¹ The disparity in names given to places in this part of the world is often a source of confusion. The name Nablus is the generally accepted term for the largest town in Samaria (the hill country north of Jerusalem). This town is, however, called in Hebrew, “Shechem”, the name by which it is generally known in the Bible. The new settlement involved in this case, was named Eilon Moreh, which is an alternative name for the Biblical town of Shechem, see Genesis 12:6; Deut. 11:30. The term West Bank is the generally recognized term for the area of the Palestinian mandate west of the Jordan River which had been held by Jordan from 1948 until the Israeli conquest of the area in 1967. Many people, however, prefer to use the Biblical designations for sections of this area, i.e., Judea and Samaria (Yehudah and Shomron in Hebrew).

² Ojeu et al. v. The Minister of Defence et al. (1978) (II) 33 P.D. 113. See also Sheik Abu Nilo et al. v. State of Israel, et al. (1973) (II) 27 P.D. 169.

³ See, e.g. Guardian of Abandoned Property v. Samariaz [1956] 10 P.D. 1825.

⁴ In the latter argument the settlers relied primarily on an analysis of the situation by ProfessorBlum, Y., “The Missing Reversioner: Reflections on the Status of Judea and Samaria,” (1968) 3 Is.L.R. 279.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

^{page 136 note 1} Nili v. Shlomi (1976) (II) 30 P.D. 3; and Tirah Co. v. Levi (1977) (II) 31 P.D. 334.

^{page 137 note 2} Nili v. Shlomi, supra n. 1 at p. 7.

^{page 137 note 3} “Simulation and Illegality” (1978) 8 Mishpatim 507.

^{page 137 note 4} 27 L.S.I. 117.

^{page 138 note 5} It is expressly provided in sec. 13 that the fact that a contract made merely for appearance sake is void “shall not affect a right acquired by a third party in bona fide reliance on the existence of a contract”.

^{page 138 note 6} Although Barak J. bases his rejection of the prior case law in this area almost exclusively on his view that after the adoption of the new contract law, the proper legal analysis of the problem is that of “contracts made merely for appearance sake” and not “illegal contracts” he also comments “incidentally” that his view concerning the possibility of enforcement of the “internal” contract after the voiding of the “external” one should also apply “even if the external contract is voided not because it is made merely for appearance sake but because of illegality. It appears to me that illegality of the external contract does not produce, as a matter of course, the illegality of the internal contract” (p. 583). However, he does not pursue this point and neither Bechor J. nor Witkon J. address it at all.

^{page 138 note 7} For the issues involved, under Israeli law, in enforcing a memorandum of understanding for a sale of land when the parties do not execute a more formal contract, see Goldstein, & Schottenfels, , “A Digest of Recent Israeli Cases” (1979) 14 Is.L.R. 382, 384.Google Scholar

^{page 139 note 8} See n. 7, supra.

^{page 141 note 1} For later discussions as to the meaning of “legal act” within sec. 1 (a) of the Agency Law, 1965 (19 L.S.I. 231) see Dadone v. Avraham (1979) (III) 33 P.D. 365.

^{page 142 note 2} Appellant contended that his stock was the only fully paid stock in Promisiones. Appellant's investment in Promisiones was $28,000, the exact sum he was to receive from respondent according to the agreement.

^{page 144 note 1} Explanation accompanying the Draft Law: The Crime Law (Eavesdropping) 1978 H.H. 1361 (1978) 301. See also Gavison, , “The Minimal Area of Privacy—Israel,” in Goldstein, , ed., Israeli Reports to the Tenth International Congress of Comparative Law (Jerusalem, 1978) 176Google Scholar and sources cited in n. 2 infra.

^{page 145 note 2} For discussions of the report of the Kahn Committee and the question of the desirability of the adoption of a statute concerning a general right of privacy, see Gavison, , “Should We Have a General Right of Privacy in Israel” (1977) 3 Is.L.R. 155CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Elman, , “Comment on the Kahn Committee Report on the Protection of Privacy” (1977) 3 Is.L.R. 172.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

^{page 145 note 3} See Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 83 S. Ct. 1381, 10 L.E. 2nd 462 (1963); U.S. v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 91 S. Ct. 1422, 28 L.E. 2d 453 (1971). See also Rathbun v. U.S., 355 U.S. 107, 78 S. Ct. 161, 2 L.E. 2d 1341 (1958).

^{page 145 note 4} 18 U.S.C.A. ch. 119.

^{page 146 note 5} See authorities cited supra n. 3. See also Enker, , “Controls on Electronic Eavesdropping—A Basic Distinction” (1967) 2 Is.L.R. 461, 462, 643.Google Scholar

^{page 146 note 6} Supra n. 1 at 302.

^{page 147 note 7} Ibid. It should be remembered that the man and woman provision was not part of the original bill and thus is not referred to in the explanatory note.

^{page 147 note 8} Moreover, it is clear that from the exception to the matters between a married couple concerning legal proceedings, that it is contemplated that matters discovered by “listening” with consent will be used in court.

^{page 148 note 9} Supra n. 1 at 305.

^{page 148 note 10} Compare the determination of questions of security needs in Dwikat et al. v. The Government of Israel et al. (the Eilon Moreh decision discussed in this digest at p. 131). Compare also sec. 44(a) of the Evidence Ordinance (new version) 1971, which provides for review by a judge of the Supreme Court of a declaration by the Prime Minister or Defence Minister that the giving of certain evidence in court “is liable to injure the security of the State”.

^{page 149 note 11} See Goldstein, and Schottenfels, , “A Digest of Recent Israeli Cases” (1979) 14 Is.L.R. 382, 387–388.Google Scholar

^{page 150 note 1} 9 L.S.I. 184.

^{page 152 note 2} 2 L.S.I. [N.V.] 288.

^{page 152 note 3} Dinei Medinat Yisrael (Nusach Chadash) No. 29, p. 567.

^{page 152 note 4} 2 L.S.I. [N.V.] 198.