. 2 (Summer 1990): 181CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴ See Commission of the European Communities, “Report from the commission on the implementation of measures intended to promote observance of human rights and democratic principles in external relations for 1996 –1999,” COM (2000) 726 final (Brussels, November 2000)Google Scholar; Commission of the European Communities, “The inclusion of respect for democratic principles and human rights in agreements between the Community and third countries,” COM (1995) 216 final (Brussels, May 1995)Google Scholar; see also “Resolution of Human Rights, Democracy and Development,” 28 November 1991, adopted by the Council, “EP, Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security, Subcommittee on Human Rights,” PE 156.345, 26 February 1992.

⁵ European Commission, “Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, The European Union ´s role in promoting human rights and democratisation in third countries,” COM (2001) 252 final (Brussels, 8 May 2001), 8Google Scholar.

⁶ See Fierro, Elena, The EU's Approach to Human Rights Conditionality in Practice (The Hague 2003), 98–102Google Scholar.

⁷ Interview with Senior EU Commission Official, Commission of the European Union, St Andrews, Scotland, 5 March 2005.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ During the “Critical Dialogue” which was launched in 1992, demands were repeatedly expressed by EU member states and the Council, which however failed to directly link improvements on the part of the Iranian government to any changes in the relationship, thus giving Tehran no incentives to comply. The “Critical Dialogue” lost much of its momentum, when in 1997, the so-called Mykonos-Verdict by a Berlin court found the Iranian government, including the Leader, guilty of ordering the assassination of Kurdish opposition leaders in Germany. Disclosed German intelligence and police reports also revealed to what extent German authorities were aware of Iranian intelligence activities across Europe from as early as 1992, but failed to intervene or influence its unconditional Iranpolitik vis-à-vis Tehran. See Kaussler, Bernd, “Defending the Satanic Verses– Constructive Engagement: British–Iranian Relations and the Right to Freedom of Expression (1989–2004),” (unpublished PhD thesis, University of St Andrews, Scotland, 2007)Google Scholar. For the most detailed list of areas of concern for the EU, see Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel, Plenarprotokoll, Deutscher Bundestag 13. Wahlperiode-104. Sitzung, Plenarprotokoll 13/104 [Plenary session of the German parliament], 9218, for the “Mykonos Verdict” see Kammergericht Berlin, http://www.kammergericht.de/entscheidungen/Strafsenate/1_StE_19–93.pdf.

¹⁰ Interview with Senior EU Commission Official, Commission of the European Union.

¹¹ Commission of the European Communities, Brussels 7/2/2001, COM (2001) 71 Final, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, “EU Relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran,” 4.

¹² Ibid., 4; see also House of Commons, Hansard, 18 July 2000, Column 199.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Commission of the European Communities, Brussels 7/2/2001, COM (2001) 71 Final, 8–9.

¹⁵ Statement by Shamsedin Khargani, Iranian Foreign Ministry – Director for Western Europe, Islamic Republic News Agency, 28 October 2002 (hereafter IRNA).

¹⁶ Iran Focus 13, no. 100 (November 2000) (Aban-Azar 1379): 13.

¹⁷ Interview with Official, European Commission – External Relations.

Human Rights & Democratization Unit, 13 April 2005; Council of the European Union, EU Annual Report on Human Rights 2003, Doc. No. 13449/03, Brussels, 10 October 2003, 39.

¹⁸ Interview with German Foreign Ministry official, Tehran, 28 August 2004.

¹⁹ Bulletin of the European Union, 6–2002, para. 1.6.78 Council conclusions on Iran.

²⁰ Bulletin of the European Union, 12–2002, para. 1.2.10 Financing of operations to promote democracy and human rights.

²¹ See Bulletin of the European Union, 10–2002, para. 1.2.4 Council conclusions on human rights in Iran

²² Report of the Special Representative of the Commission on Human Rights on the Situation of Human Rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, UN Doc. A/56/278, 10 August 2001, para. 14.

²³ Danish Institute for Human Rights, Collected Papers From the First Roundtable Under the EU-Iran Human Rights Dialogue, Tehran, 16–17 December 2002 “Discrimination and Prevention of Torture” (Copenhagen, 2003), 67–68Google Scholar.

²⁴ Ibid., 47–48.

²⁵ Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2002/42, 16 January 2002, para. 67.

²⁶ The EU Troika also pointed to Art. 38 of the Iranian Constitution which clearly prohibits the use of torture.

