Achen, C.H. (2001), ‘Why lagged dependent variables can suppress the explanatory power of other independent variables’. Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Political Methodology Section of the American Political Science Association, July 20–22, Los Angeles.
Baldini, G. and Baldi, B. (2014), ‘Decentralization in Italy and the Troubles of Federalization’, Regional & Federal Studies
Baumgartner, F.R. and Jones, B.D. (1993), Agendas and Instability in American Politics, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Baumgartner, F.R., Foucault, M. and François, A. (2009), ‘Public budgeting in the French Fifth Republic: the end of La République Des Partis?’, West European Politics
Blais, A., Blake, D. and Dion, S. (1993), ‘Do parties make a difference? Parties and the size of government in liberal democracies’, American Journal of Political Science
Blais, A., Blake, D. and Dion, S. (1996), ‘Do parties make a difference? A reappraisal’, American Journal of Political Science
Breunig, C (2011), ‘Reduction, stasis, and expansion of budgets in advanced democracies’, Comparative Political Studies
Budge, I. (2001), Mapping Policy Preferences: Estimates for Parties, Electors, and Governments, 1945-1998, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Budge, I. and Hofferbert, R.I. (1990), ‘Mandates and policy outputs: U.S. party platforms and federal expenditures’, The American Political Science Review
Busemeyer, M.R. (2007), ‘Determinants of public education spending in 21 OECD democracies, 1980–2001’, Journal of European Public Policy
Castles, F.G. and Mair, P. (1984), ‘Left–right political scales: some “expert” judgments’, European Journal of Political Research
Cotta, M. and Verzichelli, L. (2007), Political Institutions in Italy, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Cowen, T. and Sutter, D. (1998), ‘Why only Nixon could go to China’, Public Choice
Cusack, T.R. (1997), ‘Partisan politics and public finance: changes in public spending in the industrialized democracies, 1955–1989’, Public Choice
Di Palma, G. (1977), Surviving Without Governing: The Italian Parties in Parliament, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press.
Döring, H. (1995), Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe, Frankfurt/New York: Campus/St. Martin’s Press.
Döring, H. and Manow, P. (2012), ‘Parliament and government composition database (ParlGov): an infrastructure for empirical information on parties, elections and governments in modern democracies. version 12/10, 15 October 2012’. Retrieved 26 July 2013 from www.parlgov.org.
Downs, A. (1957), An Economic Theory of Democracy, New York: Harper & Row.
Eckstein, H. (1975), ‘Case study and theory in political science’, in F.I. Greenstein and N.W. Polsby (eds), The Handbook of Political Science, Reading: Addison-Welsey, pp. 79–138.
Efthyvoulou, G. (2011), ‘Political budget cycles in the European Union and the impact of political pressures’, Public Choice
Franzese, R.J. (2002), Macroeconomic Policies of Developed Democracies, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Garrett, G. and Lange, P. (1991), ‘Political responses to interdependence: what's ‘left’ for the left?’, International Organization
Granger, C.W.J. and Newbold, P. (1974), ‘Spurious regressions in econometrics’, Journal of Econometrics
Hallerberg, M. (2004), Domestic Budgets in a United Europe: Fiscal Governance from the End of Bretton Woods to EMU. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Häusermann, S., Picot, G. and Geering, D. (2013), ‘Review article: rethinking party politics and the welfare state - recent advances in the literature’, British Journal of Political Science
Hibbs, D.A. Jr. (1977), ‘Political parties and macroeconomic policy’, American Political Science Review
Imbeau, L.M., Pétry, F. and Lamari, M. (2001), ‘Left-right party ideology and government policies: a meta-analysis’, European Journal of Political Research
Jones, B.D. (2001), Politics and the Architecture of Choice, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Jones, B.D. and Baumgartner, F.R. (2005a), ‘A model of choice for public policy’, Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory
Jones, B.D. and Baumgartner, F.R. (2005b), The Politics of Attention: How Government Prioritizes Problems, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Jones, B.D., Baumgartner, F.R., Breunig, C., Wlezien, C., Soroka, S., Foucault, M., François, A., Green-Pedersen, C., Koski, C., John, P., Mortensen, P.B., Varone, F. and Walgrave, S. (2009), ‘A general empirical law of public budgets: a comparative analysis’, American Journal of Political Science
King, G., Laver, M., Hofferbert, R.I., Budge, I. and McDonald, M.D. (1993), ‘Party platforms, mandates, and government spending’, The American Political Science Review
Klingemann, H.-D., Volkens, A., Bara, J., Budge, I. and McDonald, M.D. (2006), Mapping Policy Preferences II: Estimates for Parties, Electors, and Governments in Eastern Europe, European Union, and OECD 1990-2003, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lienert, I. (2005), Who Controls the Budget: the Legislature or the Executive?, Washington, DC, International Monetary Fund.
Mair, P. (2009), ‘Representative versus responsible government’, 09/8, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, Cologne.
Marangoni, F. and Verzichelli, L. (2015), ‘From a technocratic solution to a fragile grand coalition: the impact of the economic crisis on parliamentary government in Italy’, The Journal of Legislative Studies
Nordhaus, W.D. (1975), ‘The political business cycle’, The Review of Economic Studies
Potrafke, N. (2009), ‘Did globalization restrict partisan politics? An empirical evaluation of social expenditures in a panel of OECD countries’, Public Choice
Potrafke, N. (2010), ‘The growth of public health expenditures in OECD countries: do government ideology and electoral motives matter?’, Journal of Health Economics
Ragioneria Generale dello Stato (2011), La Spesa Dello Stato Dal’unità Di Italia. Anni 1862-2009, Roma: Ministero del’Economia e delle Finanze.
Schmidt, Manfred G. (1996), ‘When parties matter: a review of the possibilities and limits of partisan influence on public policy’, European Journal of Political Research
Soroka, S.N. and Lim, E.T. (2003), ‘Issue definition and the opinion-policy link: public preferences and health care spending in the US and UK’, The British Journal of Politics and International Relations
Tavares, J. (2004), ‘Does right or left matter? Cabinets, credibility and fiscal adjustments’, Journal of Public Economics
Tsebelis, G. (1995), ‘Decision making in political systems: veto players in presidentialism, parliamentarism, multicameralism and multipartyism’, British Journal of Political Science
Tsebelis, G. (2011), Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Tsebelis, G. and Chang, E.C.C. (2004), ‘Veto players and the structure of budgets in advanced industrialized countries’, European Journal of Political Research
Volkens, A., Lehmann, P., Merz, N., Regel, S. and Werner, A. (2014), The Manifesto Data Collection. Manifesto Project (MRG/CMP/MARPOR). Version 2014b, Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB).
Wehner, J. (2006), ‘Assessing the power of the purse: an index of legislative budget institutions’, Political Studies
Wenzelburger, G. (2015), ‘Parties, institutions and the politics of law and order: how political institutions and partisan ideologies shape law-and-order spending in twenty western industrialized countries’, British Journal of Political Science
Zucchini, F. (2011), ‘Italy: government alternation and legislative agenda setting’, in B.E. Rasch and G. Tsebelis (eds) The Role of Governments in Legislative Agenda Setting, Oxon, MD and New York, NY: Routledge, pp. 53–77.