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Negative Campaigning in No-Cabinet Alternation Systems: Ideological Closeness and Blames of Corruption in Italy and Japan Using Party Manifesto Data

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 November 2011

LUIGI CURINI*
Affiliation:
Associate Professor, Department of Social and Political Studies, Università degli Studi di Milano, Italyluigi.curini@unimi.it

Abstract

Within a one-dimensional spatial framework, we deduce that parties’ incentives ‘to go negative’, by blaming alleged insufficiencies of the rival concerning commonly shared values, increase with their ideological proximity. We test our hypothesis by considering the long period of no-cabinet alternation that characterized both Italy and Japan. In particular, we focus on the (spatial) incentives of the Italian Communist Party and of the Japanese Socialist Party to emphasize on a particular topic related to negative campaigning, i.e. political corruption issues. The status of the perennial opposition held by both parties, together with the existence of several political corruption scandals during the period considered, makes the Italian and the Japanese political systems particularly apt to test our hypothesis. The results, based on data derived from electoral programs, support our theoretical insights.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2011

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