²⁷ Collected Papers From the First Roundtable Under the EU-Iran Human Rights Dialogue, Tehran, 16–17 December 2002, 90

²⁸ According to the Special Representative, a total of 19 students had been detained in 2001 without public trial, most of which had been subject to solitary confinement and torture. UN Doc. E/CN.4/2002/42, 16 January 2002, paras. 3; 41–44. On their release most of them publicly confessed to have plotted civil unrest. Reformist media outlets printed interviews of Majlis Deputies who criticized this treatment practiced by the judiciary. For the case of Ali Afshari, leader of the “Office to Foster Unity” and comments by Majlis Deputy, Serajeddin Mirdamadisee, see Iran Focus 14, no. 6, June 2001 (Khordad–Tir 1380): 15.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ See Iran Focus 15, no. 9 (October 2002) (Mehr-Aban 1381): 2–3.

³¹ Both bills were presented to the Majlis on 24 September 2002, see IRNA, 25 September 2002.

³² For Khatami's discourse on dogma, accountability and democracy see Mohammad Khatami, Hope and Challenge – The Iranian President Speaks, 26–27.

³³ This would have entailed the public naming and shaming of unlawful practices by conservative elements by Khatami himself as well as the call for a public referendum on constitutional changes and crucial pieces of legislation.

³⁴ Iran Focus 15, no. 9 (October 2002), (Mehr-Aban 1381): 3–4.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Interview with Elaie Koualie, Member of the Iranian Parliament (6^thMajlis), (Tehran, 27 August 2005).

³⁷ See Iran Focus 16, no. 5 (May 2003), (Ordibehesht-Khordad 1382): 14.

³⁸ Human rights problem-solving workshops had been organized by the EU to discuss the ban on torture and find alternatives to existing practices, Interview with German Foreign Ministry Official “A” (Tehran, 28 August 2004).

³⁹ See Iran Focus 16, no. 1 (January 2003), (Dey–Bahman 1831): 11; UN General Assembly Resolution, UN Doc. A/C.3/60/L.45, 2 November 2005, 2; The law bans any form of torture or violence during arrest, interrogation or custody. Ayatollah Ahmad Djannati of the Guardian Council declared in a communication to parliament that the law was in conformity with the Constitution and Islamic principles, added, however, that torture was banned in Iran through Islamic Law anyway. Iran Report, Heinrich Böll Stiftung, Nr.6/2004, 8.

⁴⁰ The value put on the life of a Muslim man at that time in Iran was US$19,000, twice as much as that of a woman. Female MPs were pressing for the bill to make women equal to men in this respect, have, however failed so far. See Iran Report, Nr. 02/2003, 8–9; After initial rejection of the bill, the Guardian Council eventually approved of if in January 2004. House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Committee, Iran – Third Report of Session 2003–2004, House of Commons HC 80, 19 March 2004, 28–29.

⁴¹ The number of Iran's Bahá'ís has been estimated at 300,000 – UN Commission on Human Rights, Report submitted by Mr. Abdelfattah Amor, Special Rapporteur, in accordance with Commission on Human Rights resolution 1995/23 Addendum Visit by the Special Rapporteur to the Islamic Republic of Iran, UN Doc.,  E/CN.4/1996/95/Add.2 (9 February 1996), para. 55.

⁴² Also referred to as “Article 90 Committee” with reference to Article 90 of the Iranian Constitution. It fulfils an ombudsman-type role and spends much of its time investigating alleged miscarriages of justice. In 2004, the UN Working Group Arbitrary Detention noted that the Commission investigated situations of arbitrary detention, Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2004/3/Add.2, 27 June 2003, para. 65 (2).

⁴³ See Commission on Human Rights, Summary Record of the 49^th Meeting, held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva on 22 April 2002, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2002/SR.49, 26 April 2002, para. 12

⁴⁴ The delegation also met with Shirin Ebadi. See House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Committee, Iran - Third Report of Session 2003–2004, House of Commons HC 80, 25–26. The bill also referred to the establishment of equal divorce rights. See House of Commons, Hansard, 1 September 2003, Column 801 W.

⁴⁵ Iran Report, Heinrich Böll Stiftung, Nr.08/2003, 7.

⁴⁶ Iran Focus 16, no. 8 (September 2003), (Shahrivar–Mehr 1382): 11.

⁴⁷ Interview with Senior Official of the Commission of the European Union; It should be noted that after the EU had managed to have the moratorium announced on stoning, several hardliners in the judiciary increased the number of public hangings in towns near Tehran see Iran Focus 16, no. 1 (February 2003), (Bahman-Esfand 1381): 3.

⁴⁸ The independence of the judiciary has been repeatedly questioned by various UN Human Rights Commission resolutions and reports by Special Procedures. In fact, Deputy Minister of the judiciary, Hadi Marvi himself stated in 2001 that “judges must obey the Supreme Leader and have no independence in judgment.” cited in Report of the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers Dato' Param Cumaraswamy, submitted in accordance with Commission resolution 2000/42, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2001/65 (1 February 2001), para. 116. For concerns raised over the political use of the judiciary, see Report of the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, Dato' Param Cumaraswamy, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2003/65/Add.1 (25 February 2003), paras. 75–81; Report of the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, Leandro Despouy, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2004/60/Add.1 (4 March 2004), paras. 58–66.

⁴⁹ Gheissari, Ali and Nasr, Vali, Democracy in Iran – History and the Quest for Liberty (Oxford, 2006), 137CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁵⁰ Iran Focus 16, no. 5 (January 2004), (Orbibehesht-Khordad 1382), 12–13.

⁵¹ Interview with Italian Foreign Ministry Official (Tehran, 2 September 2004); between 2000 and 2004 EU exports to Iran almost tripled as they increased from $4.94 billion to $14.80 billion, International Monetary Fund: Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook 2005, 36

⁵² Interview with Antonio Hernandez, Spanish Embassy (speaking on behalf of the Spanish EU Presidency in 2002) in Iran Focus 15, no. 7 (July–August 2002), (Tir-Shahrivar 1381), 7.

⁵³ For Khatami's strongest stance against Shahroudi, see Iran Focus 14, no. 10 ( November 2001), (Aban-Azar 1380), 12.

⁵⁴ Patten explained to the Iranian Foreign Ministry that the reason for the EU member states refraining from tabling a resolution at the UN General Assembly the previous year was to give the Iranians time to come up with concrete results and improvements on concerns raised during the Dialogue. He also emphasized that the same EU position cannot be expected for the UN Commission on Human Rights in Geneva. For Patten's speech in Tehran, see “The Iranian Choice- An opportunity to embrace the Family of Nations” Speech by the Rt. Hon. Chris Pattern, Tehran, 5 February 2003, in “Speeches and Viewpoints”, Iranian Journal of International Affairs, 15, nos. 1&2 (Spring–Summer 2003): 129.

⁵⁵ Khatami's response directly reflects Montesquieu's eighteenth century concept of “distributive powers”, in which a moderate constitution presupposes a certain level of interaction between powers, most notably including the executive's prerogative of vetoing certain decisions by the legislative. See Crause, Sharon, “The Spirit of Separate Powers in Montesquieu,” Review of Politics 62, no. 2 (Spring 2000): 231–232CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁵⁶ Lecture given to the Middle East Society of the University of St Andrews by Christian Leffler, Commission of the European Union, Director for External Relations with the Mediterranean and the Middle East (St Andrews, Scotland 4 March 2004). It is evident that Shahroudi's understanding of “judicial power” refers not so much to the “interpretation of law” but rather to a fulfilling a monitoring role of government and society outside the realm of the rule of law.

⁵⁷ According to the new law, the officials would have to be imprisoned if they violated the personal freedoms of citizens or deprived them of rights stated in the Constitution. See Iran Focus 16, no.1 (January 2003), (Dey – Bahman 1831): 11.

⁵⁸ See interview with Drewery Dyke, Iran Desk Officer, Amnesty International (London, 3 March 2004).

⁵⁹ UNESCO chair for human rights at Shahid Beheshti University in Tehran.

⁶⁰ Danish Institute for Human Rights, Collected Papers From the Second Roundtable Under the EU-Iran Human Rights Dialogue, Brussels, 14–15 March 2003, “Rule of Law and Fair Trial” (Copenhagen, 2003), 123.

⁶¹ The Iranian Constitution allows the Guardian Council only to veto parliamentary bills which it deems contrary to codified law but not those considered contradicting “general policies” (i.e. rulings by the Leader).

⁶² Ibid., 129–130.

⁶³ Rassekh summarized the underlying principles of Mu'tazilism as follows: (1) the principle of rationalism—that justice is determined by reason' (2) the principle of voluntarism—that man's acts are the product of his own free will (ikhtiyar); and (3) the principle of responsibility—that man would ultimately be rewarded or punished in accordance with his choice between justice and injustice. According to this Islamic school of thought, God would be committing an injustice were he to punish man, devoid of responsibility; such an act is inconceivable according to reason and is also contrary to the revealed which states that “God is never unjust unto his servants” (Qu'ran 8∶51), ibid., 164–165.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 170–171.

⁶⁵ Iran Focus 16, no. 8 (September 2003) (Sharivar-Mehr 1382), 11.

⁶⁶ Interview with Hossein Mehropur, President of the Supervisory Committee for the Implementation of the Constitution (Iranian Parliament), (Tehran 3 September 2005).

⁶⁷ Prior to this, in most courtrooms judge and prosecutor were the same person. In some instances jury, defense and counsel as well. See UN Doc. A/56/278, paras. 20–21.

⁶⁸ Ibid., para. 26; It should be noted, however, that in 2005, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution condemning Iran for the “absence of due process of law, the refusal to provide fair and public hearings, the denial of the right to counsel and access to counsel by those detained, the use of national security laws to deny human rights, the harassment, intimidation and persecution of defense lawyers and legal defenders.” UN General Assembly Resolution, UN Doc. A/C.3/60/L.45, 2 November 2005; the EU, however, welcomed the decision to separate civil and criminal courts. See Bulletin of the European Union, 3-2003, para. 1.2.4.

⁶⁹ Organized by Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) Official Harriet Austin an Iranian judiciary delegation met with the British judiciary in London in 2003. Interview with Drewery Dyke, Amnesty International.

⁷⁰ An effective NGO in this field seems to be the Organization for the Defence of Victims of Violence (ODVV), which organizes workshops for law students, judges and other judiciary officials in Tehran and at the UN Office in Geneva. Interview with ODVV Staff (Tehran, 25 August 2005).

⁷¹ The Organization for Defending Victims of Violence, Defenders, Special Issue (Spring 2005), 35 given to the author by ODVV.

⁷² For criticism from Iranian scholars on interplay of modern law and Iranian politics, see Democracy Activity Brief, “The Relationship between shari'a and the Rule of Law in Iran”, FRIDE-IWA Workshop, 6–8 February 2006, available on www.fride.org.

⁷³ Amirpur, Katajun, “The Future of Iran's Reform Movement”, in Iranian Challenges, ed. Posch, Walter, Chaillot Paper No. 89 (Institute for Security Studies/EU, Paris, May 2006), 33Google Scholar.

⁷⁴ Bulletin of the European Union, 7/8-2003, para. 1.28.

⁷⁵ Allesdandro Fallavollita, Human Rights Department, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The Right to Freedom of Expression and The Right to Development” in Danish Institute for Human Rights, Collected Papers From the Third Roundtable Under the EU-Iran Human Rights Dialogue, Brussels, 8–7 October 2003 (Copenhagen, 2004), x.

⁷⁶ On Art. 24 see Chapter III; his argument was that the Press Law provided an odd interpretation of the general rule. The law inferred that “its”—the possessive adjective referring to the “exception” mentioned in the latter part of Art. 24—was a reference to the general rule on “freedom of the press” in the first part of the Article and not a reference to the exceptions that could be taken to the rule. See Danish Institute for Human Rights, Collected Papers From the Third Roundtable Under the EU-Iran Human Rights Dialogue, Brussels, 8–7 October 2003, 29.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Ibid., 30 (i.e. restrictions to the right to freedom of expression and opinion may be imposed under Iranian law as long as they are within the framework of Article 19 of the ICPCR).

⁷⁹ See Bulletin of the European Union, EU 10–2003, para. 1.2.11. During his visit in Iran the Special Rapporteur met judiciary officials including hardliner Tehran Chief Prosecutor Abbasali Alizdeh and openly criticized their role in the restriction of freedom of speech. See Iran Focus 16, no. 10 (November 2003), (Aban-Azar 1382), 13.

⁸⁰ Report by the Special Rapporteur on the right to freedom of opinion and expression, Mission to the Islamic Republic of Iran, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2004/Add.2, 12 January 2004, para. 26.

⁸¹ Ibid., para. 27.

⁸² Ibid., para. 33.

⁸³ See Bulletin of the European Union, EU 10–2003, para. 1.2.11; UN Doc. E/CN.4/2004/Add.2, para. 95. The Special Rapporteur was invited back to Iran in 2003.

⁸⁴ UN Doc. E/CN.4/2004/Add.2, para. 43; the 5^thMajlis proposed new progressive amendments to the Press Law as early as August 2000, yet had to withdraw the bill following direct intervention by Khamenei and extrajudicial demonstrators who intimidated Majlis deputies, see UN Doc. A/53/363, para. 14–15.

⁸⁵ Iran Report, Heinrich Böll Stiftung, Nr. 10/2003, 5.

⁸⁶ UN Doc. E/CN.4/2004/Add.2, para. 43.

⁸⁷ Iran Focus 16, no. 8 (September 2003), (Shahrivar-Mehr 1382), 11.

⁸⁸ Iran Report, Heinrich Böll Stiftung, Nr.1/ 2003, 3. Though the bill was rejected by the Guardian Council on the grounds that a lift of the ban would violate Article 3 of the Iranian Constitution, there is no strict enforcement.

⁸⁹ Interview with German Foreign Ministry Official “B” (Tehran, 18 August 2004).

⁹⁰ The main target of their protest was the plight of pro-reform figure Abbas Abdi, who had been detained for publishing an opinion poll suggesting that the Iranian people favored better relations with the US. Iran Focus 16, no. 9 (October 2003), (Mehr–Aban 1382), 12. Hunger strikes on 17 and 29 September 2003 lasted one day each and, as Deputy Azam Taleghani put it, were meant to raise public awareness of the conditions and acts of torture committed in prisons. Participants also emphasized that all efforts by the Majlis had been obstructed by the Guardian Council – see Iran Report, Heinrich Böll Stiftung, Nr. 10/2003, 7. In fact, at the height of factional debate in parliament (from 2001 to May 2003 when Khatami's twin bills were rejected) a number of deputies were even summoned by the judiciary because of speeches they made during plenary sessions. The Majlis presiding board eventually decided to ignore such judicial actions and decided not to pass on the summonses to deputies as they “enjoy parliamentary immunity.” Iran Focus 16, no. 5 (May 2003), (Ordibehesht-Khordad 1382), 14.

⁹¹ It should be noted that Ayatollah Mowaheddi Kermani, Deputy Chairman for the IRGC “reminded” Majlis deputies that it was the IRGC's role in monitoring their loyalty to the velayat-e faqih (trusteeship of the jurisconsult) and Islamic principles. Given the level of power as well as the impunity the IRGC enjoys in the Iranian political system, its role in intimidating the deputies proved considerable. For Kermani's speech see Iran-Report, Nr.6 /2003, 5–6.

⁹² Written evidence submitted by Nazila Ghanea in House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Committee, Human Rights – Annual Report 2005–06. HC 574, Ev. 133.

⁹³ House of Lords, Hansard, 13 November 2003, col. 1718. Notable projects by the British government included: technical assistance relating to the rule of law and administration of law, specialised training for judges working with juveniles through the UN International Children's Emergency Fund, human rights training for young adults and a familiarization visit by five Iranian judges to the UK in 5 March 2003. See House of Commons, Hansard, col. 317 WH.

⁹⁴ See Bulletin of the European Union, 10/2003, para. 1.29.66.

⁹⁵ For Foreign Secretary Jack Straw's visit to Iran to secure Iranian commitment to play a positive role in Iraq. see IRNA, 10 June 2003.

⁹⁶ Bulletin of the European Union, 10-2003, para. 1.2.11.

⁹⁷ UN Doc. E/CN.42004/3/Add.7, 27 June 2003, 20.

⁹⁸ See Danish Institute for Human Rights, “Administration of Justice and Promotion of International Cooperation and Solidarity in the Field of Human Rights”, Collected Papers From the Fourth Roundtable Under the EU-Iran Human Rights Dialogue, Tehran, 14–15 December 2004 (Copenhagen, 2004)Google Scholar; It should be noted that the British FCO launched several projects for joint ventures with the Iranian and British Judiciary and Iranian and British Bar Associations. Together with Penal Reform International, several projects were launched in 2001 and 2002 in order to improve the administration of justice. A juvenile detention center in Tehran became the pilot project. Stated improvements included the overcrowding and alternative punishments for prison detention of people, such as drug addicts, petty offenders and economic crimes. IRNA, 13 April 2003.

⁹⁹ Out of 8,144 candidates, 3,533 (including some 80 incumbent Majlis deputies,) were disqualified by the Guardian Council from standing in the 2004 parliamentary election, prompting reformists and reform-orientated media outlets to talk about a “parliamentary coup d'état” see Iran Focus 17, no. 2 (February 2004), (Bahman–Esfand 1382), 3.

¹⁰⁰ Initial inducements offered Iran to attain “Most Favored Nations Status” as a dry run for WTO membership, Full fledged WTO membership was offered to Iran in 2004; House of Commons, Hansard, 10 January 2005, col. 37W; interview with French Foreign Office Official (Tehran, 2 September 2004).

¹⁰¹ See “Iran Commission welcomes Iran's signature of the Additional Protocol to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,” EU Press Service No. IP/03/1782, Brussels, 18 December 2003.

¹⁰² Ansari, Ali M., Confronting Iran – The Failure of American Foreign Policy and the Roots of Mistrust (London, 2006), 205Google Scholar.

¹⁰³ Only 12 percent of Tehran dwellers went to the polls, compared with a turnout of only 25 percent in other big cities. This was far lower than in any previous elections. Another reason for the reformists' failure was that four of the 18 reformist groups competed for seats on the Tehran council. Iran Focus 16, no. 3 (May 2003), (Esfand 1381–Farvardin 1382), 10.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., 4.

¹⁰⁵ See “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran Resolution adopted by the Board on 13 March 2004,” IAEA—Board of Governors, UN Doc. GOV/2004/21, 13 March 2004.

¹⁰⁶ Interview with Senior Official of the Commission of the European Union (St Andrews, 5 March 2005).

¹⁰⁷ Asian Affairs 8, no. 89 (March 2004), 10–14.

¹⁰⁸ Iran Focus 17, no. 3 (March 2004), (Esfand–Farvardin 1382), 9.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 8–9.

¹¹⁰ Shargh and Yas-e No were both shut down by the judiciary for printing excerpts of an open letter written by over 100 Majlis Deputies criticizing the Leader for approving the Guardian Council's disqualification. See http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/02/19/iran7571.htm (website accessed, 19 June 2006).

¹¹¹ The General Affairs Council mildly “regretted that many candidates, including sitting members of the Majlis were prevented from standing in the February elections, thus making democratic choice impossible,” Bulletin of the European Union, 1/2 2004, para. 1.6.122. The information on the EU tactic to get hardliners back to the negotiation table is based on interview with EU Commission Official.

¹¹² For EU humanitarian efforts in response to the earthquake see Bulletin of the European Union, 1/2–2004, para. 1.6.95.

¹¹³ The Times, 9 February 2004.

¹¹⁴ Summary of cases transmitted to Governments and replies received. Commission on Human Rights, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2005/64/Add.1, 29 March 2005, para. 468.

¹¹⁵ The reformist-intellectual discourse on human rights in Islam finds its most authoritative manifestation in Soroush's dialectics on the link between progressive Islamic jurisprudence and international human rights law. At its core, his interpretation contends that the rule of law directly corresponds to the prominent concept of logic found in Shi'a jurisprudence. Since “religious jurisprudence, however divine and historical, inevitably becomes historical and assumes a wordly application”, he argues, religious judges must be subject to public scrutiny and transparency, “so that their lapses of policy and deliberations are minimized and their transgressions are democratically restituted or retributed.” Like Iranian delegates at the round tables, Soroush's human rights discourse emphasizes the notion in Islamic law that the ruler may enforce the law but is ultimately subject to it himself. See Sbdolkarim Soroush, Reason, Freedom and Democracy – Essential Writings of Abdolkarim Soroush (Oxford, 2000), 148–162.

¹¹⁶ See General Assembly Resolution on the “Situation of human rights in Iran,” UN Doc. A/RES/61/176, (1 March 2007); Council of the European Union, “Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union.

¹¹⁷ Outcomes for both elections indicated that hardline candidates and those close to Ahmadinejad lost seats to reformers and moderate conservatives. Most notably, former president Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani gained about twice as many votes for the election for the Assembly of Experts as Ayatollah Mohammad Taghi Mesbah Yazdi who is largely considered to be Ahamdinejad's mentor. See Iran Report, Heinrich Böll Stiftung, Nr.1/ 2007, 3.

¹¹⁸ Speech by the Rt. Hon. Christopher Patten, External Relations Commissioner, “The Iranian Choice – An opportunity to embrace the Family of Nations,” European Commission Press Release SPEECH/03/56 (Tehran 5 February 2003).